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Editorial Brief

We have in the second volume of IJMGS, articles that were peer reviewed by scholars in the field. All, but one, were presented at various times on virtual weekly webinar organized by the Centre. They were then revised and independently reviewed as part of intellectual rigour that the Journal editorial is noted for. The coverage is multidisciplinary in contents, and trans-global in analyses. The current world discourse is predicated on three main issues: health and development in the midst of ravaging COVID-19 pandemic; climate change; and food security. The commonality with the three challenges, and scholars' interrogation, is the phenomenal transdisciplinary migration and its global context. The articles in this volume are rich in contents, informative in analyses; and refreshing in evidence. They are useful in all parameters and will add value to finding solutions to some of the issues raised on all topics.

Hakeem I. Tijani
Editor

Migrants and the National Question: A Study of the Nigerian Migration Experience

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Abstract

This paper examined the proposition whether centuries of internal migration by various ethnic groups in Nigeria before, during and after colonial rule and the emergence of Nigeria as an independent nation-state has helped to achieve national unity, national identity, national integration and inclusiveness (all issues of interest to the concept of the “National Question”). The methodology adopted saw the development and distribution of 110 research questionnaires to respondents of Nigeria’s three major ethnic groups and 20 other minority ethnic groups resident in Nigeria’s capital, Abuja, through the purposive sampling technique to generate the primary data that was the basis of the data analysis in the paper. Secondary data was also generated both online and offline to support the primary data. Major findings revealed that unlike most nation-states in the industrialized North like the USA, Britain and Germany which have been able to achieve some high degree of integration and national identity from the diverse immigrants, who arrived there and largely able to resolve its National Question, Nigeria has not been able to achieve the same goal and it is still a work-in- progress. The paper recommends further constitutional action similar to the Federal Character principle and sanctions regimes to create a more enabling environment for attaining national inclusiveness.

Keywords: Migration, Internal Migration, Migrants, National Question and Migration Experience

Introduction

Historically, numerous independent kingdoms, empires and nations existed in the territories that constitute what is now contemporary Nigeria, even before the idea of a Nigerian State was conceived by the British Colonialists preceding the amalgamation of 1914 (Biose, 2018, 10). According to Biose, in Nigeria on the basis of this antecedent, internal migration is not a new phenomenon as the histories of the different ethnic groups cannot be told except in relation to migration.

Indeed, the histories of the different ethnic groups that constitute contemporary Nigeria are histories of movements and counter-movements. For instance, the Yoruba were believed to have migrated from the Middle East to Ile-Ife, the cradle of Yoruba civilisation, from where they further migrated to other subsequent Yoruba villages, towns and cities in pre-colonial Nigeria. The origin of the Binis, classified as a sub-ethnic group of the Yoruba is traced to the latter. The Itsekiri, Urhobo and some other ethnic groups around the Niger Delta are traced to Edo and Awka. While, the Bayajidda story whose offspring were the founders of the Hausa states chronicled a story of migration from Baghdad through the Sudan to pre-colonial Northern Nigeria (Davidson, 1965, p 34- 56).

In over a century from the amalgamation of 1914, to independence from colonial rule in 1960, to the civil war (1967-70), the long military interregnum and the return to civil rule in 1999, Nigeria had witnessed seismic shifts in its political configuration in which internal migration had been further spurred. Indisputably, since independence in 1960, Nigeria had the requisite

characteristics of a state namely; a defined territory, population, government, common currency and international recognition.

It however lacks the qualities of a nation. There is a clear absence of a strong feeling of affinity, what can be described as “Nigerian Nationalism” among diverse ethnic groups within the country necessitating periodic resort to force to compel some sections to remain within it. The British political theorist and philosopher, Edmund Burke (1729-1797) declared that “a nation is not governed that is perpetually to be conquered” (Mustapha, 1986, 17).

The “National Question” is a derivative of *Nationalism*, in which ethnic groups within a State are able to develop a strong feeling of the “spirit of the nation”, have a passionate buy-in, believe that it has the capacity to provide an equitable environment for individual and sub-national aspirations to be achieved (Mustapha, 1986, 18). A fundamental poser was raised by First Republic Prime Minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa at the Legislative Council in Lagos in 1947: “Since 1914, the British government has been trying to make Nigeria into one country, but the Nigerian people themselves are historically different in their backgrounds, in their religious beliefs, and customs and do not show themselves any sign of willingness to unite” (Mustapha, 1986, p.18)

In the face of these dynamics, is there a Nigerian nation? What role have internal migrants played in driving national integration and resolving the National Question? This paper will seek to examine whether the country’s long history of internal migration has blurred the lines of division, increased the prospects of integration and national unity or not.

Nigeria's Internal Migrants: A Historical Background

Internal migration of diverse ethnic groups across the territories of pre-colonial Nigeria has been impacted by a critical component of colonial rule which created the need to *define* and *delineate* the colonised peoples (ACP, 2011, 14). In Africa, the European colonial powers splintered ethnic groups into subgroups which were grouped with others to form new nation-states. However, these colonially created African states are not successors of their pre-colonial counterparts; sub-ethnic groups still retain kith and kinship ties with the others in the pre-colonial kingdoms and empires. For example, the Igbomina of Kwara in Nigeria are separated from their kin in Osun, Ibarapa are split between Oyo and Ogun, Yoruba are in Kogi and Kwara states aside from the core South West. The Ketu of Benin Republic are separated from their kin in South West Nigeria. The Hausa are spread across the seven North West states and separated from their kin from Niger and Mali (Oyeniya, 2020, 33).

Subsequently, movement by migrants across much of Africa's porous borders neither respect nor recognise these international modern-day borders created by the colonial enterprise. An analysis of these patterns of migration is therefore divided into three time periods: *pre-colonial*, *colonial* and *post-colonial* (ACP, 2011, 12).

Pre- Colonial Period

In pre-colonial Nigeria, internal migration had largely been a function of movement and counter-movements by the diverse ethnic nationalities across each other's' territories. For example, local slave trade, especially the predation of the Igbo and Ibibio areas by Itsekiri, Urhobo and Efik, led to the

displacement of thousands of Igbo and Ibibio peoples who fled into the forests to escape capture and enslavement (Davidson, 1965). This evidence also suggests that the phenomenon of internally displaced persons (IDPs) arising out of conflicts is not new to Nigeria. The use of cavalry in the 19th century Yoruba Civil War has been traced to the movements of men and merchandise from pre-colonial Northern Nigeria (Davidson, 1965, 34). There is also historical evidence of long-distance Central and Western Nigeria merchants interacting with traders in Kano and Sokoto. Clapperton, an early English explorer to pre-colonial Nigeria reported that in the 1830s herders from Sokoto were destroying farm products in Ancient Oyo which resulted in large fights. In 1830, a strong and vibrant Hausa community had been established in Iraye quarters in Ile-Ife (Davidson, 1965, 52). This evidence also suggests that farmers-herders' clashes predates modern Nigeria, and is a spin-off of our migration experience. This is further corroborated by Abner Cohen in his study of the Hausa in Sagamu entitled "Custom and Politics in Urban Africa: A study of Hausa Migrants in Yorubaland" (routledge.com).

Colonial Period

In the colonial period, there were three major developments – *the spread of Islam and Christianity, western education, and the requirement for new labour* by the European trading firms which came with colonial rule and created an internal migration trajectory from urban-rural and rural-urban areas. The missions of the two religions posted preachers, teachers, imams and pastors from one location to another, while, the siting of educational institutions in urban centres enhanced rural-urban migration. Trading firms opened shops around Lagos, Abeokuta and Ibadan, and the plantations for export crops such

as cocoa, coffee, cotton and rubber in different locations helped to create migratory labour across the country (ACP, 2011,12).

Post- Colonial Period

In the post-colonial period especially after independence in 1960, the location of industries, government offices, public and private agencies, infrastructural and development projects in urban centres, which started in the colonial period, and was continued in this period further enhanced the attraction to migrate to urban centres by migrants, especially young ones from rural areas. Economic boom and decline have also stimulated migration in post-colonial Nigeria. The oil boom in the 1970s created a boom in structural and infrastructural developments in major urban cities which led to high rural-urban migration. Conversely, an economic decline in the 1980s due to the fall in crude oil commodity prices led to the harsh structural adjustment policies (SAP) and screated a huge urban-rural drift (Adepoju, 1977, 16).

Objectives of the Study

- i. Examine the effect of internal migration on national integration in Nigeria.
- ii. Determine if the National Question in Nigeria has been resolved by the century's old migration experience of internal migrants.
- iii. Evaluate other internal migration related factors, if any, to the realisation of a Nigerian Nation.

Research Questions

1. The Nigerian Nation is thought to be directly tied to value addition by internal migration to national integration?
2. What is the impact of the centuries old Nigerian migration experience towards resolving the National Question in Nigeria?
3. Extraneous factors related to internal migration may have inhibited the realisation of a Nigerian Nation?

Methodology

Due to the need to highlight the experience of Nigeria's internal migrants to the issues of national integration, resolving the National Question and their migration experiences as related to these dynamics, primary data was generated through questionnaires distributed to 110 respondents selected through purposive sampling technique. *Empiricism* was deployed through this process to enable the researcher know firsthand the real-life experience of Nigeria's internal migrants. The rest of the literature was generated through secondary data.

Conceptual Discourse

In this analysis, there is an absolute need for the clarification of these key concepts – *Migration, Internal Migration, Migrants, Migration Experience* and *National Question*.

Migration

The literature on migration is largely tilted towards *international migration* which involves people crossing state boundaries and staying in the host state for a minimum length of time, in most cases, people internationally migrate for reasons related to work, family and study. In some other tragic circumstances, they leave due to conflict, persecution and disaster creating refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) (IOM World Migration Report, 2020, 46). Migration is a process of movement and involves action. International migration has seen the USA often cited as the best example of a nation that has created a common national identity and sense of belonging for immigrants through what is described as the concept of the *melting pot*, but yet there are variations producing a hyphenated identity such as Nigerian-American, Indian-American, Arab-American and Italian-American among others. Indeed, it is viewed from its foundation as a nation of immigrants as it has created various policies to drive inclusiveness such as the Affirmative Action and anti-segregation (IOM Report, 2020, 47).

Internal Migration

However, the focus in our study is on *internal migration*. Although, no universally accepted definition of internal migration currently exists, the consensual definition of internal migration is any temporary or permanent movement of people from one area of a country to another area of the same country for the purpose, or with the effect of establishing a new residence (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2011, 23). Nigeria's National Population Commission (NPC) in its 2010 Estimation Survey on Internal Migration

(IMS,2010, 23) defined internal migration as any change of residence that has taken place within national borders and across local government areas, but also that such movement must have lasted for a period of not less than six months.

In some other literature, a time frame of between ten days and three months, as well as any location whether or not such location lies within the same local government area as the place of habitual residence or not, have been suggested (Bilsborrow, 1987, Kingsley, 1974 quoted in ACP, 2011). On this basis, an IDP, a transferred civil servant, a graduate on National Youth Service Scheme (NYSC), a trader relocating to another area for business and so on are all internal migrants, as most often stay beyond the threshold of six months.

Given this analogy in this paper, it is safe to conclude that internal migration in what later became Nigeria is an experience transcending century spread over three historical periods – pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial. This paper seeks to examine this centuries old *migration experience* to see whether it has helped the cause of national integration. Deepak K. Mishra writing on the Indian migration experience in his treatise” Internal Migration in India” alluded to the same experience.

Migrants

Migrant is a person so described in the context of migration. It is a concept more readily applicable to international migration and there are aspects that also easily fit into description of internal migrants. There are instances where some people who have never undertaken migration are described as migrants – children born overseas are commonly called second or third generation migrants. International migrants are categorized into nine (9) groups. These

are- temporary labour, irregular, illegal or undocumented, highly skilled/business, refugees, asylum seekers, forced migration, family, return, and long-term/low skilled. Both are divided into two large groups – permanent and temporary (IOM Migration Report, 2020, 28). Both types of migrants often have a significant effect on the political economies of their localities.

Internal migrants may not be illegal, asylum seekers, irregular or undocumented but most of these other categorisations apply to them – temporary labour, forced migration (IDPs), family, business, highly skilled (public and private sector employees), and low skilled (artisans and farmers etc.) (ACP, 2011, p. 17).

Migration Experience

The concept *migration experience* refers to the fact that different causes for migration among individuals will produce different outcomes observable from a sociological perspective. For example, an internal migrant within a nation may not have the same migration experience as a political refugee going abroad, but IDPs fleeing conflict from their localities and some other refugees from conflict zones going abroad fleeing their homeland and leaving family behind may have shared experiences of psychological trauma (JRank, 2020).

National Question

The concept of the *National Question* is historical, sociological and has political and economic underpinnings. It takes off from the understanding that a nation

may not necessarily be homogeneous; it could be multi-national or heterogeneous. Its binding force is a spirit of nationalism and a strong sense of national unity – a subjective sentiment of belonging together, in spite of racial, ethnic, religious, language or cultural differences. For example, Switzerland is a nation with three races, four official languages and many local dialects. While Great Britain is made up principally of the Irish, Scots and Welsh. Both countries are bonded by strong nationalism (Anifowoshe and Enemu, 1999, 34).

This sense of nationalism is greatly enhanced by the ability to achieve this critical purpose for a state as posited by Adam Smith, “the duty of protecting subjects from injustice, that is, the duty of establishing a clear system of justice (inclusiveness)”. Herbert Spencer stressed that further when he stated that, “the state is nothing but a natural institution for preventing one man from infringing on the rights of another; it is a joint –stock protection company for mutual assistance” (quoted in Anifowoshe and Enemu, 1999).

Eastern Question

A major historical development that exposed the frailty of the National Question if not properly managed in a political system was the “Eastern Question”. The Eastern Question referred to the political crisis in the 19th century in Eastern Europe where Turkey the colonial power had conquered the Balkan Peninsula – made up of the Serbs, Romanians, Greeks and Bulgarians. Turkey lost control as these colonised peoples rebelled against Turkish political authority due to the rise of nationalism and foreign interference by the Great Powers – Britain, Russia, France and Prussia who

were competing for influence in Eastern Europe. The failure of the Turks to provide an inclusive political system that accommodated other nationalities led to the eventual revolts and *balkanisation* (break up) of the Balkan colonies (Peacock, 1971, 76).

Therefore, in any nation where the National Question is improperly managed there is always a potential threat for break away or secession by aggrieved sections that could lead to the balkanisation of a state. The case made here is to the effect that the failure of the Ottoman Empire to properly integrate and run an inclusive governance process of the various nationalities under its sovereignty under the unanswered Eastern Question which balkanized its empire could also occur in a modern state that has many nationalities which fails to integrate effectively.

Issues on Nigeria's National Question

In Nigeria, therefore, despite the centuries of internal migration and the emergence of Nigeria as an independent nation, how far has the National Question been addressed? The concept of *inclusive governance* is central to good governance and is dictated by the ideals of equity and a sense of belonging to all bonafide citizens of a state. Inclusive governance is critical because nationalities or component parts of the Nigerian Federation are not interested in the constitutional provisions of the structures to provide equity in appointments, promotions, admissions and representation but on *actual implementation*. What is the reality on the ground? How much of all these 'national cake' and largesse actually gets to the ethnic groups. The Federal Character Principle (FCP) introduced by the Murtala Administration and

enshrined in the 1979 constitution was expected to eliminate in the Public Service, ethnic domination induced by emotions, nepotism, tribalism and gerontocratic traditionalism (Idike et al, 2019, 46). Similarly, the Quota System admissions policy into public schools was expected to liberalise and provide an inclusive admissions policy for all ethnic groups.

The constitutional creation of the Federal/State structure, the creation of the Federal Character Commission (FCC), the strenuous debate and effort to break the indigene/settler dichotomy, the unofficial six geopolitical zones structure and North-South Rotational policy for nomination of candidates to elective positions adopted by political parties since 1999 are all parts of efforts to create a sense of belonging for all nationalities within the Nigerian political space (Idike, 2019, 47).

Sir Tafawa Balewa according to *The Hansard* (March 20- April 2, 1947) declared that, “Since the amalgamation of Southern and Northern Provinces in 1914, Nigeria has existed as one country only on paper...it is still far from being united, Nigeria’s unity is only a British intention for the country” (Mustapha,1986, p.36). The Western Nigeria Premier, Chief Obafemi Awolowo echoed a similar sentiment as published in *Path to Freedom* (1947), “Nigeria is not a nation: it is a mere geographical expression. There are not ‘Nigerians’ in the same sense that there are ‘English’ or ‘Welsh’ or ‘French’; the word ‘Nigeria’ is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not” (cited in Mustapha,1986,36).

Theoretical Underpinning

It is generally accepted in migration studies that the dominant theory is that of Ernest Ravenstein's "Push- Pull theory" which he developed in his "Laws of Migration" (1889). Many subsequent theorists followed in Ravenstein's footsteps, and the current theories are more or less variations of his conclusions (Piche, 2003). This paper focused its theoretical underpinning on Wilbur Zelinsky's (1971) *theory of mobility*. Zelinsky argued that migration is mostly interlinked with demographic expansion as throughout history; each society had developed reproduction strategies by combining the reproductive mechanisms of fertility, mortality and migration (Piche, 2003). Of the four stages outlined by Zelinsky in his theory, this paper narrowed its interest to the second stage that has to do with the extent that internal migration of ethnic groups in Nigeria over time at the *urbanizing/industrial* stage had been concerned with the demographic expansion of settler communities wherever they were found. More came from their ancestral land to join those who already had a foothold in the host communities and soon through rapid reproduction they were competing in numbers with indigenous communities. This later became a source of resentment and potential conflict.

Methodology

Several centuries after, despite the migration experience of Nigerians and the numerous policies and efforts at inclusiveness, do some or most Nigerians still feel like outsiders? Is there really a Nigerian nation that has been able to resolve the National Question? We sought to provide some answers through

the data analysis provided by the distribution of questionnaire made up of 5 questions.

110 questionnaires were distributed to Abuja based respondents selected through *purposive sampling* in which the researcher deliberately distributed 30 questionnaires each to Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa (the 3 major ethnic groups or the tripod on which Nigeria stands according to popular perception), 20 others were given to minorities (at 2 each) – Ijaw, Tiv, Urhobo, Jukun, Egbira, Bolewa, Angas, Kanuri, Ette and Bajju. As had been clearly stated in the abstract on the methodology, this is not an omnibus survey that cuts across Nigeria, but through purposive sampling targeted at Abuja, the nation's capital alone. By the provisions of the 1976 Federal Military Government Decree (Decree No.4, 1976) which created the new Federal Capital – the original inhabitants and indigenes were the Gwari ethnic stock. Every other ethnic nationality which subsequently came to seek for work, relocating for business opportunities or other reasons were migrants of a kind. The other important explanation for this approach is that though the respondents are based in Abuja they are from different states of the Federation so on the basis of their experiences they were also asked to show how much they think that their ethnic groups have been integrated in an inclusive process in their home states in the light of the controversy over such issues as indigene/settler dichotomy and constitutional provisions such as the Federal Character principle which explains the responses in Tables 3, 4 and 5.

Data Analysis and Findings

Table 1: Configuration of Ethnic Groups (Respondents)

ETHNIC GROUPS	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Hausa	30	27.2
Igbo	30	27.2
Yoruba	30	27.2
Ijaw	2	1.8
Tiv	2	1.8
Urhobo	2	1.8
Jukun	2	1.8
Egbira	2	1.8
Bolewa	2	1.8
Angas	2	1.8
Kanuri	2	1.8
Ette	2	1.8
Bajju	2	1.8
Total	110	100

Source: Field Survey, 2020

Table 2: Employment Profile

OPTION	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Unemployed	15	13.6
Self- employed	26	23.6
Private Sector	18	16.3
Public Sector	51	46.3
Total	110	100

Despite the disparity in the proportion between those who are informally and formally engaged in the national economy, there seems to be some subsequent alignment in the responses between both cleavages on the mutual issues of integration and inclusiveness.

Table 3: The settler/indigene dichotomy has been largely resolved to provide equal opportunities for you and your children anywhere in the country (either in the FCT or your home state) despite the failure of the constitution to address it?

OPTION	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Strongly agree	5	4.5
Agree	2	1.8
Undecided	3	2.7

Strongly disagree	92	83.6
Disagree	8	7.2
Total	110	100

Source: Field Survey, 2020

90.8% respondents do not think that the settler/indigene dichotomy has been resolved.

Table 4: You feel very *Nigerian* and have a sense of belonging and national unity from your experience (either in the FCT or your home state) because discrimination is no longer an issue in your interaction with other ethnic groups?

OPTION	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Strongly agree	3	2.7
Agree	7	6.3
Undecided	1	0.9
Strongly disagree	96	87.2
Disagree	3	2.7
Total	110	100

Source: Field Survey, 2020

About 90% still believe discrimination is an issue in their interaction with members of other ethnic groups.

Table 5: Constitutional provisions such as the Federal Character principle, Quota system and Federalism as a system of government have created an inclusive and equitable environment for you to achieve your aspirations as a Nigerian (either in the FCT or your home state)?

OPTION	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Strongly agree	20	18.1
Agree	18	16.3
Undecided	0	0
Strongly disagree	61	55.4
Disagree	11	10
Total	110	100

Source: Field Survey, 2020

Over 65% do not have a favourable impression of the integrative influence of the listed policies, but almost 40% think they have a positive effect on the search for integration and inclusiveness.

Table 6: There is a visible evidence of Nigerian nationalism as a sense of national unity and identity has been created due to an equitable sharing of national resources and opportunities for your nationality from your experience (either in the FCT or your home state)?

OPTION	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Strongly agree	12	10.9
Agree	14	12.7
Undecided	4	3.6
Strongly disagree	50	45.4
Disagree	30	27.2
Total	110	100

Source: Field Survey, 2020

72.6% view negatively the idea of a Nigerian nationalism faulting that on inequitable sharing of national resources and access to opportunities.

Table 7: The National Question (meaning fair and equitable opportunities in the political, economic, and social spheres, and public service for all ethnic groups) is no longer an issue as the Nigerian nation has emerged to address concerns of group marginalisation (either in the FCT or your home state)?

OPTION	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Strongly agree	9	8.1
Agree	15	13.6
Undecided	2	1.8
Strongly disagree	72	65.4

Disagree	12	10.9
Total	110	100

Source: Field Survey, 2020

76.3% affirmed that the National Question still remains unresolved with its potentials as a disaggregative factor against nation-building.

Findings:

1. Nigerians sampled in this survey believe that despite centuries of migration and co-habitation the settler/indigene dichotomy (a barrier to real inclusiveness) is still an issue in inter-ethnic relations based on their experience, and that despite the centuries old migration experience and processes, real integration and inclusiveness is yet to be achieved.
2. Discrimination according to the respondents in interaction between ethnic groups in group relations has had a negative influence in failing to create a sense of belonging and national unity.
3. The survey revealed that despite constitutional provisions and policies such as the Federal Character principle there has been a noticeable failure in effective implementation, and Federalism as a governance mechanism has largely not been able to create the desired level of integration and inclusiveness.
4. Nigerian nationalism, according to the respondents has failed to gain traction because a good number of Nigerians believe there has not been

an equitable sharing of national resources and access to opportunities in the nation's political economy.

5. The National Question in Nigeria is still unresolved because majority of Nigerians sampled in this survey think that the goals of national integration and inclusiveness (stem the tide of marginalisation) which are expected to have been addressed are still intractable.
6. The Nigerian migration experience as shown in this research has failed to serve as a catalyst for national integration. Unlike in most other states in Europe who have overcome the artificial barriers of religion, marriage, indigenous customs, practices and other peculiarities, migration has not been a useful instrument in nation building in Nigeria.

Conclusion:

The study has so far shown that the goal of the Nigerian migration experience to build Nigeria as a nation is still work-in-progress as several centuries of internal migration and constitutional and political measures since independence in 1960 have not yet created the desired sense of belonging, national unity, national identity, integration and inclusiveness for its diverse nationalities. These are the requirements needed to resolve the dilemma of the National Question as far as it concerns the Nigerian State.

Recommendations:

1. Further constitutional interventions like the Federal Character principle in the 1979 constitution should be considered by the current National Assembly to abrogate the settler/indigene dichotomy by legalising *state of residence* as an additional qualification to *state of origin* for access to national opportunities.
2. A sanctions regime should be put in place against violators of the implementation requirements for Federal Character principle, Quota system and other such policies meant to provide a level playing field and equitable access to recruitments, appointments, promotions, and admissions into the Public Service and Public Schools respectively which are now observed to be more in the breach in this regard.
3. Resolving the National Question is an incremental process that could be achieved by concrete pro-active policies and actions on the ground to promote national unity, integration and inclusiveness rather than mere lip service.

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Virtual Migration: Policy Consideration for Quality Teaching and Learning in Nigerian Higher Educational Institutions

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Abstract

Technological advancement before the advent of the pandemic introduced different applications for online meetings which have also been found very useful for virtual teaching and learning. In Nigeria, virtual learning is not a new phenomenon in the education system because there are higher educational institutions such as National Open University which offer Open, Distance, and e-Learning (OD&eL) mode of educational delivery. As a result of the lockdown occasioned by COVID-19 pandemic, schools were completely shut and academic activities ceased, at least, for some period of time. The need to ensure continuous learning thus made several institutions of learning to migrate online. The main thrust of this paper therefore is to discuss areas that require the strengthening of policies in the quest for quality teaching and learning in Nigeria's higher educational institutions en route virtual migration. The genesis of Corona virus globally and in Nigeria was

discussed. Discussions on some relevant concepts such as quality teaching and learning, virtual migration, and so on were also brought to the fore. Factors that are necessary for implementing effective virtual migration in higher institutions like vision and plans, students and staff support, copyright and intellectual property law were also highlighted. The paper underscored some areas where policies are to be strengthened in an attempt at transiting to a virtual institution. Finally, the paper recommended among others that higher educational institutions need the full support of the government in terms of making concrete policies and funding appropriately, this would help augment quality teaching and learning in the school.

Keywords: Quality teaching, Quality learning, Virtual migration, Virtual pedagogy, Virtual literacy

Introduction

The pandemic, 'Coronavirus' is no longer new to the academic world or the global entity. It is a virus which has succeeded in disrupting the economy, health, and the education sectors. Coronavirus, simply known as COVID-19 originated from Wuhan, China in the year 2019. It is an infectious disease ranging from common cold to more severe diseases, which in some cases has led to death. The hit of the virus was impromptu, and it was never envisaged that a virus could attack a country, transmit to other countries and cause a total lockdown for months all over the world.

Researches done after the advent of the pandemic brought to knowledge that in history, a similar situation had happened in the 19th Century but fortunately did not end up being a global pandemic. It was known as the first influenza

pandemic in 1918 and was called the Spanish influenza, it however, unavoidably claimed many lives (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2018). The inception of coronavirus transformed the family, the society, the community, the nation, and the entire world in relation to hygiene, businesses, health, and education.

According to United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation, UNESCO (2019), research has brought to limelight the positive and negative impacts of COVID-19 to the world, especially to the education system. Besides, the downturn of the economy at large, deaths and total lockdown experience, COVID-19 birthed digital transformation in all sectors stretching from the developed nations to the underdeveloped ones. Digitization in the developed countries is not new because they embrace and create room for innovations, creativity, and advancement. On the other hand, developing and underdeveloped nations find it hard to finance innovations and embrace changes brought about by technological advancement.

Technological advancement before the advent of the pandemic introduced different applications for online meetings which have also been found very useful for virtual teaching and learning, common examples are Zoom, Google Meet, Microsoft Teams, Skype, et cetera. These applications help to foster communication even while at different places at the same time. Virtual learning is not also a new phenomenon in the education system here in Nigeria because there are higher educational institutions which offer open-distance and e-learning, such as the National Open University of Nigeria (henceforth,

NOUN). Nevertheless, with the COVID-19 crisis, it became a new dimension of learning for basic and senior secondary education.

In order to combat the spread of the infectious disease, the governments of various countries had to announce a compulsory and complete lockdown for some months which was to be strictly adhered to by the citizens of the country. This lockdown affected schools and offices, including markets and businesses. Developed countries were however able to continue teaching and learning virtually, meetings were also organised virtually, every activity became digitized in order not to stop the flow of communication and networking necessary for the day-to-day existence of man. The reverse seemed to be the case in most of the developing and under-developed nations.

As a result of the lockdown caused by COVID-19, schools were completely locked and academic activities ceased, these had a negative influence on students' attitudes and behaviours at home and in the community (UNESCO, 2019). In the quest to continue learning even during the pandemic, schools decided to transit virtually with the use of such means as WhatsApp, radio and television for the less-advantaged living in remote areas of the country. Unfortunately, for higher institutions (specifically for universities) in Nigeria, the Academic Staff Union of Universities(ASUU) had some unresolved issues with the government that led to a comprehensive and total strike action for a period of nine months which made it impossible for learning to take place within that period either conventionally or virtually, at the NOUN, which is the only Open, Distance, and e-Learning-dedicated Institution in the country.

The management of private universities in Nigeria tried to prevent continuous loss of academic session and so, decided to continue teaching and learning virtually for their students. In the same vein, the management of some public universities, like the University of Lagos, were undergoing reformation to create learning Moodle that would help to accelerate teaching and learning immediately ASUU suspended her nine-months old strike action.

It should be noted that the quality of a school depends on many factors, which include the school management. There are two forces that control the management of higher educational institutions, namely the external and the internal control. The external control body involves the government through different bodies in charge of policy making for higher institutions, that is, National Universities Commission (NUC) the control body for Universities; National Board for Technical Education (NBTE), the control body for Polytechnics and Monotechnics; and National Commission for Colleges of Education (NCCE), the body in control of Colleges of Education in Nigeria. On the other hand, the internal control system is made up of the principal officers and the Senate which serve as the decision-making entities for the growth and progress of the school. The quality of a school management can be portrayed through the mechanism in which solutions can be proffered in difficult situations, example is the COVID-19 pandemic which has caused unrest in the educational sector. The ingenuity of a school management made it possible for learning to continue even while students were in different homes.

Broadly speaking, quality management of higher educational institution would help to deliver robust quality teaching-learning services to its loyal customers (Ali & Shastri, 2010; Farouq, Akhtar, Ullah, & Memon, 2007), boost workers' self-esteem, ensure constant institutional growth, good quality from the perspective of the customers, fill the lacuna amongst faculties' functions and promote team-work. Digitization of the educational sector must be totally embraced by the school management in order to make teaching-learning not only continuous, interactive, and problem solving, but also of good quality.

COVID-19 Pandemic in Nigeria

In Nigeria, the first index case of COVID-19 was first reported by the Federal Ministry of Health (FMH) on February 27, 2020. The case was made possible by an already-infected Italian citizen who works in Nigeria and returned from Milan, Italy to Lagos on the 25th of February 2020. Later, the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control, NCDC (2020) reported over 50 confirmed cases throughout the country within two months.

The second wave of the pandemic in the country started early December 2020 as in most parts of the world. Specifically, on the 23rd of December 2020, 1,133 new confirmed cases and 5 deaths were recorded in Nigeria. These 1,133 new cases were reported from 18 States namely – Lagos (397), FCT (357), Kaduna (81), Plateau (63), Katsina (46), Sokoto (32), Oyo (28), Ogun (21), Kano (19), Rivers (18), Osun (13), Edo (12), Niger (12), Bayelsa (11), Borno (11), Bauchi (8), Jigawa (2), and Ondo (2).

New confirmed cases of COVID-19 in Nigeria reported on March 30, 2021 were 121, spread across the following States: Lagos-40, FCT-15, Katsina-12, Kaduna-11, Imo-8, Kebbi-8, Nasarawa-8, Delta-7, Edo-3, Osun-3, Rivers-3, Ekiti-1, Jigawa-1, Kano-1, The statistics released from the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control showed that 167,762 cases had been confirmed, 151,532 cases had been discharged while 2,056 deaths had been recorded in 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory by March 31, 2021. Table 1 shows detailed statistics of COVID-19 pandemic by States in Nigeria.

Table 1:

Statistics of COVID-19 Pandemic by States in Nigeria

SN	States	No. of Laboratory Confirmed Cases	No. of Cases on Admission	No. Discharged	No of Deaths
1	Lagos	57,634	205	56,990	439
2	FCT	19,632	1,428	18,041	163
3	Plateau	9,024	36	8,931	57
4	Kaduna	8,932	59	8,808	65
5	Rivers	6,912	26	6,786	100
6	Oyo	6,838	491	6,224	123
7	Edo	4,878	11	4,682	185
8	Ogun	4,617	105	4,463	49
9	Kano	3,909	26	3,773	110
10	Ondo	3,172	1,029	2,080	63
11	Kwara	3,083	214	2,814	55
12	Delta	2,606	791	1,744	71
13	Osun	2,530	29	2,449	52
14	Nasarawa	2,333	1,947	373	13
15	Enugu	2,237	285	1,923	29
16	Katsina	2,095	31	2,030	34
17	Gombe	2,030	3	1,983	44
18	Ebonyi	2,007	24	1,951	32
19	Anambra	1,909	64	1,826	19

20	Akwa Ibom	1,765	290	1,461	14
21	Abia	1,665	1	1,643	21
22	Imo	1,650	21	1,592	37
23	Bauchi	1,521	3	1,501	17
24	Borno	1,327	89	1,200	38
25	Benue	1,188	575	591	22
26	Adamawa	1,051	745	274	32
27	Niger	930	496	417	17
28	Taraba	910	24	864	22
29	Ekiti	866	19	836	11
30	Bayelsa	852	22	804	26
31	Sokoto	774	1	745	28
32	Jigawa	519	18	485	16
33	Kebbi	450	42	392	16
34	Cross River	366	1	348	17
35	Yobe	313	20	284	9
36	Zamfara	232	3	221	8
37	Kogi	5	0	3	2

Source: Nigeria Centre for Disease Control, [NCDC], March 31, 2021

The States were arranged in order of magnitude.

Conceptual Clarifications

There are some key concepts which must be clarified for broader understanding of this paper. Some of these concepts include quality management, virtual pedagogy, virtual literacy, and virtual skills

Quality Teaching and Learning

Probably there is no other topic in education which generates so much discussion and controversy as 'quality'. A substantial discussion around the meaning of quality took place around 20 years ago within the field of higher education, and views still differ about what quality is and how it should be obtained (Stensaker, 2007). Quality teaching and learning is linked to the structural and process characteristics of educational systems. Importantly, the role of education policies, of schools and of teachers in promoting high student performance is increasingly recognised (IEA, 2016; Hanushek & Woessmann, 2014).

Although the word "quality" is a broad concept which could mean different things to different people, according to Anastasia and Maria (2017), it is not only connected to the concept of superiority and excellence, but also a state of perfection. The Concise Oxford Dictionary simply put quality as a degree of excellence, Defoe and Juran (2010) further referred to it as fitness for purpose while Goetsc and Davis (2010) defined it as a constantly changing state which has to do with products, services, people, processes and environment that meets or exceeds expectations and helps generate superior value. Quality teaching and learning within the context of this paper means teaching and learning methods that successfully help learners develop the knowledge and skills they will require in a digital age.

The standardized definition of quality has to do with all the indices of a product/service that the customer deprived satisfaction from and as well in accordance with any regulations associated with such products or services

(Tzvetelin, 2006). Quality management is one of the several stages of quality, the rest being quality control, quality assurance, and total quality management (TQM). Quality management connotes is the totality of activities that the higher institution managers execute to drive home the organisational excellent policy, such activities may include quality higher educational planning, quality educational control, quality assurance and quality educational improvement. According to Loughran (2018), quality in teaching and learning requires an ability to:

- i. Create a need to know in the students so that they can be genuinely engaged in learning. In other words, knowing how to create an invitation to students to learn so they develop curiosity and interest in a subject is crucial.
- ii. Develop ways to engage a diversity of learners at the same time. This, despite the inevitable variety of entry points to engagement in a subject, range of levels of interest, motivation and attitudes to the content, and perceived ability and style of learning. This is demanding work.
- iii. Draw out and use students' prior knowledge. Students don't enter the classroom as a blank slate. They come with pre-existing ideas, views, opinions, experiences and 'alternate facts!' that a teacher must be able to draw out and work with in order to build meaningful learning.
- iv. Conceptual understanding of content. A strong indication of a deep knowledge of a subject is evident in a person's conceptual understanding, and that goes well beyond simply 'knowing the facts'. Working at the big-picture level means a teacher must know how to conceptualise the central ideas that shape deeper understandings of a subject.

v. Building trusting relationships and safe learning environments. Just as quality can be seen in the way a teacher creates a dynamic relationship between teaching and learning, the same exists in the trusting relationships that must be fostered and developed between teacher and student(s), as well as student to student.

Virtual Migration

The concept of Virtual Migration is credited to Aneesh (2006) who described it as transforming “body shopping” – physical – to virtual machines eliminating human contacts. It is an expanding transnational space where globalization married programming code. According to Tijani (Tijani, et al., 2020) virtual migration is an uncommon concept among stakeholders within Nigeria and Sub Saharan Africa; and it gains steam in Digitisation of African universities. It is an exciting and innovative decolonization of migration emphasizing how software flows replace people flows.” Tijani then defined virtual migration as the non-physical movement of operations through automation and technology using applications and code to guide against vulnerability to cyber-attacks or compromise.

Virtual migration within the context of this paper however refers to the transition of academic activities, either in part or wholly, from physical to online, especially during pandemic so as to prevent learning disruption, using modern technologies. It is the mobilisation of information and communication technologies from physical environment, where meaningful teaching-learning activities are being threatened to online environment in order to prevent learning disruption due to the pandemic. It is the same as virtual transition.

Virtual Pedagogy

Virtual pedagogy simply means the method and practice of teaching that is carried out non-physically and course content accessed or stored by means of a computer through a network or Internet. It is a type of learning that strictly has to do with online courses or online environment. In this type of learning, the students and lecturers are physically separated. Students may access the course materials in real time or at a later hour. It reduces or abolishes the need for the lecturer and the student to have physical contact in an enclosed centre or classroom. This type of learning could come in several ways which include computer-based, internet-based, remote teacher online, blended learning, and facilitated virtual learning.

The computer-based virtual pedagogy is that in which instruction is supplied not by the lecturer but by installed software, this software can often personalise the contents to fit the personal needs of individual learner. Another form of virtual pedagogy that is closer to the computer-based is the internet-based; the major difference is that the software supplies instruction to learners via a web and it is stored on a remote server. In the remote teacher online pedagogy, instruction is supplied through the teacher in absentia; interaction between the learner and the lecturer is through the Internet in form of an online video, online groups, e-mail or real-time messages.

The virtual pedagogy that mixed both traditional physical interaction with the computer or internet-based or remote virtual pedagogy is the blended learning. Instruction in the blended learning may spring from two sources which is the face-to-face classroom teacher and any of the virtual forms of

learning. The facilitated virtual pedagogy is facilitated by a person; the facilitator does not control the learners' instruction but only assist them in the learning process through supervision. This type of pedagogy could be computer-based, internet-based or remote lecturer internet instruction.

Virtual Literacy

Virtual literacy is the ability of the lecturer and the learner to be able to use information and communication technology effectively. The American Library Association defined it as the competence in using information and communication technologies to locate, evaluate, create and communicate information requiring cognitive and technical skills. Virtual literacy goes beyond sending and receiving instant messages, a learner might be able to send instant messages and not be virtually literate, virtual literacy is all encompassing. A virtually literate learner must have some fundamental skills for online learning, some of these skills according to Bigne, Badenes, Ruiz and Andreu (2018) include web writing skills, persistence, effective time management skills, effective and appropriate communication skills, basic technical skills, motivation and independence and a good study environment.

Enabling Factors for Effective Implementation of Virtual Migration

The outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic has forced the world to migrate from in-person traditional way of learning to virtual teaching and learning. The teaching-learning activities of over 1.6 billion, which accounted for over 91% of the global student population have been disrupted, and this has surged the demand for virtual teaching and learning experiences. Devaney, et al., (2020) reported that there were over 10.3 million enrolments in online

courses from the same locality within the last 30 days. The inability to give in-person learning has made higher institutions of learning to make available continued uninterrupted academic activities through remote teaching. Migrating to virtual learning comes with its own demands. Maria (2020) highlighted the following six factors that serve as prerequisites for implementing virtual transition in higher institutions:

1. **Vision and Plans:** The first prerequisite for a successful transition to virtual learning is to have a clear vision and plans; this will enable the college faculty and other supporting staffs to have the knowledge of the change in organisational culture (Hache, 2000). The vision and plans should cover a wide range of areas such as administrative support framework, learners' services, ICT support, training of faculty and making available the required supports to make the migration smooth. According to Berge and Mrozowski (2001), the major important phase for transiting to a well-run and organised virtual learning is the planning phase, it is a phase that determines how judiciously money is going to be spent in purchasing a strong software package that will have a long life span than purchasing the same software yearly.
2. **Curriculum:** Virtual learning is a unique and logical area of education that goes beyond the known method of teaching. It dwells more on modern method of content delivery and pedagogical principles. The virtual learning curriculum requires the lecturer to move away from their traditional instructional design such as interactive lectures, small group projects, and closed laboratory work which is mostly seen by many as the only way that a course could be delivered. Anderson and

Middleton (2002) added that some lecturers have not yet adequately upgraded to the advances provided by the advent of technology through PowerPoint presentations and other multimedia.

3. **Staff Training and Support:** Another key prerequisite for virtual transition is the training and support needed by instructors so they can be motivated to adopt and embrace this new method of teaching. The instructors must be taken through a routine training on how the virtual platform can be accessed and how their course materials can be implemented in the new teaching and learning environment. The dynamic of knowledge calls for new advanced and original methods of curriculum development which faculties must be conversant with through on the job training.
4. **Student Services:** For effective virtual transition, focus should also be on the students and not on technology alone. Moore and Kearsley (1996) submitted that technology cannot be brought to teaching pedagogy without changing the ways other things are done in the teaching process.
5. **Student Training and Support:** Fink (2002) suggested that students who are not ready for the virtual transitioning can negatively influence other students who may be willing. Students are more likely to succeed and the overall purpose of virtual transition achieved when there is adequate provision for a support system such as online tutoring, online

counselling, and online study group. Those students who do not know how to do virtual/online classes or the use of the Internet to download a file should be trained and supported.

- 6. Copyright and Intellectual Property:** The major aspect of law that is grossly connected with educational institutions especially during virtual transition is the copyright law. The Nigeria copyright law (Cap 28, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria) allows the holder of the copyrighted works to reproduce the work in any material form and publish the work. It is one of the two domains of intellectual property law. Downloading any work without permission is a copyright violation. Copyright permission must be duly sorted out when materials are being downloaded.

Some Administrative Areas for Policy Consideration

In any learning environment, learners ought to have a good understanding of what the teacher anticipates from them, just as what they can anticipate from the teacher. This then calls for effective policy guidelines that will ensure a hitch-free virtual learning. Ideally, a course prospectus additionally presents general rules used to regulate the course, for example, an attendance policy, and a grading policy that clarifies how students' learning outcomes will be assessed.

1. Student Privacy Policies

Privacy policies and related procedures that protect a student's legal right to privacy and confidentiality. Most educational institutions in the United States

have a student privacy policy. This can be done by restricting access to a students' course sites so that gate-crashers cannot see the resources that reside there, as well as students' discussion responses. In the United States, for instance, most institutions of higher learning have student privacy policy. This practice has to be observed in Nigeria.

2. Attendance Policy

A set of principles strategy should address participation prerequisites. Simultaneously, taking participation in an e-learning environment, particularly in an absolutely online course, is more hazardous than in a conventional learning environment. Participation required in e-learning activities can be construed as attendance in an e-learning course. Non-attendance like inability to answer to email or take part in a conversation, for instance – is absence of participation. Perhaps the best procedures to advance participation in e-learning exercises is to ensure that participation counts towards a learner's grades.

3. Discussion Policy

The term 'discussion' is used to denote both chats and forums. A discussion policy contains rules governing one's engagement with students in chats and forums including the degree to which one will also get involved in students' discussions. For instance, a few teachers partake in a conversation after all the students have gotten an opportunity to react. If one uses this approach, it has to be explicitly stated, so students will not anticipate more regular participation from their teacher.

4. Assignment Policy

Clear rules regarding written assignments are significant and need to be clearly stated, partially in light of the fact that they decrease students' frustration when preparing assignments. Furthermore, they are also important on the grounds that they can lessen the amount of emails students will send to you requesting explanation.

5. Submission Policy

Establish guidelines about how students should submit completed assignments. For instance, if an assignment is sent by e-mail, there should be a policy directing them to place their full names, course code, and a brief assignment identifier both in the subject line of the e-mail and in a prominent heading on any attachments. Students could also be asked to place assignments in a course site storage area where you have read and write privileges and students have only write privileges. Likewise, emphasize that you will acknowledge documents only if they are without infection and in a format that conforms to your software standards policy.

6. Cheating and Plagiarism Policy

A code of conduct policy should address cheating and literary theft. The teacher should post institutional approaches on cheating and copyright infringement and related punishments as a component of her/his online student implicit policy.

7. Intellectual Property Rights Policy

The Internet makes it extremely simple to acquire and utilize work created by others, thus easy to commit their rights to such work. An intellectual property

rights policy enables teachers and students to understand and prevent illegal use of the intellectual property of others.

Conclusion and Recommendations

*Virtual learning which is a learning experience that is mediated through the use of computers and additionally the web both outside and inside the facilities of the educational institutions has come to stay. It has been found to be highly indispensable, if learning disruptions have to be prevented. **Virtual learning** is that type of learning that can functionally and effectively occur without conventional study environments (Simonson & Schlosser, 2006).*

The world has become a digital economy which implies that in order to move along the cycle, one must allow for personal development alongside the updated changes in the digital world. This makes it pertinent for the school management to ensure that all and sundry embraces digitization in the school. *Based on the main thrust and discussions of this paper, it is therefore recommended that:*

1. Government should fully support higher educational institutions in terms of making concrete policies and funding appropriately, which would help augment quality teaching and learning in the school.
2. Every stakeholder in the education industry should embrace virtual learning and thus, change their attitudinal dispositions towards it by doing away with “It cannot work” orientations. It has become the way to go in the new normal.

3. There should be effective synergy and collaboration between higher educational institutions and network providers to find a means of reducing data cost for educational purpose.

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**Migration on The Health of School-Age Children and Adolescents: The
Pivotal Role of Health Education**

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Abstract

There is no doubt migration impacts the health of individuals physically, mentally, and socially. Conditions surrounding the migration process can increase the vulnerability to ill health especially when the migration is involuntary, fleeing natural or man-made disasters. Children and adolescents are vulnerable group and conditions affecting health status increase migration risk of children This is paper is aimed at highlighting the impact of migration on the health of this vulnerable group as well as positioning health education as a tool to ameliorate the outcome of the health effect of migration on this group (children and adolescents). A comprehensive review of the literature was conducted on the associations between migration and health of school-age children and adolescents. Publications in standard outlets were examined using the following keywords: migration, vulnerable group in health, children migrants, adolescent migrants, health education for migrants, health impact on migrants in International Organization for Migration (IOM), PubMed, iSi, related base journals, some standard textbooks, as well as the researcher's observations on migrants between 2010 and 2020. These articles were critiqued to arrive at the analysis and recommendations of this review. The findings revealed that Child and adolescent migration appear to be on the increase despite the health impact of migration on this vulnerable group. Also, migrant children, are more prone to physical, mental, and social health conditions than non-migrant children. They also experience respiratory infections, skin infections. and gastrointestinal illnesses because of poor living conditions, suboptimal hygiene, and deprivation during migration, and they lack access to proper health care. Creative health education was highlighted as a means of giving information, collaboration and advocacy that can help to bridge gaps in knowledge on health conditions experienced by this group of migrants and their families.

It is recommended that all countries should have active policies to bridge the gap of inequalities between migrants and non-migrants in different countries.

Keywords: Migration, children & adolescents' migration, health of children migrants, health education

Introduction

Migration may be defined as the movement of living beings (animals also migrate) from one location to another driven by economic (greener pasture), educational, safety (security) and natural disaster (WHO 2020) a. There are basically two types of migration: local (e.g., from one city to another, herdsmen in search of pasture in Nigeria) and international (from one country to another) (WHO 2020) b. Children and adolescent migration are intensifying globally and especially in the developing countries like Nigeria. Migration is an issue of global health importance that can have an immediate and lasting impact on an individual's health and well-being. This is a development that challenges the health of children and adolescents who are mostly at risk (Solbakk, 2015).

Migration may be driven by economic (greener pasture), educational, safety (security) and natural disaster. It is noteworthy to mention that migration has become a way of life due to technological progress and globalization, which have made distances to disappear, and shortened the time of travel. Despite this development, the devastating effect on vulnerable individuals especially children and adolescents cannot be overemphasized.

Migration impacts all the aspects of health defined by World Health Organization in 1948 (Huber et al., 2011), that is physical, mental, and social wellbeing of individuals, thus increasing their vulnerability to illness. School-age children and adolescents' health are particularly affected by migration conditions. Indeed, they are usually referred to as at-risk group or vulnerable individuals. Children are generally referred to as a vulnerable population with respect to their health because of their relative inability to advocate for their own interests and to protect themselves from harm. Harm may result from an

interaction between the resources available to individuals and communities and the life challenges they face. Other vulnerable individuals include women and girls, refugees, the elderly, HIV/AIDS patients, the homeless, the poor, migrants among others (Rukmana 2014; UNHCR, 2017). General conditions surrounding migration tend to have more devastating effect on children's health. Such conditions include: parental poverty, overcrowded or substandard living conditions, food insecurity, natural or man-made disasters, interrupted schooling, poor sanitation facilities, etc. children are especially prone to respiratory infections, skin infections, gastrointestinal illnesses because of poor living conditions, suboptimal hygiene, and deprivation during migration, and they require access to proper health care. Thus, the health of this group (school-age children and adolescents) is of particular concern to health educators and other healthcare workers (Solbakk, 2015).

The United Nations Population Funds (UNFPA 2019) defined school-age children as age-group 6 - 12 years old and adolescents as ages 10-19 years old. This implies how young and immature this group of children are. In the same vein, reports reveal that migration in this age group appears to be on the increase despite the health impact of migration on this vulnerable group (United Nations migration report, 2019). The United Nations migration (2019) and UNICEF (2019) reported the need for closing the gap of data on child migrants and refugees. They also reported that in 2019, the number of international migrants reached 272 million; 33 million of them were children. This report exposes the very distressing situation of the large number of children migrants globally, especially unaccompanied minors and thus justifies why health education should be immediately employed to reduce or

ameliorate the health implications of migration on children and adolescents (UNICEF 2019). This precarious situation is perceived to be connected to inadequate health education of people in the society, particularly children and adolescents on the expected health problems associated with migration. Therefore, this paper examined the impact of migration on the health of school-age children and adolescents with the pivotal role health education can play in ameliorating the situation.

Statement of the Problem

Convincing body of evidence reveal that inadequate access to health services and unfavorable conditions that many migrants live and work in, make them subject to a variety of health risks (UNICEF, 2020a). Lately, there have been reports indicating the increase in the migration of school-age children and adolescents from developing countries to more developed countries with the attendant health implications which appear more exaggerated among this vulnerable group; school-age children and adolescents (United Nations Migration Report, 2019).

It appears that the role of health education in ameliorating the impact of migration on health implications of children and adolescents' migrants have not been fully positioned by many studies. Health education may be used to give health information for this group of people to make informed decision about their health as migrants.

Thus, this study highlighted the impact of migration on the health of children and adolescents and position the pivotal role of health education as a tool to ameliorate the health risks of migration on this vulnerable group (children and adolescents).

Conceptual/Theoretical Framework

This study is based on the two theoretical frameworks commonly used to explain the health status of immigrant populations: the cultural framework and the structural framework.

The cultural framework: literature provides evidence in support of an initial healthy effect and a subsequent decline in health of immigrants, although it is not fully understood why this is so (Constant et al., 2018). The cultural framework gives the most common explanation by viewing culture as the primary determinant of individual level health behaviours. According to the cultural view, culture impinges on health outcomes via influencing social networks and individual health behaviours (e.g., smoking, drinking, calorie-dense diet, and less physical activity). As the immigrants arrive in a new society, they abandon the cultural practices of their country of origin and quickly adapt to those from the host country, leading to a progressive deterioration of their health status (Constant et al., 2018). Highly connected to cultural explanation, is the concept of acculturation in which immigrants take on the culture and habits of the mainstream population, to the extent that this process influences health risk behaviours; acculturation is negatively associated with health (Dina, 2019).

The structural framework: Structural factors refer to the broader political, economic, social, and environmental conditions and institutions at national, regional or international levels that either increase or decrease an individual's likelihood of experiencing violence, exploitation or abuse before, during or after migrating. These factors tend to negatively affect healthcare of migrants if not well situated. Acculturation tends to divert the attention from the

structural factors, for example, access to healthcare and differences in labour markets, and obscures the role these factors play in the unequal distribution of health outcomes among the immigrants. However, a consistent shift has occurred to bring more emphasis to the structural framework. Health inequalities among the immigrants is so pronounced and requires attention. This framework tends to focus on access to healthcare or the barriers to accessing healthcare and on health outcomes causally linked to migration status or the living and working conditions of the immigrants. Hacker, et al (2015) reported that barriers to health care for undocumented immigrants go beyond policy and range from financial limitations to discrimination and fear of deportation. Access to healthcare has been the most common structural factor explored in the literature. Bousmah, Combes and Abu-Zaineh (2019) also reported that while the health of the native and foreign-born populations converges over time, there is substantial effect heterogeneity depending on the wealth of the countries of birth.

Hence, these two frameworks, form the basis to attempt to understand migration and its impact on the health of school-age children and adolescents; and position the pivotal role of health education.


Methods

A comprehensive review of the literature was conducted on the associations between migration and health of school-age children and adolescents. This review aimed at highlighting the impact of migration on the health of school-age children and adolescents as well as positioning health education as a tool to ameliorate the outcome of the possible health effect of migration on this vulnerable group (children & adolescents).

Extant and grey literature and other web materials were also searched. Many publications in standard outlets were examined using the following keywords: migration, vulnerable group in health, children migrants, adolescent migrants, health education for migrants, health impact on migrants in International Organization for Migration (IOM), PubMed, iSi, related base journals, some standard textbooks, as well as the researcher's observations on migrants between 2010 and 2020. Articles were examined by title, and their abstracts were widely read. A narrative design was chosen to merge the empirical studies, theory, and policy. Particular attention was given to relevant articles that highlighted the health of children migrants, school-age children, and adolescent migrants. The number of relevant publications on the role of health education on the health of children migrants were relatively low; topic relevance as well as articles published before 2010 were used as exclusion criteria. These articles were critiqued to arrive at the analysis and recommendations of this review. The shortcoming of this method was that all available articles with relevant topics may not have been examined.

Results

Figure 1: Results of articles found



The above method yielded 400 publications. A critical analysis of the publication titles reduced the number of potentially relevant publications to 40. This was further reduced to 31 which were fully reviewed based on abstract relevance to form the basis of this study. Approximately, 19% of 31 abstracts were not fully reviewed for the studies (6) because they did not relate migration to all the variables (see figure 1). The remaining 81% of the reports (25) treated relevant themes: migration of school-age children and adolescents, health implications of migration (impact on physical health, mental health, and social health), and the role of health education.

Figure 2. shows the countries most migrated into globally





Figure 2 shows the countries with the most immigrants globally in 2019. United States of America has the highest (at least four times the number of migrants to other countries) migrants.

Many countries especially in the western world have a rise in the number of migrants in the last ten years. This is important to note as this figure may assist countries most migrated into, to make policies to improve immigrants' access to healthcare. It could also change the legal status of large numbers of immigrants to have advocates, and analysts to review other policies concerning the status of immigrants in those countries, especially the United States.

Figure 3: Spike in Unaccompanied Child Arrivals at U.S.-Mexico Border



Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), “Annual ORR Reports to Congress” (several years), accessed June 25, 2019, available online; ORR, “Latest UAC Data – FY2018,” updated May 6, 2019, available online; ORR, “Latest UAC Data – FY2019,” updated May 30, 2019, available online (Chishti 2019).

Figure 3 shows that in 2015, there was a drop in the number of child migrants but from 2016 to 2019 there was an increasing rise in child migration in the United States – Mexico border.

The results on the physical, mental and social health of school-age children and adolescents include the underlisted among others:

The impact of migration on physical health includes violence, food insecurity/ excess feeding, lack of shelter leading to more susceptibility to diseases for example, skin infections, and other communicable and non-communicable diseases.

The mental health of school-age children and adolescents is negatively affected by migration by the presenting with more cases of anxiety and frustration, deprivation and insecurity, mood disorders, low self-esteem,

suicidal ideation, substance abuse, injustice and hardship in the prisons resulting in depression.

The social health of the school-age children and adolescents is affected with more presentations of cases with marginalization and discrimination in the country of settlement, barriers to accessing social services, challenges to the rights to citizenship and identity, intimidation, insecurity, antisocial behaviour, school avoidance because of fear and insecurity.

Discussion

Migration is increasing globally, which has resulted in a growing number of children and adolescents also migrating in most cases for greener pasture. This migration is not without its impact on migrants' health. Despite increasing attention towards migrant health, the experiences of children and adolescents who migrate have been relatively overlooked in research to date (WHO, 2018). Not many studies have positioned health education as an important aspect to prevent the health implications of children and adolescent migrants. This study examined the impact of migration on the health of school-age children and adolescents and tried to reposition the pivotal role of health education in ameliorating and forestalling the negative effects of migration on their health. From the findings, many journal articles searched in this study did not specifically report on the impact of migration on school-age children and adolescents (figure 1). There is the need for more focus on the health of this young migrants because they are the future of this generation. Fellmeth et al (2018) pointed out the need to focus on the healthcare of children and adolescents that are migrants or left-behind from migrant parents. This focus on the health of school-age children and adolescent migrants has become more necessary because of the increase in the migrant rate of this group of

children from developing countries to developed countries in the last decade see Figure 2. (Pison, 2019). Apart from the increase observed in the number of children migrants, they are also unaccompanied compared to what used to happen in the past. International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2011) had reported the increase in unaccompanied children migrants globally. This was confirmed by Chishti et al. (2019) where they reported the steady increase in the number of unaccompanied children migrants. These children are on their own looking for survival. Figure 3 (Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) presents the graph of increase of children migrants in the United States and Mexico border. This development further endangers the health of these young migrants as they may not be able to adequately identify a deteriorating health condition or prevent circumstances that may lead to ill health. Thus, this study covers the migration impact on the physical, mental, and social health and the pivotal role of health education.

The implication of migration on the physical health of school-age children and adolescents:

Humans migrate and some carry diseases with them (e.g., infectious diseases) as they migrate to their new destinations. Health-related vulnerabilities can increase due to various factors such as the lack of access to health services, inadequate hygiene, and sanitation within densely populated living spaces; the children tend to develop skin infections with this type of environment, inadequate nutrition, and violence (Fellmeth, 2018). The migrant children have suffered a lot of violence from different sources, especially in the new environment. The stress of travelling makes them susceptible to diseases because stress affects the immune response by lowering it, thus infectious diseases increase. However, some studies have reported that the health of

migrants and non-migrants alike is influenced by determinants including genetics and biological factors, socioeconomic status, environmental exposure, and behaviour. Some diseases inherent in individuals may manifest in their migrant country, with worse presentations according to Barker since many diseases displayed in adulthood have their foundation in childhood (Olsen 2014). WHO (2018) also reported that migrant children suffer from violence related to maltreatment, community violence, bullying, physical fighting, physical assault to homicide, and sexual violence which can be more severe in adolescence, especially the female migrants.

Implication of migration on mental health of school-age children and adolescents

Migrant children are more at risk of more mental and psychological problems. Migration predisposes to developing mental health complications due to stress experienced by the migrants. Many migrant children stay a long time in detention and the length of detention has been associated with the severity of mental disorders and psychosocial issues. Detention of children destroys their mental health; they suffer a lot of injustice and hardship in the prisons, they are made to carry out hard labour beyond their age. Most become asylum victims and not able to care for themselves (Dogra et al., 2010). This should be avoided especially when they are put with adults in the same prison, and some of the children develop mood disorders. Studies also reported the occurrence of the underlisted conditions at a much higher percentage (60-75%) in adolescent migrants compared to non-migrants: increased risk of depression, increased low self-esteem, increased risk of suicidal ideation, increased substance abuse and clubbing (Virupaksha, 2014).

Some migrant workers, especially those with low level skills, are employed in sectors often amongst the most dangerous, difficult, and demanding (3Ds), with low wages, hazardous and harsh working conditions, and a lack of status recognition, social protection, and occupational health rights (Dogra et al., 2010). These conditions make the young migrants develop stress and anxiety, leading to anti-social behaviour because they develop inferiority complex. The antisocial behaviour affects the social health of the migrant child negatively. To alleviate mental health issues, the health educator must intensify health promotion and migration health assistance to make migration process easier and less complicated. The health educator must strive to provide information to prepare children migrants, collaborating with other healthcare providers to ensure that necessary health and public services are available to help prevent psychological distress.

Impact of migration on social health of school-age children and adolescents

Social health implications of children migration affect families, communities, and the children. Some parents are ignorant of the overwhelming social effects of migration and encourage their underage to migrate. The health educator has a strong role to play in orientating parents on the social health implications of migration. They need to better understand how migration affects societies, families, and children in countries of origin and settlement. The antisocial behaviour of the migrant children is more marked because of their independence; the absence of protection and support from their families, and by the challenges of their new situations after migration. This behaviour is further manifested by withdrawal, temper tantrums, and irritability, among

others, prolonged separation disrupts family bond and emotional stability (Zhao et al., 2018).

Marginalization and discrimination in the country of settlement also limit how much the children can adjust to their new environment, coupled with barriers to accessing social services, challenges to the rights to citizenship and identity (UNICEF, 2020b). Emotional and social development is a big issue in the migrant child (esp. LBC): children and adolescent migrants face intimidation (afraid and insecure; school avoidance is observed). Therefore, health educators must provide adequate information to enable families and children to make informed decisions about movement.

The pivotal role of health education on impact of migration and children's health

The role of health education in ameliorating the impact of migration on the health of children cannot be overemphasized. Health education is “any combination of learning experiences designed to help individuals and communities improve their health, by increasing their knowledge or influencing their attitudes” (WHO 2019). Health educators must rise to this global emergency (migration) and provide the necessary health information to assist individuals and the government in making informed decisions. The health educator must prevent child migration and protect the migrant child. For successful prevention of child migration, health educators must employ screening in schools and communities to identify children who are most likely to migrate by their disposition, so that they can benefit from specific/targeted health education. The risks of migration must be explained to all. Schools can affect migrant children's health behavior and outcomes and can play an

important role in reducing health disparities and improving health equality (Ji et al. 2016; Li, 2020). To achieve this, the health educator must carry out its preventive and protective role earnestly. It is important to be sensitive to some factors that may necessitate screening in school-age children; conflict, disaster (can lead to forced movement), children separated from family, past traumatic experiences such as maltreatment, death of parent(s) and extreme poverty, among others. Health information concerning health risks of migration must be communicated to them through health literacy, particularly after screening. Health Literacy (HL) is the ability to obtain, read, understand, and use healthcare information to make appropriate health decisions and follow instructions for treatment (Centre for Disease Control (CDC), 2020). Health literacy must be well grounded from school (primary and secondary schools). Health literacy must also be deliberately targeted to educating members of the communities about health issues and migration. It must be integrated using information process to access, understand, appraise, and apply the health information. Health literacy is critical to empowerment because it raises awareness of the determinants of health and encourages individual and collective actions which may lead to a modification of these determinants. With health literacy, health education is achieved through methods that go beyond information diffusion and entail interaction, participation, and critical analysis. Thus, enabling effective community action, and contributing to the development of social capital.

For the less educated or illiterate migrants, there is need to mitigate effects of limited language proficiency through the provision of information in different languages. Also, there should be improved access to health information which may be organized through access to telehealth in rural areas, health educators

should organize home visit to ensure support of available family members for the child. health talks, showing videos of children migrants with health issues. The direction for health education must be clearly mapped out to achieve the preventive role of hazardous health for children migrants. The health educator must use policy-based and more specific interventions to promote mental health and well-being of the migrant child. Health education must support the well-being of migrant children (Dogra et al, 2010; Virupaksha, 2014). Health educators must get involved in the use of well mapped out advocacy, inform policy makers of health issues and influence policies on migrant children's health. Appropriate health education responses are often premised on the building of children's knowledge, confidence, and skills to adapt to their new circumstances. Global and national policies are needed to consider the health needs of children. Health education should acknowledge, and successfully address, the socially located barriers to children's health-enhancing practices (including experiences of stigma, discrimination, and social exclusion) that may prove helpful in enhancing social integration and the well-being of young migrants (Dogra et al., 2010; Adhikari et al., 2011). Health educators must constantly carry out research to improve on managing migrant children's health.

In summary, the key points of direction for health education include the following:

- Act as an intermediary between children and their parents/guardians by establishing good rapport with the families.
- Provide information on the lack of access to health care and other essential services that are not available in the country the migrant child is going to; this must be made clear to the migrant child and family.

- Advocate for the need of children staying in school and make healthcare accessible in any country they find themselves.
- Advocacy for policies to prevent children from separating from their parents and other family members and to give children their legal status to prevent them from violence and discrimination
- Must join in the campaign to end the detention of migrant children by creating practical alternatives: foster care, supervised independent living, or other family or community-based living arrangements. Children should not be detained in adult facilities.
- Work with UNICEF to actualize its calls on local leaders, religious groups, non-governmental organizations, the media, and the private sector to combat xenophobia and nurture a greater understanding between uprooted children and families and their host communities (UNICEF 2020c).

Conclusion

School-age children and adolescents have been identified as vulnerable group, whose health and wellbeing must be safeguarded. This study highlighted the implications of migration on the health of school-age children and adolescents. It discussed the health implications on this group under physical health, mental health, and social health. The study observed through reviewed literature that most children migrants flee their homes to escape conflict, persecution, and poverty, many of these children face danger, detention, deprivation, and discrimination which affect their health, and the world must stand up for them. Since migration for various reasons is inevitable, the study positioned the pivotal role of health education in ameliorating the effects of

migration on the health of children migrants. Creative health education has a pivotal role in mitigating or addressing this national and international crisis, to avoid problem in adulthood and societal disharmony.

Recommendations

To comprehensively address the health problems of migration on school-age children and adolescents, health educators must be frontline members in ensuring that the following are addressed:

- National Board for Migrant Education and Health (NBMEH) must be activated and functional.
- Multisectoral collaboration is critically needed for sustainably improving the quality of life of migrant children.
- Inspectorate agency on migration is available in every local government area (LGA)
- Promote family and ward units on health education (on migration).

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Climate Change and the Crisis of Food and Human Security in Nigeria

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Abstract

Climate change continues to pose fundamental challenges to agricultural food production and human security in Nigeria. Since the last four decades, the country, like other countries of the world has been grappling with projected impacts associated with many of the scenarios outlined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). These include catastrophic shifts in temperature and water supplies, as well as rising river levels and steady decrease in arable land due to intense drought and desert encroachment in the extreme northern part of the country. These and other extreme weather events are having devastating effects on agricultural food production with attendant adverse socio-economic effects on the entire Nigerian citizenry directly or indirectly. Less crop yields and income, poverty, unemployment, lower living standard, rural-urban migration and the like, resulting from the effects of climate change have increased criminality. The southward movement by the Fulani herders for grazing land has resulted in serial violent conflicts with farmers who also want to hold on to their farmland. This development has exacerbated the tensed security situation in the country. The study concludes that though climate change impacts may not cause conflict, it increases its likelihood. It suggests measures to curb potential vectors for climate change-induced conflicts and recommends ways to mitigate its socio-economic effects.

Introduction

Climate change can be defined as a change in the state of the climate that can be identified by changes in the means and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period typically decades or longer (IPCC, 2007). Making reference to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report, Odjugo (2010) points out that, the

anthropogenic factor in climate change involves human activities which distorts nature directly or indirectly. Such activities either emit large amount of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere that depletes the ozone layer or reduces the amount of carbons absorbed from the atmosphere. The human factors that emit large amounts of greenhouse gases include industrialization, burning of fossil fuel, gas flaring, urbanization and agriculture. Human activities that reduce the amount of carbon sinks are deforestation, alterations in land use, water pollution and agricultural practices. The human factors have been proven to be responsible for the ongoing unequivocal climate change or global warming (IPCC 2007).

Ugwuayin (2017) notes that one of the visible effects of climate change in Nigeria is desertification due to the long effect of drought. She adds that, drought is an insidious hazard of nature that originates from a deficiency of precipitation over a long-extended period of time. Desertification reduces arable land for agricultural purposes with attendant shortfall in food production and imminent food crisis. In Nigeria, food crisis constitutes a major threat to the livelihood of the teeming populace. The northern part of the country, where large percentage of food crops are produced, is most vulnerable to climate change because of its proximity to the Sahara Desert further north. As Enete and Amusa (2010) aptly put it, the challenge of food security threat posed by climate change is more prominent in Africa. This is because the continent faces steady decline in agricultural products and per capita food production in the face of population growth which will double the demand for food, water and forage in the next three decades.

Food crisis in Nigeria portends great danger to the country such as aggravating the existing socio-economic problems such as hunger and poverty

which have bearing with the high level of unemployment in the country. This is in addition to the poor state of the economy which will be aggravated by the global economic recession occasioned by the Covid-19 pandemic. Aside from these challenges, food crisis also encourages migration from one part of the country to the other. On the one hand, the inability of farmers to adapt to climate change is making them to seek for alternative means of income and thereby worsening the rural-urban migration in the country. On the other hand, desert encouragement is compelling a gradual drift from the north to the south for grazing and farming. According to Toulmin (2009), migration as a response to floods and droughts is a well-known means of reacting to climatic stress. For example, communities in some disaster-prone areas have moved to upland areas either with support from government or on their own, using networks and contacts to help them. However, Toulmin noted that, large flows of migrants can generate serious problems in their destinations, given scarce land, water and shelter, from which conflict can develop.

It is against this background that the study focuses on human security challenge on the account of food crisis induced by climate change. Human reaction to food crisis and other effects of climate change is premised on many factors. These can be related to the projected impacts associated with many of the scenarios outlined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). These include catastrophic shifts in temperature and water supplies, as well as rising sea levels and a large increase in the incidence of hurricanes, storms and other extreme weather events. According to Toulmin, (2009:109) “these impacts would jeopardize the security of most countries around the world, and especially low-lying small island states, which risk seeing their territory inundated”.

Nigeria is a plural state with a long history of ethnic and sectarian conflicts. The serial farmers/herders' clashes in the last two decades is an indication that climate change will generate a greater number, and intensify conflicts in the country. Besides, Nigeria has been portrayed as particularly vulnerable to such a rise in conflict, owing to its high poverty index, high rate of unemployment, weak internal cohesion and poor levels of state organization. The study interrogates security and conflict as it is induced by climate change. It also goes on to examine recent patterns and causes of conflict in Nigeria and assesses the likelihood of their increase as a consequence of climate change. It gives support to the view that, "the evidence shows that, while climate change may not cause conflict, it will increase its likelihood" (Toulmin, 2009: 109). Premised on food crisis and human security challenge, the study analyzes and evaluate these two major factors of climate change as they affect Nigeria.

Climate Change: The Factor of Desertification and Agricultural Food

Production in Nigeria

Climate change is different from the generally known terms like climatic fluctuations or climatic variability. These terms denote inherent dynamic nature of climate on various temporal scales. Such temporal scale variations could be monthly, seasonal, annual, decadal, periodic, quasi-periodic or non-periodic. "Climate change is caused by two basic factors, which include natural

processes (biogeographical) and human activities (anthropogenic)” (Odjugo, 2010:47).

In terms of biogeographical factor, Nigeria is naturally endowed with rich vegetation and abundant mineral resources, thus making it one of the richest countries in Africa. Due to its large size, four distinct physical regions can be distinguished ranging from the south to the north. Along the coastline is the dense belt of mangrove swamp forest that varies from 18 to 108 kilometres width, which is sparsely populated and little developed. Next is the tropical rain forest belt which is intersected by streams and rivers and varies from 90 to 180 kilometres northward from the east to the west. This is followed by a 480-kilometres-wide belt of open woodland and grass savannah. This zone finally graduates into a vast undulating plateau with intervals of hills until it reaches the southern fringes of the Sahara Desert. The graduation in vegetation and climate is the result of wide variation of rainfall determined by the seasonal inflow of humid air from the South Atlantic (Coleman, 1986). The variation in the climate from the south to the north makes the country to be broadly classified into the hot dry savannah of the north and the damp swampy coastal area of the south. There are two major seasons – the dry season and rainy season that varies from the south to the north. The dry season begins in the north in October and ends in April, while in the south it is of a shorter duration. The dry season is also characterized by the Harmattan – a dry north-easterly wind which brings along with it a thick haze composed of minute particles from the Sahara Desert. The rainy season has peak periods in July and September. The average temperature varies from 72F to 89F depending on the season (Ezera,1964). This difference in regional climate and vegetation is a major determinant of the soil fertility and the production of the

various cash and food crops. Perhaps the most prominent physical feature of Nigeria is the river from which the country derives its name. The River Niger enters the country from the north-west and is joined by its principal tributary, the Benue at Lokoja from where it flows into the Delta area before emptying into the Atlantic Ocean.

This natural climatic pattern has been disrupted over the last three decades as a result of climate change. Nigeria, like most other countries of the world, has experienced unusual rainfall pattern and high temperature level year in year out. The unusual rainfall pattern has resulted in either scarce or excess rainfall where much rain is needed for the production of such crops as millets, sorghum, groundnut, cassava and yam. Due to excessive rainfall, the country has witnessed perennial flood in the last eight years. For example, when the country witnessed the unprecedented flood incidence in 2012, more than twenty out of the 36 states were badly affected. The flood washed away farm lands and affected agricultural produce. Ever since, it has become an annual occurrence, especially in states that the Niger and Benue Rivers (the two major rivers in the country) run through like: Kebbi, Niger, Kwara, Taraba, Benue, Kogi, Anambra, Delta, and the coastal states like Lagos, Bayelsa, Rivers, Cross River. The excessive rainfall resulted in the overflowing of the river boundaries.

Couple with excessive rainfall is high temperature level that the country has also experienced. The year 2014 ranks as Earth's warmest since modern recordkeeping began in 1880, according to two analyses by the U.S. government and another by Japan. The shortfall in rain and high temperature recedes downward from the Sahel region that borders the semi-desert area of the extreme northern part of the country to the Savannah region, down to the

rain forest and the Mangrove Swamp of the coastal area of the south. This persistent high temperature and scarce rainfall has resulted in drought in most parts of the extreme northern states –Sokoto, Zamfara, Kano, Katsina, Jigawa, Yobe and Bornu. Ugwuayin (2017) expresses the view that, this usually results in water shortage in the environment when the supply of moisture from precipitation or moisture stored in the soil is insufficient to fulfill the optimum water needs of plants. This, she further explains is relative to some long-term average condition of balance between precipitation and evapotranspiration (evaporation and transpiration). Drought is also related to the timing and effectiveness of rains from the perspective of principal season of occurrence and delays in the start of rainy season and occurrence of rains in relation to principal crop growth stages. More importantly, rainfall intensity and number of rainfall events are important benchmarks for ascertaining drought in an environment.

Ugwuayin (2017) further observes that, rainfall in the Sahel has been declining steadily since the 1960s which has resulted in steady loss of farmlands and grazing land. Many different communities, including fishermen, farmers and herdsmen are now confronted with difficulties arising from climatic changes. Peoples' livelihoods are being harmed, and already poor people are becoming even more impoverished. Climate refugees are being created, as climate change makes some land inhabitable and impacts water supplies. Ugwuayin maintains that, most parts of northern Nigeria which falls within the Sudan Savannah is increasingly becoming an arid environment at a very fast receding rate per year occasioned by fast reduction of the amount of surface water, flora and fauna resources on the land. Added to this is the effect of wind erosion that is quite severe in most Sahel States of Sokoto, Zamfara,

Kebbi, Katsina, Kano, Jigawa, Borno, Yobe, Kano, Adamawa and Bauchi as a result of drought conditions in the area. The Sahel states are known for the production of major agricultural crops such as groundnut, sorghum, millets, legumes, cassava, yam and vegetables that are among the major staple food in Nigeria.

So severe is the effect of drought that desertification has constituted a major challenge to the agrarian society of the extreme north represented by the states mentioned above. According to Ugwuayin (2017), Nigeria is presently losing about 351,000 square kilometers of its landmass to the desert, which is advancing southward at the rate of 0.6 kilometers annually. She added further that, the consistent reduction in rainfall leads to a reduction in the natural regeneration rate of land resources, which presents a chain of causal reaction that, makes people to exploit more previously undisturbed lands leading to depletion of the forest cover.

Theoretical Framework: The Link between Climate Change, Desertification-Driven Resource Crisis and Human Security

The factor of climate change as it induces food crisis with attendant human security challenge can be conceptualized through the interrogation of these three factors that will be examined in sections.

The Concept of Climate Change and Food Crisis - IMPACT and DSSAT Models

There is a close link between climate change and food crisis as a direct consequence of climate-induced biogeographic and anthropogenic factors. So many models have been adduced to explain this concept. However, this study is combining IMPACT (International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodity and Trade) and DSSAT (Decision Support System for Agro-technology Transfer) models to explain the concept because of their interrelationship as presented by Nedumaran et al (2010). The IMPACT model combines a partial equilibrium model that has global coverage with hydrology and water supply and demand model. This is implying that there must be equilibrium in the demand and supply of water either in excess or shortfall as a major determinant of crop production yield. It is also a multi-commodity, multi-country partial equilibrium agricultural model for 40 commodities of crop and livestock, including cereals, soybeans, roots and tubers, meats, milk, eggs, oilseeds, oilcakes/meals, sugar/ sweeteners, and fruits and vegetables. The DSSAT model on the other hand is crop-modelling suite for five crops – rice, wheat, maize, soybeans and groundnuts. The model is techniques of supporting crop growth with an option to include CO₂ fertilization effects at different levels of CO₂ atmospheric concentration.

According to Easterling et al. (2007), the models have shown positive yield impacts in cooler climates, while decreasing yield levels in lower latitudes where the majority of the developing countries are located. Changes in yield of rain fed crops will be driven by changes in both temperature and precipitation, whereas those of irrigated crops will be driven by changes in precipitation alone. Similarly, Jarvis et al., (2008) contend that, changes in temperature and precipitation regimes are likely to cause the extinction of wild relatives of crops as suitable natural ecosystems would decrease or

disappear. Cline (2007) also observes that, owing to global warming, the developing countries face a 9% to 21% decline in overall agricultural productivity, whereas effects on industrialized countries will range from a 6% decline to 8% increase, depending on the offsetting effect the additional atmospheric carbon could have on rates of photosynthesis. Again, Jarvis et al. (2011) maintain that, it is expected that shifts in crop climates to 2050 will result in many countries facing novel climates that are currently not found in their boundaries. The challenges and stresses that face global food production and distribution systems are particularly acute and pressing for sub-Saharan Africa, where persistent levels of food insecurity already exist. Dixon et al., (2001) explain that about 43% of the population lives below the international poverty line. Additionally, the area affected by land degradation within the region is expanding, thereby reducing the yield levels.

Climate change effects on crop production enter into the IMPACT model by altering both crop area and yield. Yields are altered through the intrinsic yield growth coefficient and water availability coefficient for irrigated crops. These yield growth rates depend on crop, management system and location. For most crops, the average of this rate is about 1% per year from effects that are not modelled. In some countries, however, the growth in yield is assumed to be negative, whereas in others it is as high as 5% per year for some years.

From the African context, the application of these two models is indicative of the reality that Climate change has started to, and will continue to impact negatively on agriculture and food security, especially in tropical and subtropical regions, because greenhouse gas emissions would increase the risk of hunger by additional 80 million people by 2080 in Africa (Odjugo, 2010:47). Similarly, the IPCC 2007 report states that, 'Africa is one of the most

vulnerable continents to climate change and climate variability, a situation aggravated by the interaction of multiple stresses attributable to anthropogenic and human factors.

Toulmin (2009), gives an overview of the causes of climate change for a better understanding of the phenomenon. She explains that, the earth's climate is determined by a combination of the energy that comes from the sun and the physical and chemical properties of the earth's surface and atmosphere. Some of the sun's radiation striking the earth is absorbed by the surface, while the rest is reflected, either escaping into space or becoming trapped by gases in the earth's atmosphere. Trapped radiation is then recycled back to earth, adding extra warmth to the surface – a process called the 'greenhouse effect'. This, according to her is a natural phenomenon that ensures that the amount of energy coming in is balanced by that radiated into space, so maintaining a relatively stable temperature at the earth's surface. The concern over global warming focuses on gases in the earth's atmosphere, which have a capacity to absorb the radiation reflected from the earth in order to trap heat. Most greenhouse gases (GHG), such as carbon dioxide (CO₂) and methane (CH₄), occur naturally, and are normally present at atmospheric concentrations that effectively regulate the earth's temperature.

In terms of the anthropogenic factor for climate change, Toulmin again explains that, an increase in their concentration has occurred over the last 250 years which however, due to human activities, such as burning carbon-based fuels – an increase which has intensified the greenhouse effect and is leading to global warming. Other greenhouse gases, such as nitrous oxide (N₂O), are man-made and are also increasing in concentration. The increase in man-made GHG has also been accompanied by an increase in small particles of dust, soot

or sulphur from industrial pollution and soil erosion, which reflect or absorb incoming solar radiation, also leading to cooler or warmer conditions. Volcanic eruptions – even though not experienced in Nigeria, are very important source of such particles and play a part in global cooling (Toulmin, 2009:16-17).

The Concept of Climate Change and Human Security

There is also a close link between human security which is the conditions necessary for survival against the socio-economic problems associated with climate change such as poverty, hunger, unemployment, etc. Hussein et al (2004:8) allude that “human security is a critical component of the global political and development agenda”. Against this backdrop, they also observe that two ideas lie at its heart: firstly, the protection of individuals is a strategic concern for national as well as international security; secondly, security conditions for people’s development are not bound to traditional matters of national defence, law and order, but rather encompass all political, economic and social issues enabling a life free from risk and fear.

Effects of Climate Change on Food and Human Security in Nigeria

A lot have been written on the environmental effects of climate change. But the effects as it bothers on food crisis and human security in Nigeria is very scanty. Hence, this study is prompted by the relatively less attention given to these two phenomena to interrogate the devastating effects of what has been tagged “the doomsday predictions” (Nwolise, 2013). Again, there is the need to bring into context scholarly views on this.

Expressing view on desertification as a process of climate change, Toulmin (2009) argues that, natural systems are normally resilient to a certain degree of climate variation. In the same manner, plant species have relied on their

genetic diversity to help them evolve over many generations. Trees can adapt to long-term changes in environmental conditions by, for example, altering their pattern of growth and the timing of flowering, fruiting and germination, to fit with the new constraints. At the same time, environmental change will also alter the behaviour of other key species, such as pollinators and animals that rely on the tree for food and shelter. But such adaptation takes time, especially in forests where the lifetime of a tree is measured in hundreds of years. Making reference to the opinion of Pernetta (2004), Toulmin further contends that, a wide genetic base can give plants greater tolerance for a variety of environmental conditions. This provides the option of shifting their geographic range, in terms of altitude or latitude, when conditions in one place no longer suit them. Toulmin also draws on the views of Petit et al. (2008) that the adaptation processes have proved reasonably successful in the past, although fossil records show previous extinctions of plant species have occurred, primarily during periods of high climate variability.

On the role of human-induced climate change and gradual process of adaptation, Toulmin also observes that, if climate change is rapid relative to the generational time of the plant, and creates conditions not previously experienced, then the change may push the species to the limits of how fast it can adapt. This will happen even more quickly if the plant species has a limited genetic range. The expectation is that the speed of global climate change over the next 100 years will put 20–30 per cent of plant and animal species at increased risk of extinction, including those within forests. These impacts will stem directly from the changes in rainfall and temperature described earlier, and from a range of other factors, such as the increased frequency and intensity of wildfires, hurricanes, insect and disease outbreaks, flooding and

drought. Maintaining a broad genetic range within a given tree species, as well as a high level of biodiversity within forests as a whole, will be important factors in maintaining the resilience and productivity of forests in the face of growing pressures. Toulmin also supports her view with Hansen et al.'s (2003) opinion on forest management, maintaining that, other elements in forest management to reduce vulnerability to climate change include avoiding fragmentation of forest areas, providing buffer zones, protecting mature tree stands, and establishing refuge areas.

Firstly, it is important to look at the vulnerability of agriculture to climate change in a broad perspective. Nedumaran et al (2015) identifies a number of factors that make agriculture vulnerable to climate. They ascribe higher temperatures as a factor because it reduces yields and tend to encourage weed and pest proliferation. According to them, greater variations in precipitation patterns increase the likelihood of short-run crop failures and long-term production declines. They also maintain that, though there might be gains in some crops in certain regions of the world, the overall impact of climate change on agriculture is expected to be negative, threatening regional food security in many parts of the developing world that are still predominantly agrarian in nature in particular and world over in general.

Even though desertification is blamed on overgrazing practices of the local population, it has been discovered that the real problem is climate change. Ugwuayin (2017) contends that, Nigeria is not a major contributor of greenhouse gas emissions when compared with industrialized countries; but is a major supplier of oil and gas to countries with high greenhouse gas emissions. The exploitation of gas and oil for export from the Niger Delta

contributes to global warming and it also destroys the environment and harms communities living near these projects. Oil fields in the Niger Delta of Nigeria contain crude oil mixed with very large amounts of gas. Major oil companies operating in Nigeria separate the oil from its associated gas at flow stations, where the gas is simply burned off, serving no useful purpose and contaminating the air and lands for local communities. The effects of gas flaring on the communities are continuous noise, rise in temperature in communities close to flare sites, acid rain, retarded crop yield, corroded roofs, respiratory diseases and the loss of darkness as with the unnatural illumination from gas flares at night. Gas flared in Nigeria contains high amount of methane and carbon dioxide and is a major contributor to global warming as it produces emissions that is more than the combined emissions of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa (Adegbulugbe and Akinbami,2006). These oil and gas projects do not provide energy to the people who live in the region but only pollute their air and lands from the gas flared by Shell and other major Transnational Corporations. Hydropower generation is the energy source most likely to be affected by climate change because it is sensitive to the amount, timing, and geographical pattern of precipitation, as well as temperature. Reduced flows in rivers and higher temperatures reduce the capabilities of thermal electric generation. Higher temperatures also reduce transmission capabilities. Excessive drought will lead to higher evapotranspiration, which adversely affects water volume, and hence reduces hydroelectric capacity. There are glaring pieces of evidence that climate change is not only happening, it is changing the lives of Nigerians, directly or indirectly (ibid).

Extreme events, sea level rise, disruption and damage from floods and storms are also major consideration. A changing climate will also bring a higher level of extreme events, such as storms and floods, causing damage to infrastructure, housing, energy and transport systems. Over time, sea level rise will force some people from their homes and necessitate the relocation of coastal settlements and farming areas. It is reckoned that those areas already adversely affected by weather-related hazards will experience an increase in their intensity and frequency. For conflict to be avoided under this condition will depends on how it is managed with adequate levels of disaster preparedness, whether it triggers a wider sense of grievance, and how far people choose not to politicize such disasters (Toulmin, 2009).

Effects on Food Production

The obvious impact of climate change is in the agricultural sector. The biological effects of climate change on the production of these crops is explained by Nedumaran et al (2015). They contend that biological effects of climate change on crop yields induces changes in production and prices, which play out through the economic systems as farmers and other market participants adjust autonomously, altering crop mix, input use, food production, food consumption and trade. They contend that, the IMPACT and DSSAT climate models' simulations for the twenty-first century consistently predict increases in precipitation in the higher latitudes (very likely) and parts of the tropics, and decreases in some subtropical region (see Table 2).

Table 1: Climatic Change and Food Security in Nigeria

Production and Yield of Crops in Nigeria in Baseline Scenario, 2010 and 2050

	2010			2050					
	Yield	Area	Production	Yield		Area		Production	
Crop	Yield	Area	Production	Min	Max	Min	Max	Min	Max
Sorghum	1.20	8,261.62	9,922.53	1.98	2.01	8,450.37	9,113.37	16,744.01	18,122.02
Millet	1.28	5,680.14	7,298.22	1.97	2.00	7,969.10	8,490.17	15,676.36	17,001.57
Groundnut	0.76	3,262.32	2,223.19	0.84	0.97	2,845.39	3,534.85	2,720.40	3,202.05

Key: Area in '000ha; Production in '000tons; Yield in tons/ha

Source: Adapted from table on Climate Change & Food Security in Asia and Africa: Agricultural, (Nedumaran et al in *Challenges and Adaptations at Farms Level: Case Studies from Asia & Africa*).

**Table 2: Climatic Change and Food Security in Nigeria
Impact of Alternative Climate Scenario on Crop Production in Nigeria
(Percentage derivations from baseline, 2050)**

Crop	CSIRO B1			CSIRO A1 B			MIROC B1			MIROC A1B		
	Yield	Area	Prod.	Yield	Area	Prod.	Yield	Area	Prod.	Yield	Area	Prod.

Sorghum	0.59	1.03	1.69	0.44	1.25	1.69	1.52	0,23	1.75	0.14	-6.12	-5.98
Millet	1.61	1.61	2.18	0.62	1.74	2.37	0.51	-0.07	0.43	-1.03	-4.63	-5.61
Groundnut	0.30	7.89	8.22	-6.44	2.67	-3.94	7.82	-6.40	0.92	5.87	-13.15	-8.06

Key: Area in '000ha; Production in '000tons; Yield in tons/ha

Source: Adapted from table on Climate Change & Food Security in Asia and Africa: Agricultural, Nedumaran et al in *Challenges and Adaptations at Farms Level: Case Studies from Asia & Africa*.

As climate change progresses, Nedumaran et al (2015) maintain that, it is increasingly likely that current cropping systems will no longer be viable in many locations. As mentioned above, a number of processes linked to climate change will impact agricultural productivity. This is why Easterling et al., (2007) express the view that, agricultural productivity is expected to decrease in tropical regions. Tables 1 and 2 show how climate change productivity effects are produced by calculating location-specific yields for each of the three selected Nigerian crops (sorghum, millet and groundnut) modified with DSSAT for between the 2010 and 2050 climate. They are crops produced in the northern part of the country where the effect of the climate change is much more obvious. The production and yields of these crops in a baseline scenario. Given a particular climate scenario, Nedumaran et al show that the direction of change is determined through three variables – yield, area and production.

Table 1 shows that, the yields, area of cultivation and production output for the three crops is projected to increase minimally or maximally between 2010 and 2050.

A country's wealth and infrastructure will determine, in large part, its ability to tackle and adapt to climate change (Toulmin, 2009). Giving a total of four climate scenarios, Table 2 indicates that, the percentage deviations of the forecast for 2050 from the baseline 2050 values have been reported as they represent the largest of the increases/decreases for the entire time period (2010–2050) for which the IMPACT model makes forecasts. According to Nedumaran et al, the rationale for reporting the percentage deviations rather than the absolute values is that they are indicative of the direction of change from the baseline values. They explain that since the future climate is uncertain, two emission scenarios were considered namely, A1B and B1 for the purpose of this study. Each of these two emission scenarios are combined with the two most commonly used general circulation models (GCMs), namely MIROC1 and CSIRO. On the one hand, the CSIRO model simulates a situation in which there are no increases in precipitation and small increases in temperature. The MIROC model, on the other hand, simulates a future scenario wherein there are the largest increases in rainfall and temperature. The A1B scenario is a greenhouse gas emissions scenario that assumes fast economic growth, a population that peaks mid-century, and the development of new and efficient technologies, along with a balanced use of energy sources. The B1 scenario is a greenhouse gas emission scenario that assumes a convergent world with the same global population, which peaks in the mid-century and declines thereafter, with rapid changes in the structure of the economy towards a service and information economy, with reductions in material

intensity, and the introduction of clean and resource-efficient technologies Nedumaran et al (2015:89). The projected percentage yields, area of cultivation and production of sorghum, millet and groundnut under the four climatic scenarios as indicated above will decrease between 2010 and 2050.

It is indicative from the above analysis that Nigeria will be confronted with serious shortfall in food output by 2050. In other words, given the next thirty years, Nigeria may face food crisis due to effects of climate change. This portends socio-economic challenges for the country. This assertion is supported by Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)'s recent estimate that, the number of people suffering from chronic hunger has increased from under 800 million in 1996 to more than a billion. Most of the world's hungry are in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. The report further indicated that, these regions have large rural populations, widespread poverty and extensive areas of low agricultural productivity owing to steadily degrading resource bases, weak markets and high climate risks. Farmers and landless labourers dependent on rain-fed agriculture are particularly vulnerable due to seasonal variability in rainfall and endemic poverty that forces them to avoid risks. (Nedumaran et al, 2015). Supporting this view, Vermeulen et al., (2012) remark that, climate change is of particular significance for these countries, which already grapple with global and regional environmental changes and significant inter-annual variability in climate change. Also expressing view on the effect of climate change on food production, Godfray et al. (2010) observe that climate change will bring further difficulties to millions of people for whom achieving food security is already problematic and is perhaps the most pressing human challenge as the goal is to nourish 9 billion people by 2050.

Human Security Challenges

While discussing the vulnerability of agriculture to climate change, it is also pertinent to examine its effects on human security. The link between climate change and human security can be looked at from two perspectives. From the socio-economic perspective, the concern is that climate change will “alter and threaten the living conditions of much of mankind. They may induce large-scale migration and lead to greater competition for the earth’s resources” (Toulmin, 2009:114). The second perspective focuses on security risk that climate change-induced conflict engenders. “There may be increased danger of violent conflicts and wars, within and between states” (ibid).

The human socio-economic effects of climate change involve increased poverty, poor standard of living, unemployment, enhanced rural-urban migration. Rosenzweig and Parry (1994); McGuigan et al. (2002), opine that, the impacts of climate change on agricultural activities have been shown to be significant for low input farming systems in developing countries in Africa. Africa has a higher proportion of people living in poverty than any other region of the world. Across the whole region, rural poverty still accounts for 90 percent of total poverty and approximately 80 percent of the poor still depend on agriculture or farm labour for their livelihood (Eneate & Amuas, 2010: 4).

Human security can be defined as the security of the individual with respect to the satisfaction of the basic needs of life. It also encompasses the creation of the social, political, economic, military, environmental and cultural conditions necessary for the survival, livelihood, and dignity of the individual, including the protection of fundamental freedoms, the respect for human rights, good governance, access to education, healthcare, and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his/her own potential (African Union Summit, 2004). Viewed from the qualitative and quantitative perspectives

(Thomas and Wilkin,1999), human security is about protecting and empowering citizens to obtain vital freedom from want, fear and hunger, as well as freedom to take action on one's own behalf including, among other things, creating the building blocks of human flourishing, peace with dignity and a secure livelihood (Salih, 2008).

If the above definition is anything to go by vis-à-vis the effects of food crisis predicted by the analysis on food production between 2010 and 2050 made above, Nigeria will be confronted by a myriad of social problems. Low yields in agriculture, resulting from climate change-induced drought/desertification and in some cases destruction of crops and loss of farmland due to flood, many farmers will be gradually out of job. This in turn will increase unemployment and the poverty index of the country. According to the Global Multidimensional Poverty Index of the UN, Nigeria's poverty index was 46% as of 2010. Higher percentage of the unemployed will imply lower standard of living and encourage rural urban migration for means of livelihood. This will in turn put pressure on the country's urban centres, increasing the rate of crime, emergence of slums, and pressure on government's ability to provide social amenities for the teeming population.

However, the obvious and most challenging national question in Nigeria today is the security of lives and property which climate change-induced conflict engenders. To this end, Toulmin (2009) expresses the view that, climate extremes and uncertainty will add to existing tensions in already volatile regions of the world and Africa will be one of the regions hardest hit by climate change. This implies that, while Nigeria is grappling with the socio-economic induced problems, it also has to guarantee its citizens freedom from violence – physical hurt, injury, abuse or the threat thereof that

constitutes the core of security risk. In the last few years, the country has witnessed serial farmers/herders' clashes over the diminishing arable land due to drought, desert encroachment and flood.

The Farmers/Herders' Conflict

It is envisaged that climate change and environmental degradation will lead to major conflicts and struggle over ever scarcer resources, such as water and good land in Africa (Homer-Dixon, 2009). The tendency to resort to conflict is linked to poverty and weak institutional development that characterized most modern African states (Toulmin, 2009). Although, Africa is a conflictual continent owing to multifaceted factors, there is direct link between resource scarcity and violence caused by climate change.

The farmers/herder's conflict has become a national question because of the ethno-religious nature of the problem. The herders, identified as the Fulani nomads (cattle Fulani), an extraction of the Fulani ethnic group have been in violent confrontation with various local farming communities in the country over grazing land for their cattle. Apart from the northern part of the country where they are predominant, the need for grazing land has compelled some of these Fulani herders to settle in different parts of the country for several decades. However, as the effect of drought and desert encroachment continues to reduce grazing land and arable land in the northern part of Nigeria, the need to remain in business has compelled southward movement of more Fulani herders. This southward surge has led to violent confrontation with the local farming communities. In order to understand the root cause of the incessant violent confrontation, the study interviewed a local farmer, a Fulani herder and relation of a victim of the violent confrontations that have almost

degenerated into inter-ethnic and religious confrontation. They expressed different views on the reasons for the confrontation.

In an interview with Alhaji Jauro Ado, a Fulani herder in Baddiko, near Jengre, Plateau State, central Nigeria, he claimed that his grandfather, Baba Buki had migrated and settled in the place several decades ago. According to Ado, the land was on free lease from one Rakahama, an indigene of Baddiko. Initially, he said that they were not paying royalty for the land but that they started paying a token of N10,000 every five years to the Rakahma family. He maintained that, they had lived peacefully as good neighbours in the past until the face-off began. He attributed the face-off to the use of fertilizer and other chemical by farmers as affecting good pasture for their herds. He also attributed the violent clashes to reprisal action which often occurred when there was loss of life from either side.

Also in an interview with Manchido Ayuba Abarishi, a farmer in Aweh, Nassarawa State, central Nigeria, he attributed the farmers/herders clash to intentional grazing on farmland, an action he considered as vagrant disregard of the farmers' means of livelihood. According to him, the act of leaving the grazing land for the farmland was an indication that their action was intentional. But rather than ascribe it to the effect of climate change, Manchido saw it as an age-long religious rivalry between the Muslim Hausa/Fulani and the indigenous Christian farming communities. He maintained that, this religious rivalry had its root in the inability of the Fulani to establish political control over the minority ethnic groups in today's "Middle Belt states" (Taraba, Benue, Plateau, Kaduna, Niger, Kwara and Kogi States).

Another interviewee who expressed his view was Pastor David Rakaham Boyi, an indigene of Baddiko near Jengre, Plateau State. As a relation of the victim of farmers/herders' conflict, Pastor Boyi presents the opinion of those who are directly or indirectly affected by the farmers/herders' conflict. Pastor Boyi whose sister was a victim of the farmers/herders' clash in Baddiko said that his grandfather leased their family land to Alhaji Ado's grandfather for herding some decades ago. Giving reasons for the conflict, Pastor Boyi expressed the view that, climate change is a trigger to the underlying factors. To him, the conflict had religious motive. According to him, the Fulani herders never had problem with land for grazing. To him, the underlying reason was to Islamize Nigeria. He buttressed this point with the claim that the Fulani herders had assumed the role of landlords on these leased lands to the extent that some of the indigenous people had become tenants on their own lands. The bid to carry out this Fulani agenda had always led to vindictive and vengeance mission.

These three categories of interviewees represent the views of the wider Nigerian populace going by the endemic nature of the conflict. The opinions expressed here is indicative of the fact that as much as there may be some underlying reasons for the farmers/herders' conflict, the effects of climate change have exacerbated these factors. In other words, the effects of climate change cannot be wished away from the interface between these warring parties because land is a major factor for their livelihood. Moreover, the farmers/herders' conflict has spread from the northern to the southern part of the country. Between 2015 and 2019, the country recorded not less than 16 clashes (see Table 3).

Table 3: Newspaper and agency reports between 2015 and 2020 of some incidences of farmers/herders' violence in Nigeria

Date	Newspaper/Agency	Place of Conflict	State	Incidence
Sept. 16, 2015	This Day	Ibi, Ibi LGA	Taraba	9 persons killed
December 10, 2015	The Punch	Kwata, Jos South LGA	Plateau	22 persons killed
February 12, 2016	The Punch	Agatu	Benue	300 persons killed
February 21, 2016	New York Times	Godogodo Village	Kaduna	Burning of buildings
September 8, 2017	Premium Times	Ancha	Plateau	19 persons killed
February 4, 2018	Daily Post	25 Villages	Nasarawa	Houses burnt down
February 4, 2018	World Watch Monitor	Shiuba and Shinure	Adamawa	30 people killed
May 28, 2018	Premium Times	Jalingo	Taraba	1 person killed
June 17, 2018	The Telegraph	Meye Village	Kaduna	71 persons killed
June 25, 2018	New York Times	Several villages	Benue	21 persons killed

August 10, 2018	EU RIR	Benin City	Edo	Several schools burnt down
February 10, 2019	New York Times	Ungwar Barde	Kaduna	60 persons killed
February 21, 2019	New York Times	Kutura	Kaduna	4 persons killed
February 13, 2020	Premium Times	Aywon, Uwheru	Delta	2 persons killed
February 14, 2020	Niger Delta Weekly	Ughelli	Delta	10 persons killed
February 15, 2020	Premium Times	Agadama	Delta	7 persons killed

Source: Compiled from the newspaper and agency reports.

The above Table is a compilation of a few national newspapers and agency reports on farmers/ herders' violence in Nigeria between 2015 and 2020. It shows that not less than 556 people were killed within this space of five years with unquantifiable value of property destroyed. This is excluding several other incidences that were not included in the compilation. And as Krista Mahr, a special correspondent with *New York Times* in a report quoted the Amnesty International to have recorded nearly 3,500 deaths in more than 20 of Nigeria's 36 states within the space of three years. The Table shows that the country witnessed the highest incidences of farmers/herders' violence with not less than 123 fatalities in addition to the destruction of unquantifiable value of property in six states alone.

Potentials Vectors for Climate Change-induced Conflict in Nigeria

Nigeria is an entity within the West African sub-region that share so many common features and effects of climate change. Consequently, there are several trends of potential tensions that will arise because of changes to resource availability and where investment in better governance and institutions would help both strengthen resilience to adverse change and reduce risks of conflict (Toulmin,2009).

Development of Hydroelectric Power and Water Management – Nigeria is contending with developing its electric power need and to effectively manage the various River Basins for agricultural purposes. The construction of hydroelectric dams along so many rivers like Niger, Shiroro and Mambilla amidst the effects of climate change will cut water flow downstream and further put pressure on the availability of water for agricultural purposes in the various river basins.

Migration of People Facing Crop Failure – Climate change could lead many people to migrate to areas with better conditions. Apart from creating environmental refugees as a result of drought and other changes to weather systems, it has also engendered rural-urban migration. The ability of the government to keep impoverished rural people on the land, in their villages or camps. (like in Ethiopia), is to avoid a growing landless population seeking shelter in the cities, since riots by a large and hungry urban mass can threaten and topple an unpopular government (Toulmin, 2009).

Inflation in Food and Fuel Prices – Food insecurity is another factor leading to climate change-induced conflict. The vulnerability of food systems in many parts of Africa is associated with changes in supply and demand. This is based

not only on the rapid increase in prices but also on the high level of uncertainty as regards food availability. Going by the food crisis in most African countries in recent times (like Ethiopia in the early 1970s and Niger in late 1980s), the fear of the Buhari administration on the consequences of food shortages in the big cities is founded. This is because a hungry mob constitutes a very powerful threat to its political future.

Suggestions to Mitigate Food Crisis and Human Security Challenges

On accepting his Nobel Peace Prize, Al Gore called on the nations of the world to mobilize to address climate change 'with a sense of urgency and shared resolve that has previously been seen only when nations have mobilized for war' (Toulmin,2009 :114). From the above discussion, it is obvious that climate change is affecting food production in Nigeria with non-availability of land for farming and grazing as a major challenge to farmers and herders. This in turn has created human security challenge that has gone beyond the livelihood of farmers and herders but has led to violent confrontation between the two sides. As a way forward, the study is making the following suggestions and recommendations.

Stronger Agricultural Policy: The government has been advised to strengthen its policy on agriculture in Nigeria. Machido Abarishi, wants farming to be encouraged so that agriculture resumes its preeminence as it was before the country's independence in 1960. He also advised that, there should also be legislation to protect local farmers from the marauding herders whose activities is creating setback for agricultural food production in Nigeria.

Ruga Settlement as a Solution? - The government is contemplating establishing Ruga Settlements or ranches as solution for the incessant farmers/herders' conflict. The problem to grapple with is the land to use for such Ruga settlements. While a Fulani herder, Alhaji Jauro Ado saw the idea of Ruga settlement as a welcome development, a local farmer, Machido Abarishi was against it. Sharing the same view, Pastor David Boyi was of the opinion that Ruga settlement would amount to snatching land from local farmers for Fulani herders. On Abarishi's part, the move would reduce the farmland for agricultural purposes in States like Nassarawa, Benue and Taraba, considered as the food basket of Nigeria. He also believed that, the idea of Ruga settlement would not work because herders cannot be restricted to a particular place.

Reduction in Gas Flaring: Gas flaring as a contributing factor for greenhouse gases, constitute a major environmental problem in Nigeria. The reduction in gas flaring must be intensified. The ongoing projects aimed at reducing gas flaring, such as the World bank-financed Escravos Flared Gas Reduction Project combined with a tax incentive package for all projects aimed at reducing gas flaring under the Associated Gas Framework Agreement (AGFA) will go a long way in considerably reducing gas flaring in the country (Adegbulugbe and Akinbami, 2006). The promotion of less environmentally offensive energy resources such as solar, wind, small hydro, biogas, should be encouraged. These will help alleviate the burden on the environment through the exploitation of fossil fuels (ibid).

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Interviewees

1. Alhaji Jauro Ado (56 old), Fulani herder. Interviewed at a his settlement in Baddiko near Jengre, Plateau State, Nigeria on January 5, 2020.
2. Pastor David Rakahma Boyi, (54 old), Baddiko near Jengre, Plateau State, Nigeria. Relation of a victim of farmers/herders confrontation. Interviewed at his house at Baddiko on November 29, 2019.
3. Manchido, Ayuba Abarishi, (44 old), farmer in Aweh, Nassarawa State, Nigeria. Interviewed at his house at Aweh on November 26, 2019.

Public Health Intervention: The Role of Social Science Knowledge

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Abstract

The perspective of non-economic social sciences in designing and implementing development programmes is marginalized in discourse and practice. This paper examines the empirical role of social science knowledge in development programmes designed by official development agencies and implemented by governments in developing countries such as Nigeria. The focus is on programmes run by specialised knowledge-based organization, such as – the United Nations and World Health Organisation (WHO). Though the WHO defines health as a social goal, the study has found an exclusivity of biomedical approach and the neglect of social science perspectives in the design of public health interventions. Interventions remain vertical entities that are often divorced from the priorities and needs of beneficiaries and the national health system in Nigeria. The paper argues that mainstreaming social science knowledge in programme design and implementation is critical to effective delivery.

Introduction

A combination of social analytical skills and an awareness of people's social organisations, their institutions and interactions make it possible to understand the complex causal factors that drive development outcomes and social change in various settings, and how it is done. The use of Social Science Knowledge (SSK) has been evolving within Development Practice (DP) since the 1970s as lens to meet these needs, and to operationalise Social Science (SS) perspective more broadly within what is defined as 'development'¹ across all sectors (cf. Gardner and Lewis, 2015:64; Green, 2006:110; Eyben, 1995:46; Cernea, ¹ 1996:11-13). The utility of Social Scientist is also growing, in the drive to 'putting people first' at the centre of development projects in order to enhance (positive) social impacts (WHO, 2008b). Plethora of sources, books and toolkits for social analysis developed in the last decade by major multilateral and bilateral institutions demonstrates growing demand for social analytical knowledge in development work. All of these instruments (see box 1 below) are justified in terms of the shortcomings of conventional development planning methods, viewed as lacking 'human', 'social', 'cultural', 'political', and 'institutional' dimensions (Hall and Midgely, 2005).

The paper takes as a starting point the explicit recognition that failure to incorporate analytical perspective from social sciences design and implementation of development projects generates inequities in the development process (Chambers, 1995, Cernea, 1991). Using a case study research, the paper attempts to interrogate the utility of social analytical knowledge in public health intervention in and within national health authorities in Nigeria, an institutional arena where the applied role of Social

Science knowledge (Social Scientists) is little known. It offers an empirical perspective on its application and contribution to public health programmes implemented by governments, supported by official development agencies, by specialised knowledge-based organizations, such as - the United Nations and World Health Organisation (WHO).

Delimiting the Field: Health and Development

Development is a nuanced phenomenon, its meanings are highly contested and its normative content is also evolving (cf. Hettne, 2009:1-3). The conception of Development to which I refer in this paper is the deliberate action of nation-states or International Development Organisations (IDOs) to 'develop' and 'transform' the economic and social structure of the 'Third World', to pre-emptively engineer 'progress', improve people's health status, living standards and eliminate poverty (cf. UNDP, 1949). Normative accounts of development remain clearly linked to economic progress with an insistent emphasis on economic growth as the primary goal and meaning of development, in spite of equally persistent claim by some social scientists that development is about more than just income and material wealth (Sen 1999:26, Cernea, 1993, 1991; Chambers, 1997, 1983). Rather, they argue that development is about people – their wellbeing, their freedoms, their social organisations and their institutions. In recent times, as the idea of 'development' takes on a narrow meaning of the practice aiming at eliminating poverty and meeting of international development goals. These goals include those of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (2000 – 2015) and the current Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (2015-2030).

Health on the other hand is an elusive concept, and although in its many facets, health status is changing with development, it is not necessarily changing for the better or leading to health improvements. Social, cultural, environmental, economic and structural changes are leading us to new health risks and these different dimensions must be addressed in practical ways if development is to be associated with healthy life, also to ensure a more successful public health intervention (effective and sustainable). The term 'Public Health' itself requires some clarification. As Sand explains, "In relation to the isolated individual, the art of preventing and curing disease is known as private medicine, in relation to the community as a whole, it is public medicine. In relation to those people and classes whose conditions call for special measures, it is social medicine" (Sands 1953:1477). It is these last two uses of the term that is referred to in this paper. The relationships between health and development remain complex. It is possible for development to occur in economic terms without alleviating poverty or reducing inequalities and health disparities (cf. Thomas 2000:38; Kothari and Minogue 2002:2-7).

Nevertheless, growing international attention on the links between health and development has pushed health high up in the international development debates. Albeit, premised on the view that fighting disease will essentially promote more sustainable and equitable global health architecture to stimulate economic development (cf. Brundtland, 1998a; Sachs, 2005, 2002; WHO, 2001). Overall, the contribution of social science perspectives to the vision of development and health is ensuring that people, their priorities, their needs as well as the broader context of environment and health (including the

health system) are at the starting point, the centre and the end goal of each development intervention (UNDP, 2010:2).

Social Analysis, Social Science Knowledge and Development Practice

Growing criticisms of the narrowness of economic growth paradigm and its one-size-fits-all approach along with the acknowledgement that concomitant levels of social development and poverty reduction have not accompanied economic development, fostered an enabling context for Social Development (SD) perspective within development practice from the 1970. Social development perspective emerged as a critique of mainstream development and attempted to push back the predominance of economic world view, and put people (humans) at the centre stage. This critique paved the way for integrating non-economic social science perspective into the mainstream of development planning and created an environment in methods of other social science discipline that could also evolve in development discourse and practice (Cernea, 1991; Midgely, 1995). Social Analysis is the analytical framework used to operationalise **particularly the non-economic Social Science Knowledge** broadly within development practice. Social Analysis brings to bear the conceptual and research techniques of non-economic social sciences into programme planning (Cernea, 1996:4). It is multi-disciplinary and wide-ranging, an eclectic mix of methodologies from the contextualizing disciplines in social sciences with some adapted versions of development administration and management tools (Green, 2002:54). Jackson (2002), coined the acronym SAP as a label for sociology, anthropology and political science, which she identified as the noneconomic social science disciplines

deserving proper role as equal partners with economics in discourse and at the level of development planning and policymaking. This paper recognises historical perspectives as equally relevant within the same frame of analysis and uses the label History, Anthropology, Sociology, and Political Science (HASP) to denote the same point of reference. Just as the primary focus of social sciences (i.e. concern with people), methodologies of Social Analysis (see Table 1) brings to bear the conceptual and research techniques of non-economic social sciences (Cernea, 1996:4). By tradition, the social analyst in multidisciplinary team identifies, conceptualises, and deals with social and structural variables that make up the social dimension of development programmes. They are usually field-based-studies and qualitative analysis of social situations (Gardner and Lewis 2015:60, Green, 2006:111). Basic questions include: Does the existing social and institutional structures have the 'socio-political absorptive capacity' for the intervention being proposed?" (Guillaumont and Guillaumont, 2007). Can it function effectively at the accelerated pace of development projects often triggered by a large financial influx or funding from international development organizations reminiscence of the 'big-push model? What social adjustments are needed to keep step with the other elements of the intervention?

Table.1. Some methodological approaches and current techniques for Social Analysis

Stakeholder Analysis	
Social Assessment	
Beneficiary Assessment	
Gender Analysis.	
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA),	
Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF),	
Participatory Poverty Assessment	
Participatory Learning and Action (PLA)	
More Recent Approaches	
Social Determinants of Health (SDH) logic,	
Health Impact Assessment (HIA)	
Poverty and Social Impact Assessment (PSIA),	
Poverty Analysis	
Political and Social Analysis,	
Power Analysis.	
* Source: World Bank, DFID, WHO	

The demand for Social Analysis grew from the manifest failure of the main theoretical perspectives of development and its ‘trickle-down’ assumption to reduce poverty and inequality in the 1960s. It also arose from repeated failures and negative social consequences that resulted from many planned development programmes and involuntary resettlement schemes in developing countries from the late 1960s. These failures were widely acknowledged as resulting from ‘largely sociologically ill-informed and ill-conceived’ planned development interventions (Cernea, 1991:1, see also Kottaks, 1985; Lele, 1975). The input from Social Analysis is therefore seen as

a necessary contribution alongside the economic, technical, institutional and environmental analyses, which are also required as necessary input in the design and implementation of planned development (ODA, 1995:3).

More recently, insights drawn from people-centered discourses, such as Robert Chamber's promotion of 'bottom-up' perspective, Michael Cernea's advocacy for 'putting people first' and Amartya Sen's capability approach promote Social Analysis in the planning and implementation of development programmes, especially project of international assistance. Their theses which drew attention to the need to broaden development analytics around the social dimension of development further pushed development planners to establish criteria of incorporating Social Analysis in project design and programme implementation. Key areas of interest include, assessment of social processes and issues relating to poverty, vulnerability, gender and marginality.

As a result, Social Analysis has become central to the repertoire with which development practitioners and official development aid agencies have sought to address social and contextual issues, build people's participation into development programmes and improve development effectiveness. The current goal of Social Analysis is to ensure that poor and vulnerable groups either benefit directly from development intervention, or are not disadvantaged and made poorer as a result of their engagement with the development process (ODA, 199:18; Green, 2002:53).

Contemporary Social Science perspective finds expression in dominant development planning frameworks (see table 1) and international development agenda. Such as the World Bank's Comprehensive Development

Framework (CDF), in its recognition of the importance of social institutions, and processes in meeting human needs (cf. World Bank, 2000/01), the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), the MDGs and currently the SDGs. All take the idea of the 'social' as the starting point from which to 'attack' poverty explicitly and recognize Social Analysis (SA) and the role for non-economic social analysis as a prerequisite to planning (World Bank, 2003, 2000, UNDP 2011, 2000). Thus, indicating that Social Analysis has been integrated into the mainstream of development policy design and implementation.

Yet, for all the rhetoric and plethora of sourcebooks and toolkits the inability of Social Analysis to fulfil its key potentials have remained. The sense of optimism shared amongst development practitioners and development aid agencies that integrating Social Analysis into the mainstream of development planning will enhance social impact and produce a more successful, and equitable pattern of development has been challenged. Social Analysis has proved to be of limited effectiveness in enhancing social impacts and improving development outcome. Indeed, while development takes place in some places as measured by an increase in economic growth, social development indicators highlight the fact that for many, deprivation has increased and inequality in the distribution of the benefits of economic growth is widening. Likewise, disparities in health outcomes for a large number of people in sub-Saharan African have also increased particularly among the poorest, facing threats from neglected tropical diseases, climate change, disease epidemics and their impact on health (WHO, 2008b, UNDP, 2010). And even as the UN agencies promoted Social Development and people-centered

approaches, the mainstreaming of Social Analysis ebbs and flows within institutional practice and development discourse.

The marginalisation of Social Analysis within development agencies and discourse was identified as the most critical constraint that limits its effectiveness and the potential impact on development outcomes (cf. Green, 2002:59). Yet, critical insights into the Social Analysis discourse tend to focus on conceptual and ideological examination of its theory, methods and practices (cf. Mosse 2011; 2001; Cooke and Kothari, 2001).

Evidence based on an examination of public health intervention in Nigeria indicates that thus far, so little non-economic social science knowledge is included in programming (Mamman, 2017). The empirical application of social science knowledge or its applied role in public health interventions and the mechanisms by which it contributes to programme planning and implementation is sparse. Besides, the actual processes (social, political and economic) that includes social science-oriented change in institutional structure are so little understood. This knowledge shortfall is a flaw in the literature and it is to this shortfall that this paper has sought to make an empirical contribution through an examination of the applied role of Social Analysis in national public health practice. These tensions are explored more fully in subsequent sections.

The Public Health Paradigm

Within the discipline of Public Health,¹ two epistemologically opposed paradigms can be broadly distinguished as follows: the biomedical approach or biomedicine which sees health and well-being from 'external' 'observation-oriented' perspectives. The biomedical approach relies on epidemiological analytic and on other scientific disciplines like biology, statistics, and engineering, using methods such as surveillance and clinical trials to understand disease etiology. The approach narrows the analytic of population health to individual's behaviour, biology and the risk factors for illnesses. The biomedical approach is reductionist and unsurprisingly falls on the same divide as observation-oriented subjects such as economics (cf. Sen, 2004:261). On the other hand, its alternative is referred to as the developmental approach or social model of health or social medicine. This approach sees health and well-being from an 'internal' 'perception-oriented' perspective. This view of health is underpinned by philosophical perspectives from non-economic social sciences (Sen, 2004:261). The analysis of population health in this context is often seen in terms of the wider political, historical, social and cultural determinant of health, and related events including disease and other sources of epidemiological variations (cf. Farmer, 2006:535).

As it currently stands, the biomedical approach is the dominant model through which public health interventions are articulated and implemented in ID practice. Its epidemiological analytics shape policy formulation, institutional practice and target health care delivery, and remain as the cornerstones of public health ideology. The holy grail of modern medicine remains the search for the molecular basis of disease, increase

'desocialization' of scientific inquiry: a tendency to ask only biological questions about what are in fact biosocial phenomena" (Farmer et al., 2006:1686). Social sciences knowledge is used only to better understand the proximate causes and distribution of disease conditions in a defined population. Social Model of Health or the Social Determinant of Health (SDH) logic provides the intellectual foundation that sustains the applied role of Social Analysis (SA) in field of public health. Terms such as Social Determinants of Health (SDH): 'SDH policies', 'SDH logic' are used to denote the same frame of reference that addresses core postulate of Social Development perspective in public health, such as, community participation and involvement in planning and implementing public healthcare services. Others include key dimensions such as the economic, the political and the environmental, as well as Intersectoral Action for Health (IAH). Social Analysis creates the understanding and awareness of the social and economic issues that accelerate or facilitate preventable morbidity and inescapable mortality, remedying deprivation and disparities (Farmer, 2005:7).¹ The discourses of the biomedical and developmental models paralleled the economic versus socially-oriented approaches and are reminiscent of the broader debates within mainstream development thinking about social and economic development. Much of the criticisms particularly focus on the unravelling of social science disciplines and 'the desocialisation" of public health policies which have largely been brought about by the narrow focus of the biomedical approach and its failure to take due account of "many socioeconomic" factors (Farmer et al., 2010; 2005; Sen 2004; Kleinman 2004 Marmot, et al. (2004, 1995). 'Resocialising' the understanding of disease distribution by linking ethnographic and clinical-epidemiological research

through ‘unflinching Social Analysis’ helps to ensure that the poor are not disadvantaged by disease and intervention therapies are implemented where they are needed the most (Farmer, 1997:125).

Public Health Intervention: World Health Organization (WHO) and Social Analysis

The World Health Organization (WHO) is a leading global health agency formally established in 1948 into the fold of the UN in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War to provide the technical means of supporting the so-called ‘underdeveloped areas’. The WHO constitution (see Box 1) defined its first function as, "to act as the directing and coordinating authority on international health work" (WHO, 1948:2). The WHO has 194 Member States including Nigeria. The Organization’s core functions include working with the Member States and appropriate specialised agencies to achieve health progress. The WHO Constitution went beyond the technocentric meaning of health by defining health more broadly, as an ideal state encapsulated as:

"State of complete physical, mental, and social well-being (Emphasis added) and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity" (WHO, 1948:2)

By giving health the meaning of physical, mental, and social well-being of the individual, the WHO constitution reflected a concern with health in its broadest sense. It also underscores the interplay between the scientific and social-political dimension of health (cf. Bonita et al., 1997:269). Through the assertions that “health [is] one of the fundamental rights of every human being”; the “healthy development of the child” and active cooperation on the part of the public [is] of utmost importance”; and the recognition that “Unequal

development in different countries [...] [is] a common danger” (see Box 1). These assertions necessarily situate public health as a Social Development goal and reinforces organisation’s commitment to promote a concept of health that is multidimensional and requires action on broader determinants of health, and the social factors that underpin health and diseases. WHO’s core responsibilities include global vaccination campaigns, responding to public health emergencies, defending against pandemic influenza, and leading the way for eradication campaigns against life-threatening diseases like polio and malaria (WHO, 2016). As a result, the organization’s programmatic decisions and institutional planning procedures have significant impact on the beneficiaries of internationally driven medical interventions and on the outcome of the process, illustrated in the recent cases of Ebola, Zika virus and Covid 19 Pandemic.

Since the mid-1970s (in the search for alternatives to vertical disease control), the WHO and UNICEF actively promoted the Alma-Ata declaration in 1978, which adopted the “Health for All (HFA) by the Year 2000” through Primary Health Care (PHC). The HFA/PHC strategy (Box 2) marked a forceful rejuvenation and acknowledgement of Social Development approach as a major prerequisite for more effective programme delivery. It also marked the beginning of a new role for other development actors in public health and the need for health improvement to work as a poverty reduction strategy. In the institutional context the Primary Health Care provides the ideological foundation that sustained Social Development Perspective in public health. The HFA/PHC strategy further popularised social science methods and approaches in international public health policy.

Box 1 Constitution of the World Health Organization: Principles

‘NOT MERELY THE ABSENCE OF DISEASE’

Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.

The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, and political belief, economic or social condition.

The health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security and is dependent on the fullest cooperation of individuals and States.

The achievement of any State in the promotion and protection of health is of value to all.

Unequal development in different countries in the promotion of health and control of diseases, especially communicable disease, is a common danger.

Healthy development of the child is of basic importance; the ability to live harmoniously in a changing total environment is essential to such development.

The extension to all peoples of the benefits of medical, psychological and related knowledge is essential to the fullest attainment of health.

Informed opinion and active cooperation on the part of the public are of utmost importance in the improvement of the health of the people.

Governments have a responsibility for the health of their peoples, which can be fulfilled only by the provision of adequate health and social measures.

Source: the WHO Constitution, 1948:2

Box 5.3. Declaration of Alma-Ata: principles “Health for All” (HFA) by the Year 2000 with “Primary Health Care” (PHC), USSR, September 1978 Declaration of Alma-Ata.

I. The Conference strongly reaffirms that health is a fundamental human right and that the attainment of the highest possible level of health requires the action of many other social and economic sectors in addition to the health sector.

II. The existing gross inequality in the health status of the people is politically, socially, and economically unacceptable.

III. Economic and social development is of basic importance to the fullest attainment of health, and the health of the people is essential to sustained economic and social development and contributes to a better quality of life and world peace

IV. The people have the right and duty to participate individually and collectively in the planning and implementation of their healthcare

V. Governments have a responsibility for the health of their people. Primary health care is the key to attaining this target as part of development in the spirit of social justice.

VI. Primary health care is essential health care based on practical, scientifically sound, and socially acceptable methods and technology made universally accessible to individuals and families in the community through their full participation and at a cost that the community and country can afford to maintain at every stage of their development in the spirit of self-reliance and self-determination. It forms an integral part both of the country’s health system, of which it is the central function and main focus, and of the overall social and economic development of the community. It is the first level of contact of individuals, the family, and community with the national health system, bringing health care as close as possible to where people live and work, and constitutes the first element of a continuing health-care process.

VII Primary health care: (1) reflects and evolves from the economic conditions and sociocultural and political characteristics of the country and its communities and is based on the application of the relevant results of social, biomedical, and health services research and public health experience; (2) addresses the main health problems in the community, providing promotive, preventive, curative, and rehabilitative services accordingly; (3) includes at least: education concerning prevailing health problems and the methods of preventing and controlling them; promotion of food supply and proper nutrition; an adequate supply of safe water and basic sanitation; maternal and child health care, including family planning; immunization against the major infectious diseases; prevention and control of locally endemic diseases; appropriate treatment of common diseases and injuries; and provision of essential drugs; (4) involves, in addition to the health sector, all related sectors and aspects of national and community development, in particular agriculture, animal husbandry, food, industry, education, housing, public works, communications, and other sectors; and demands the coordinated efforts of all those sectors; (5) requires and promotes maximum community and individual self-reliance and participation in the planning, organization, operation, and control of primary health care, making fullest use of local, national, and other available resources; and to this end develops through appropriate education the ability of communities to participate; (6) should be sustained by integrated, functional, and mutually supportive referral systems, leading to the progressive improvement of comprehensive health care for all, and giving priority to those most in need; (7) relies, at local and referral levels, on health workers, including physicians, nurses, midwives, auxiliaries, and community workers as applicable, as well as traditional practitioners as needed, suitably trained socially and technically to work as a health team and to respond to the expressed health needs of the community.

VIII All governments should launch and sustain primary health care as part of a comprehensive national health system in coordination with other sectors

IX All countries should cooperate in a spirit of partnership and service to ensure primary health care for all people since the attainment of health by people in any one country directly concerns and benefit every other country.

X An acceptable level of health for all the people of the world by the year 2000 can be attained through a fuller and better use of the world’s resources, a considerable part of which is now spent on armaments and military conflicts. A genuine policy of independence, peace, détente, and disarmament could and should release additional resources that could well be devoted to peaceful aims and in particular to the acceleration of social and economic development of which primary health care, as an essential part, should be allotted its proper share.

Abridged from WHO Declaration of Alma-Ata, 1978.

Today, promoting Social Determinants of Health (SDH) enjoys an unprecedented prominence on the WHO's policy agenda (WHO, 2012). For instance, the organisation continues to make the argument that:

“the most ‘powerful’ cause of disease and health inequalities in the world’s poorest and most vulnerable communities are the social conditions in which people live and work, referred to as the Social Determinants of Health (SDH).” (WHO, 2005:4).

Currently, the SDH agenda is the normative and institutional basis that sustains the utility of Social Analysis (SA) and social science perspective in the formulation and implementation of public health interventions. ¹ The narrative of crosscutting SDH logic in planning or programmatic activities occurs consistently in official UN records. For instance, in its latest policy document 2014-2019 Twelfth General Programme of Work (GPW), the WHO maintains its usual commitment to health as an aspect of social development and followed by a renewed commitment to action on SDH. According to the GPW:

addressing the social, economic and environmental determinants of health as a means of reducing health inequities within and between countries is not new in WHO... its origins can be traced to the Alma-Ata Declaration on Primary Health Care” (WHO 2014a:35).

The document further reiterates that:

The concept of social determinants of health constitutes an approach and a way of thinking about health that requires explicit recognition of the wide range of social, economic and other determinants associated with ill health, as well as with inequitable health outcomes... The wider application of this approach ... is, therefore, a leadership priority for the next six years in its own right (WHO, 2014a:35).

In particular, the WHO GPW 2014-2019, echoes a shift in emphasis away from categorical, disease-focused programmes, and biomedical-centric approaches, reflecting concern for more people-centred approaches. However, since it was established in 1948, various sources of tension – historical, political, institutional, and epistemological – have appeared from its formative years to define how the WHO pursues its constitutional mandate (cf. Lee, 2009: 12-17; Chorev, 2013: 638). In its first three decades, international political climate, the Cold War, geopolitics and scientific breakthroughs (new antibiotics, vaccines) dictated that it holds off social models of health (Lee 2009:45; Irwin and Scali 2005:8). The WHO pursued a biomedical model of health with technology-led vertical disease programmes. Albeit with little emphasis on social considerations, this approach achieved notable successes in particular the historic eradication of smallpox in the 1970s and other diseases such as yaws. Nevertheless, costly failure of global malaria eradication programme¹ promoted by WHO-UNICEF and US agencies in the late 1950s revealed the limitations of the biomedical approach (Packard, 2009:51). Tensions also arise in the organisation between those concerned with improving population health status through biomedical (therapeutic), cost-effective technologies designed to reduce disease and at the lowest cost and those who favoured a broader developmental approach. Also referred to as the supporters of vertical versus the horizontal 'comprehensive' approach health. These sets of tensions, (epistemic and ideational), have substantially defined how the organisation grapples with its constitution's commitment to Social Development principles and approaches to public health interventions. Yet, the perception of the WHO and the way the organisation is presented in the public health literature (as intently focused on the broad and inclusive vision

of health), such as the PHC strategy, the SDH rhetoric appears to make self-contradictory assertions with the experience on the ground. As a result, it diverts scholarship away from interrogating the WHO as specialised development agencies and their implementing partners (governments) in developing countries such as Nigeria and sees SA as an important mandate to fulfil. **As the discussion in the next session shows, (sadly)** the vision for a social model of health promoted in the WHO Constitution and applied methods of social sciences has often come unravelled. As a result, Social Analysis is not often seen in practice in public health development programmes

Public Health Programme Planning in Nigeria: The Role of Social Science Knowledge and Social Analysis

Nigeria is a federation of 36 semi-autonomous states with a combined population estimated at about 171 million making it the most populous country in Africa. There are 3 tiers of government; a central federal government, state governments, and local governments. The Federal Ministry of Health (FMOH) through the National Council on Health (NCH), which is the highest decision-making body in the country on health matter lead the States and Local health authority to coordinate other actors in the health sector including the WHO and its development partners. Nigeria remains deeply fractured by the extreme disparities in health, wealth and development, across the geopolitical zones and cultural and religious differences. Disparities in social indicators and health outcomes between men and women, rural versus urban areas, and between the different parts and geopolitical regions of Nigeria also persist. The unevenness is particularly marked in the Muslim North compared to Christian Southern Nigeria (UNDP, 2015:100). This lack of

security, which is found across the different domain of health, the economic, education, gender food and child malnutrition are more prevalent among families in the northern zones of Nigeria. Although, gender inequality persists across Nigeria, it is more pronounced in the northern parts of the country than in the southern part (UNDP, 2015). A selection of key statistics for Nigeria is provided in the table below.

A Selection of Key Statistics for Nigeria	
Key Statistics	Achievements
Child health	
Infants exclusively breastfed for the first six months of life (%) (2013)	17.4
Diphtheria tetanus toxoid and pertussis (DTP3) immunization coverage among 1-year-olds (%) (2016)	49
Demographic and socioeconomic statistics	
Life expectancy at birth (years) (2015)	55.6 (Female)
	53.4 (Male)
	54.5 (Both sexes)
Population (in thousands) total (2015)	182202
% Population under 15 (2015)	44
% Population over 60 (2015)	4.5
Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.25 a day (PPP) (% of population) (2011)	54.4
Literacy rate among adults aged ≥ 15 years (%) (2007-2012)	61
Gender Inequality Index rank (2014)
Human Development Index rank (2014)	152
Health systems	
Total expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP (2014)	3.67
Private expenditure on health as a % of total expenditure on health (2014)	74.85
General government expenditure on health as a percentage of total government expenditure (2014)	8.17
Physicians density (per 1000 population) (2009)	0.376
Nursing and midwifery personnel density (per 1000 population) (2008)	1.489
Mortality And Global Health Estimates	
Neonatal mortality rate (per 1000 live births) (2016)	34.1 [24.7-46.3]
Under-five mortality rate (probability of dying by age 5 per 1000 live births) (2016)	104.[77.4-139.5]
Maternal mortality ratio (per 100 000 live births) (2015)	814 [596 - 1180]
Births attended by skilled health personnel (%) (2013)	35.2
Public Health and Environment	
Population Using Safely Managed Sanitation Services (%)	
Population using safely managed drinking water services (%) (2015)	19 (Total)
Sources of data: Global Health Observatory 2017 http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.cco	

Security remains an important issue in the country. Since 2014 there has been an upsurge in violent attacks including, bombings, abductions and shooting sprees. Since 2009 the Boko Haram terrorist group has led insurgency in the North-East and the Banditry attacks in North West and North-Central Nigeria, killed thousands of people, and displaced millions more, particularly, including several devastating incidents in major cities of Northern Nigeria. Nigeria perennially experiences multiple public health events, which mostly features epidemics of highly infectious nature, killer diseases and public health emergencies. As at the time of this writing, between the 2014-2015, there was the Ebola outbreak, Covid 19 Pandemic as well as, two other WHO graded emergencies, including the Lassa fever outbreak. Even as, demographic and health indicators have shown improvement over the years these harmful social conditions, specifically, terrorist attacks, religious and ethnic conflicts and related crimes pose threats to development programmes in Nigeria

Nigeria became Member state of the WHO on 25th November 1960 and the WHO Country Office (WCO) opened in Lagos in 1962. WHO-Nigeria is the second largest country operations after India, related specifically to facilitating effective coverage for Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) in Nigeria. Nigeria national health authorities is a recipient of Global Fund for AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) and Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI). The Nigeria's National Health Act 2014 (FMOH, 2014) provides a legal framework for the regulation, development, and management of Nigeria's Health System. This new act advocates Primary Health Care (PHC) approach. The Country Cooperation Strategy (CCS) which is the current main joint planning and programming framework with the Federal Ministry of

Health (FMOH) reflects WHO's vision in alignment with national health priorities (cf. 2015:47). The CCS document (2014-19) links "disease etiology in Nigeria to the social determinants of health [SDH] such as, socioeconomic status, education, gender, access to water and sanitation" (WHO, 2014b: xii).

WHO's interventions in Nigeria have had mixed results. In 1986, following the country's endorsement of the 1978 HFA/PHC strategy in Alma-Ata the Federal Ministry of Health rolled out PHC delivery services including in rural areas. A National Primary Health Care Development Agency (NPHCDA) was established in 1992 to carry out the PHC programmes as set out in the PHC philosophy. Unfortunately, the introduction of the IMF's Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) coincided with the implementation of Primary Health Care (PHC), resulting in stagnation. The PHC however, remains at the foundation of the National Health System, which is largely public sector driven, with private sector involvement. Following some crucial interaction between the context, the actors, the targets and shifts in health policies, under the pressure of an ascendant neo-liberal market-oriented policy by the 1980s, the PHC ran up against strong hostilities. This led to the development of an alternative, narrower model and a neoliberal-friendly version "Selective Primary Health Care" (SPHC). These splits hampered the effort to institutionalize a Social Analysis into public health planning (Cueto, 2004, Lee, 2009).

In 2013, the transmission of Guinea worm was eradicated. However, the government and its development partners have also been less successful with some national programmes that require changing attitudes and behaviour. Attitudes and behavior remain central in the spread of diseases and ill-being

such as family planning and contraceptive use. The southern states of the country, for instance transmission of wild poliovirus was interrupted. Yet, interrupting and eradicating the poliovirus from the northern states faced significant push-back from the community (Birukila et al., 2016:1), described in the words of one observer, as “ill-conceived ill-designed and neglected the views of the community and beneficiaries” (indicative that lessons have still not been learnt).

Empirical evidence emanating from four distinct levels uncovers the institutional process, culture and various factors that currently hinder the inclusion of Social Development perspective and undermine the utility of Social Analysis (SA) in public health development practice. The rhetoric around SDH, Social Development and Social Analysis still far outweighs the practice in official development institutions. In reality, the national authorities planning procedure did not necessarily shift towards mainstreaming SDH logic as emphasized in its latest WHO policy document for a number of reasons.

The first, is that the aid architecture and funding mechanisms of development programmes create vertical programmes and silos, which divide what, should be a multidisciplinary and integrated planning in development work. As a result, it has become a ‘beauty contest’ amongst public health planners and programmes officers under immense pressure and budget-cuts to attract donor funding. Most donors, on the other hand, are under pressure to demonstrate value for money and thus want quick results. This creates a lack of appetite to invest in procedures such as Social Analysis and SDH that seek to tackle health problems on a wide front and on a long-term.

The rise of economism in the international public health sector, particularly the entry of the World Bank as a competing multilateral public health agency and the leading source of health development finance in the 1990s heralded the rise of economic interpretation in programme planning. New insights into key links, better health and improved economic performance, which found expression in the following influential publications unravelled health from its social development underpinning and anchored it on the political economy agenda. World Bank Report (1993) *Investing in Health*, Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (CMH) *Investing in Health for Economic Development* (WHO, 2001). *Health Systems: Improving Performance* (WHO 2000), *Reducing Risk: Promoting Healthy Life* (WHO 2002).

The new universalism and the cost-effectiveness calculus planning model presented in these publications appear to have taken a hold in the organization and increasingly set the terms of WHO work in international public health. For instance, the strategic recruitment of economists to public health programming to adapt this new thinking proved antithetical to the PHC framework, to the degree that supplants Social Development perspectives and has eclipsed the application of SA in programme planning. For instance, the World Bank's contentious Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) framework endorsed by the 2000 World Health Report is criticized for lacking built-in concern for equity, which often leads to corollaries that are at odds with principles of equity (Anand and Hanson, 2004:197).

The Epistemic Communities (epicoms) culture, a positive force for progress 'as agents of policy changes' defined by the fact that their members hold a set of common practices associated with specific policy areas (Haas 1992), paradoxically contributed to the institutional marginalization of Social

Analysis. Epicoms, for instance have positioned Randomized-Controlled Trial (RCTs) and formal statistical methods as the gold standard to the degree that it fosters the sense that medical science holds the answer to population health problems. Such assertion also paradoxically downplays the need for other perspectives in programme development and planning. Such that, Social Analysis with its qualitative people-centred approach, normatively driven by anthropological and sociological perspectives is perceived as epistemologically limited in terms of epistemic relevance and consequently side-lined.

The aid architecture and funding mechanisms of development programmes creates vertical programmes and silos, which divide what, should be a multidisciplinary and integrated planning in development work. These form of inflexibilities within the context of the public health, further complicates the capacity for programmes to initiate Social Analysis, based on current needs of beneficiaries on the ground, particularly when it is not in the funding agreement. The appeal of neoliberal and 'magic bullet' thinking, and the exclusivity of biomedical approach particularly with more recent success with eradicating guinea-worm push planners and public health professionals to favour biomedical approaches. Moreover, the availability of treatment and reliance on technology meant that for many public health professionals (or health workers), understanding the complex social structure, social relations or factors that drive effective programme delivery was unnecessary. Although these factors as outlined here all help to unravel and eclipse Social Analysis, other institutional culture and barriers come in this direction:

1. The privileging of economic interpretations over non-economic social science disciplines.
2. The disregard for social perspectives and developmental approaches in international public health programmes and the focus on commodities and technologies.
3. Indifference towards social relations and people's knowledge and predicating possible community engagement in development planning on political structures and actors, rather than social organisation and social actors.

Conclusion

In light of the outcomes and conclusions drawn in this study, the reader is reminded that if the neglect of Social Analysis and the centrality of social actors in development planning persist, it will be impossible to overcome widening disparities and unevenness in the development process. However, this critique is not a rejection of the biomedical paradigm. Indeed, it is a critique in full recognition of the strengths of the paradigm, and of its achievements in public health. Rather, it is a plea to afford other disciplines, particularly the social sciences their proper role in public health analysis and policy interventions responses in ID practice.

However, the reductionism of the social dimension of development to economic benefits is a flaw. It can hide the absence of a thoroughgoing application of Social Analysis and the adverse effect on the sustainability and effectiveness of public health interventions cannot be ignored.

The future effectiveness and impact of social science perspective will depend on the willingness of practitioners to recognize that if development is about people, their lives, values and institutions and public health is about health life to the community as a whole, then Social Analysis should be at the heart and not at the margins of development practice. Indeed, social science knowledge instrumentalized as Social Analysis and SDH logic must be integrated into policy formulation principles and institutional planning procedure across all sectors.

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Mandatory Quarantine: Risks, Challenges and Experiences of Nigerians Evacuated from The United States

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Abstract:

Studies have shown that Covid-19 belongs to the class or category of novel severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) and that it is a group of hazardous and very infectious viruses and a contagious virus that tends to induce respiratory symptoms and elevated liver enzymes. These symptoms are moderated by other variables, including genetic, race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic. A significant moderator is the inability of any country to control the spread of this virus. In this study, we surveyed Nigerians' experiences, who have been quarantined by the Nigerian government upon their return from the USA. Primary

method of obtaining information through online questionnaire was adopted to elicit information from the respondents during “lockdown”. The number of participants was 10. Participants were of different ethnic, socioeconomic, and educational status. The results showed that most of the respondents indicated that the government and the institution's efforts were fairly adequate. The study recommended better institutional support for persons undergoing quarantine and provision of sound healthcare facility for persons infected with COVID-19 disease in Nigeria.

Introduction

Covid-19, which belongs to the class of novel coronavirus severe acute respiratory syndrome Coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) has had and continues to have a severe negative impact on many people's lives globally. The infection rate is very different from country to country, and within a nation, the percentage differs state by state. This shows that the virus has no limit to who to infect or not. Thus, the Covid-19 virus has no discrimination in terms of those to be infected. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) have shown that people of color in the United States are more vulnerable to be infected by this virus than their white counterparts. However, besides race as a moderator, this virus appears to run across people of different races, ethnicities, socioeconomic, and immigration political affiliation. It is also important to note that some countries have managed this virus effectively and, thus, reduced its spread in a more meaningful way. In other countries, the spread has been high either due to lack of scientific progress, lack of understanding of science, or denial of scientific results. However, according to scientists, results have shown that severe pneumonia symptoms are caused by SARS-CoV-2 infection.

Regarding contact transmission, studies have shown that vulnerable persons can be infected with the virus when they contact virus-containing body fluids from humans or animals. Such body fluids include sputum, saliva, and facial transmissions. Also, a vulnerable person can be infected with the virus when they encounter body-fluid contaminated vessels or items. Thus, indirect contact is a possible means of transmitting this virus (Zhou, Fu, Zheng, Wang, Zhao, and Qi, 2020). An infection can also happen through other transmission routes such as Aerosol transmission, Mother-to-child transmission, facial-oral, and urinary transmission. Recently in the USA, the CDC affirmed that the respiratory droplet could hang up in the air for a short period. Thus, making the transmission possible (CDC, 2020).

Emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) like COVID-19 are diseases that have appeared recently or that have recently increased in frequency, geographical distribution or both (Metcalf and Lessler, 2017). Since the end of the 20th century, there has been a constant stream of newly identified pathogens and an increasing occurrence of pandemic threats to global health (Fauci and Morens 2012). These infections are due to new agents (HIV-1, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome CoronaVirus-SARS-CoV- (2003), avian influenza virus H5N1 (2005), among others. In France, there are more than 20 million travellers every year, 4.5 million of which are destined for areas at high risk for health (Delisle, Rousseau, Broche, Leparac-Goffart, L'Ambert and Cochet, 2015). There are several modes of travel: tourist, business or visiting friends and relatives. Trips can be very short or extended in time. We have seen (re-)emergence of diseases imported by travellers in Europe, such as chikungunya and dengue in France and Italy (Marchand, Prat, Jeannin, Lafont,

Bergmann, Flusin, 2013), and malaria in Greece (Tseroni, Baka, Kapizioni, Snounou, Tsiodras, Charvalakou, 2015).

In order to contain the spread of COVID-19, many countries of the world including the USA and Nigeria adopted “lockdown” and “stay at home” measures. In the Netherland, there were restrictions in tiers. Tier one restrictions include 10pm public curfew while tier two refers to an area being on ‘high’ alert, for example, Nottinghamshire with a ban on households mixing indoors, but public and restaurants still remained open for business. According to Jonathan Gribbin, Director of Public Health for Nottinghamshire County Council:

Positive Covid-19 cases are increasing across the entire county in some areas the increase is steep. To slow the spread and prevent the need for stricter measures, we must only mix indoors within our own household (or support bubble) and we all have to observe the rules on hands, face, and space. . . If you get symptoms you need to isolate and take a test . . . Key to this is making sure you stay two metres apart, wear masks where applicable and wash hands regularly. Hands, face, space. It could not be any clearer . . . to prevent the vulnerable becoming ill, and stop the numbers of hospital admissions rising” (Gedlinge.co.uk, 2020)

In Nigeria, in a move to combat the pandemic disease, on Monday March 30, 2020 President Muhammadu Buhari directed the cessation of all movements in Lagos and Federal Capital territory Abuja for an initial period of 14 days which was later extended to all the thirty-six states of the federation (Nairametrics.com, 2020). One of the effects of the lockdown was that some sojourners became stranded in their countries of sojourn. Thus, some Nigerians visiting the United States of America were stranded and could not return to Nigeria as scheduled on their flight tickets. To ease the effect of

lockdown, the Nigerian government arranged for the evacuation of some Nigerians from the USA to Nigeria, however, such evacuees were to observe mandatory quarantine regulations for 14 days upon arriving Nigeria. Therefore, this paper investigated the risks, challenges and experiences of some Nigerians evacuated from the United States.

Conceptual Clarification

Mandatory Quarantine

Quarantine is a condition, period of time, or place in which a person, animal, plant, vehicle, or amount of material suspected of carrying an infectious agent is kept in confinement or isolated in an effort to prevent disease from spreading. Usually, it is the period of 40 days, during which an arriving vessel suspected of carrying contagious disease is detained in port in strict isolation. Thus, it means any isolation or restriction on travel or passage imposed to keep contagious diseases, from spreading (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2020). Quarantine is also a system of measures maintained by governmental authority for preventing the spread of disease. British dictionary explained that it is a period of isolation or detention, especially of persons or animals arriving from abroad, to prevent the spread of disease, usually consisting of the maximum known incubation period of the suspected disease. Mandatory is the result of a *mandate* or order, which usually comes in

the form of a law, rule, or regulation (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2020). Therefore, based on the above definitions, we can describe mandatory quarantine as the government order or regulation of a period of 14 days isolation of persons arriving from abroad during the lockdown, to prevent the spread of COVID-19 pandemic disease, during the known incubation period of the virus.

COVID-19

Scientists have identified that COVID-19 virus emerged first in Wuhan City, Hubei Province, China, in December 2019. On February 11, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) formally identified the virus caused by SARS-CoV-2 as coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). WHO scientists list some of the clinical symptoms of COVID-19 to include fever, dry cough, fatigue, and sometimes pulmonary symptoms. According to epidemiologists, SARS-CoV-2 is very contagious. Other studies have also shown that most individuals in the global population are both susceptible and vulnerable to being infected and that this disease emerged first from wild animals and transmitted to humans- 'Zoonotic' (Rothe, Schunk, Sothmann, Bretzel, Froeschl, Wallrauch, Hoelscher, 2020); Xu, Shi, Wang, Zhang, Huang, Zhang, Liu, Zhao, Liu, Zhu, Tai, Bai, Gao, Song, Xia, Dong, Zhao, Wang, 2020).

Statement of the Problem

Although, the general global community appears to be at risk in terms of the vulnerability of a population, however, the level of risk varies. For instance,

in the USA, studies have shown that people of color appear to be at higher risk of being infected than the white population (CDC, 2020). Other studies have identified chronological age as a moderating factor in terms of susceptibility. Thus, individuals over 50 years of age account for 53.6% vulnerability, and individuals ten years or old account for 0.9% vulnerability. In terms of gender, males appear to account for 51.4% (Special Expert Group for Control of the Epidemic of Novel Coronavirus Pneumonia of the Chinese Preventive Medicine Association, 2020). Other studies also identified that co-morbidity patients appear to be at high risk of infection. These underlying co-morbidities include the following: cancer, pre-existing respiratory condition, hypertension, diabetes, obesity, and cardiovascular disease. Patients with these co-morbidities also are at higher risk of developing complications resulting from their infections (Guan, Ni, Hu, Liang,, Ou, He, Liu, 2020).

Vignier and Bouchaud (2018) reported that in their study conducted with a number of 347 doctors in France (infectious diseases and general practitioners), they were asked if first-time migrant people represent a vector of infectious diseases different from the majority population: 8% answered no, 13% yes but weakly, 44% yes but moderately, 27% yes significantly and 9% did not know. The introduction of EIDs into human populations seems to be more often a consequence of economic development that brings zoonotic reservoirs in closer proximity to people. Indeed, most pandemic threats are caused by viruses from either zoonotic sources or vector-borne sources (Graham and Sullivan, 2018).

Criteria for Assessing the Severity of COVID-19

The symptomology of COVID-19 has been studied extensively, although a lot is yet unknown. Several studies have divided its symptoms based on mild, moderate, and severe presences of the symptoms at different stages of the progression. Among symptomatic and asymptomatic patients, the transmission is possible from person to person. (CDC, 2020). Other studies have presented lists of the most common symptoms of patients who have been diagnosed with COVID-19, as shown from this table below.

<u>Severity</u>	<u>Criteria</u>
<u>Mild</u>	Minimal symptoms without pulmonary involvement in chest imaging studies
<u>Moderate</u>	Fever and/or respiratory symptoms; multiple limited patchy shadows and interstitial changes in chest imaging
<u>Severe</u>	Dyspnea with a respiratory rate of >30 breaths per minute; resting oxygen saturation below 95% or arterial blood oxygen partial pressure/oxygen concentration ≤ 300 mmHg (1 mmHg=0.133 kPa); multi-lobular disease or lesion

	progression of >50% within 48 h; sequential organ failure assessment (SOFA) of ≥ 2 points; pneumothorax and/or other clinical conditions requiring hospitalization
<u>Critically ill</u>	Respiratory failure requiring mechanical ventilation; septic shock; additional organ failure

Source: Shi et al., 2020.

However, in the USA, the CDC has noted that these symptoms are not rigid but can change their symptomology in an individual and at any different progression stages. The implication is that these symptoms are relatively individualistic in their manifestations and duration. Meanwhile, a lot of countries have been working very hard to reduce the continuous transmission of COVID-19. For instance, EU countries have been able to manage the spread of COVID-19. Thus, the spread has been under control and in a manageable state. In countries doing well to address the transmission of the virus, most of the management resources are made available by scientists.

“The most effective technique is to use handheld sanitizer, wash hands, avoid interaction with face and mouth after engaging in contaminated areas. Infected caregivers should use PPE, gloves, eye cover, gowns, and face mask (N95 or FFP3) to avoid the spread of the pathogen” (Amawi, Deiab, Aljabali, Dua & Tambuwala, 2020).

However, in some countries, there has been a high COVID-19 infection and death, such as the USA. Thus, most travellers returning to their country of

birth have faced restrictions on the self and mandated isolation including Nigerians who have travelled to the USA.

Institutional Quarantine in Nigeria

In response to the outbreak of COVID-19, the Nigeria government has recommended mandatory quarantine for all returnees to Nigeria. Consequently, the mandatory institutional quarantine is to be administered by the National Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) to regulate or control the spread of COVID-19 diseases. Thus, NCDC has described mandatory/institutional quarantine as a restriction of persons' activities when they are not ill with COVID-19 for the purpose of protecting unexposed members of the communities from contracting the disease. This is important for persons who may have been in close contact with a person with signs and symptoms of COVID-19 or has travelled from one of the areas with high transmission of COVID-19 (NCDC, 2020). This means that the person will stay at a facility identified by the government without mixing with family members or the general public for a mandatory period of **14 days**. However, individuals will be required to interact only with surveillance officers dressed in appropriate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) who will come routinely for monitoring.

According to the US Department of Health and Human Services (2020), isolation and quarantine are public health practices used to protect the public by preventing exposure to people who have or may have a contagious disease. While **isolation** separates sick people with a contagious disease from people who are not sick, **quarantine** separates and restricts the movement of people who were exposed to a contagious disease to see if they become sick. These

people may have been exposed to a disease and do not know it, or they may have the disease but do not show symptoms. CDC (2020) recommends that all people, whether or not they have had COVID-19, take steps to prevent getting and spreading COVID-19. Wash hands regularly, stay at least 6 feet away from others whenever possible, and wear masks.

Thus, quarantine is used to keep someone *who might have been exposed to COVID-19* away from others and it helps to prevent the spread of the disease that can occur before a person knows they are sick or if they are infected with the virus without feeling symptoms. People in quarantine are advised to stay home, separate themselves from others, monitor their health, and follow directions from their state or local health department. Institutional quarantine is intended to facilitate early detection of ill health due to COVID-19 and to prevent its spread to loved ones, within the communities, and/or other parts of the country. Thus, by NCDC regulation, all returning travellers to Nigeria and anyone who has been in close contact with a confirmed case of COVID-19 shall be institutionally quarantined for 14 days at their own cost, in a facility identified by the government.

Guidelines for Institutional Quarantine in Nigeria

The federal government has put the responsibility of institutional/mandatory quarantine under the NCDC and state surveillance team daily and the guideline has stated that travellers coming into Nigeria will be institutionally quarantined at their own cost (NCDC, 2020). They shall be quarantined for 14 days in a facility identified by the government; be monitored by NCDC and state surveillance team daily; be provided with a digital thermometer to record and document daily temperature reading;

undergo mandatory test on the 14th day before exit of quarantine or at any point a returnee shows symptom; no family members or friends can visit; after completion of the 14 days of quarantine without any symptoms or tested negative for COVID-19, NCDC and the state surveillance team will formally discharge the traveller from quarantine and hand over his/her international passport back to him/her; and a medical certificate of completion of self-quarantine will be issued, if positive to the COVID-19 test with or without symptoms, the traveller will be moved by the case management team to a treatment site for treatment (NCDC, 2020). These guidelines sometimes appear to be very harsh and challenging for the individual and their families. Thus, this paper intends to identify and explore some of the risks, challenges, and experiences of those who have been quarantined by the Nigerian government upon returning from the USA.

Methodology

The research methodology adopted in this study is qualitative design. Both primary and secondary data were collected and utilized. Key Informant Interview (KII) was employed as the instrument for gathering the data for the study. This instrument was deemed most appropriate to generate qualitative data because it provided the researchers the opportunity to have a direct interaction online with key informants to elicit deeper responses from them, purposively chosen from amongst the Nigerians evacuees from the USA during COVID-19 lockdown. KII questions were administered online to a small group of ten persons being Nigerians stranded in the United States of America during COVID-19 and were evacuated from New York by Ethiopian Airlines on 9th May, 2020 arriving Abuja on 10th May, 2020. Evacuees were lodged at the

Royalton Hotel, Gongola Street, Area 2, Abuja from 10th to 24th May, 2020. The KII was divided into five sections being demographic details of respondents, basic knowledge on pandemic, risks factors to COVID-19, impacts of quarantine on travellers, and challenges of institutional agencies managing evacuation of Nigerians abroad under COVID-19 lockdown. The authors obtained online consent from the respondents who willingly responded to the questionnaires online.

Theoretical Framework

This study adopted the Push-Pull theory of migration proposed by Everett Lee in 1966, which was an adaptation of the original theory propounded by E.G. Ravenstein in the 1880s. According to Lee, migration in any area is the net result of the interplay between place of origin, place of destination, intervening obstacles, and personal factors (Faridi, 2018). He cited Lee (1975:191) which postulates that while positive factors attract people from other areas, negative factors tend to repel them and that some factors remain neutral and people are essentially indifferent.

Public health has been importantly influenced by human mobility patterns since time immemorial (Miller, 2010). Morens, Folkers and Fauci (2008) have noted that the relationships between migration and introduced diseases of epidemic proportions are a recurrent story in human history; and that epidemic events and other scourges of mankind have always travelled along the lines of human population mobility. Disease has frequently followed those pulled to new destinations by opportunity, better conditions, or simple inquisitiveness; or pushed from their homes by events, calamity, or chaos (Gushulak and MacPherson, 2010).

It has been found that experiences involving disease and migration have been woven into humankind's social, cultural, and medical history (IOM, 1992). Remotely, epidemics of plague, cholera, leprosy, and syphilis, and more recently, HIV/AIDS, viral hemorrhagic fevers, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), and swine influenza H1N1 have defined policy responses to protecting regional interests in economics, trade, security, and health (IOM, 1992).

Studies have found that there is an intimate relationship between human mobility, the introduction and spread of infectious diseases, and consequential attempts at control and mitigation of adverse health outcomes (Cunha, 2004; Gellert, 1993). To be effective, programs, practices, and policies must reflect the nature and dynamics of current challenges. At different time, religious orders, cities, states, and nations have implemented disease control policies and practices in what would be recognized today as public health interventions triggered by population mobility and disease events. For example, extensive and coordinated attempts were made to mitigate the impact of leprosy in medieval Europe (Miller and Smith-Savage, 2006) where facilities and institutions were constructed to house and deal with those believed to have the disease. Also, in the 14th century Roman Empire, periods of detention sufficient to allow incubating disease to present with clinical illnesses were introduced and the process of quarantine was born to control the outbreaks of plague in close association with the arrival of vessels carrying individuals who were ill or who became ill shortly after arrival (Gushulak and MacPherson, 2010). Similarly, quarantine practices accompanied the Europeans during their subsequent colonization activities and were introduced in the Americas and other regions. While originally focused on

specific infections of epidemic potential such as plague, cholera, and yellow fever, quarantine became the cornerstone of organized, coordinated attempts to deal with globalization and disease control.

According to Baldwin (1999), the impacts on commerce associated with the global pandemic of cholera in the nineteenth century precipitated regional responses to regulate the movement of vessels, goods, and individuals in an attempt to reduce imported disease risk. The principles of inspection, isolation, and denial of admission were applied to new arrivals at quarantine stations and ports of entry (Parascandola, 1998). The health policies and practices of traditional border inspection services were created to prevent the introduction of diseases arriving with immigrant populations. As major immigration nations began to regulate the process through legislation at the end of the nineteenth century, the medical inspection of newly arriving immigrants became required in nations such as the United States and Canada. The requirement for systematic medical inspection to detect both noninfectious and some infectious diseases resulted in the expansion of port-of-entry medical activities (Gushulak and MacPherson, 2010).

The true effectiveness of these activities was influenced by availability of accurate screening processes (Imperato and Imperato, 2008), the failure of inspection to detect those arriving with latent or subclinical illness, the logistical challenges of providing services at multiple ports of entry (Stern and Markel, 1999) and the application of screening based on the status, class of transport (i.e., steerage), or nationality of the arrival (Fairchild, 2004). The general approach to immigration health remains focused on the screening of certain groups for certain diseases, predominantly transmissible infections.

Therefore, with the risk associated with travellers spreading emerging infectious disease, the principles of inspection, isolation, and denial of admission were applied to new arrivals at entry ports as mandatory quarantine for at least fourteen (14) days of incubation (curation) period, before mixing with the family members and the larger society, was introduced as remedy for the spread of the infectious disease – COVID-19, among Nigerians evacuated from the USA during the lockdown emanating from the pandemic.

Results

Demographic Data

Row Labels	Count of Sex
Female	2
Male	8
Grand Total	10

From the Table above, majority of the respondents on isolation were males

Row Labels	Count of Age
11-20	1
31-40	2
41-50	1
51-60	4
61-70	2
Grand Total	10

The above Table shows that majority of the respondents on isolation were between the ages 51-60yrs followed by 31-40yrs and 61-70yrs respectively.

Row Labels	Count of Nationality
Nigerian	9
USA	1
Grand Total	10

The Table above indicates that majority of the respondents on isolation were Nigerians.

Row Labels	Count of Highest Educational Qualification
Degree	2
PhD	3
Undecided	1
WASC (West African School Certificate)	1
Masters	2
Student pilot	1
Grand Total	10

The Table shows that majority of the isolated respondents were Ph.D. holders while others were Masters and Degree holders.

Row Labels	Count of Social Status
Civil servant	1
Entrepreneur	1
Farmer	1
Gentleman	1
Lawyer	1
Nil	1
Undecided	1
Pilot	1
NA	1
Philanthropist	1
Grand Total	10

The Table indicates that the respondents were of different social status.

Row Labels	Count of Occupational Status
Analyst	1
Architect and contractor	1
Auditor	1
Businessman	1
Civil servant	1
Lecturer	1
Retiree	1
Student	1
Teaching	1
Undecided	1
Grand Total	10

The Table indicates that the respondents were of different occupational status

Row Labels	Count of State of Residence
Delta State	1
Kano State	1
Kogi State	1
Kwara State	2
Lagos State	3
Plateau State	1
Grand Total	9

The Table shows that majority of the respondents reside in Lagos; others were residents of other States in Nigeria.

Row Labels	Count of Local Government of Residence
Epe	1
Ikeja	1
Ilorin	1
Ilorin South	1
Jos South	1
Mushin	1
Nassarawa	1
Warri South	1
Yagba West	1
Grand Total	9

The Table shows that the residents were from different local governments of their States of residence.

Analyses of Variables

Row Labels	Count of Have you heard of Corona Virus popularly called COVID-19?
Yes	10
Grand Total	10

The Table above shows that all the respondents have heard of Corona Virus popularly called COVID-19

Row Labels	Count of 2. Can you explain what you know about COVID-19?
Disease with cold symptoms	1
First case reported in China and has since been spreading all over the world through human contract and contact	1
It is a pandemic that has killed about 300 000 people worldwide.	1

It is a killer disease, although I came to hear of it in February 2020.	1
Lethal	1
RNA virus associated with severe acute respiratory symptoms	1
Started in China and now spreading all over the world through human close contact	1
World cannot explain	1
It is a virus infection that is spread by droplets and affect the respiratory system	1
Undecided	1
Grand Total	10

According to the Table above, the respondents have divergent meanings to Corona Virus. It is a disease with cold symptoms as perceived by one of the respondents. To another, it is a pandemic that has killed about 300,000 people worldwide while another respondent said it is a virus infection that is spread by droplets and affect the respiratory system. Another respondent indicated that the world cannot explain it.

Row Labels	Count of Do you know of anyone that has been infected by COVID-19?
No	7
Yes	3
Grand Total	10

The Table above shows that 7 respondents do not know anyone that has been infected by COVID-19 while 3 of the respondents know someone that has been infected by COVID-19

Row Labels	Count of Do you think that Travelers are predisposed to COVID-19 infection?
Maybe	1
No	2

Yes	7
Grand Total	10

The Table above indicates that 7 respondents were of the opinion that travellers are predisposed to COVID-19 infection while 2 of the respondents said travellers are not predisposed to COVID-19 infection. On the other hand, one of the respondents was indifferent.

Row Labels	Count of If yes, can you explain the risk factors that could predispose or expose Travelers to COVID-19 pandemic with respect to the following?
Close contact and contraction, and poor hygiene	1
Close contact, touching eyes, nose and eye without washing hands after exposure to infected person or thing	1
Contact with infected person or body fluids from an infected person	1
Droplets from people around infect other people around . It is very contagious	1
People are coming from different places with different levels of exposure and hygiene	1
Reduced social distancing	1
When one is contact with the person that the infection.	1
Grand Total	7

Following the responses to Table 13 above, the respondents indicated that close contact and contraction, and poor hygiene, touching eyes, nose and eye without washing hands after exposure to infected person or thing, droplets from people around infect other people. The virus is very contagious, people

coming from different places with different levels of exposure and hygiene; and reduced social distancing are risk factors that predispose or expose travellers to COVID-19 pandemic.

Row Labels	Count of Do you live in Nigeria or USA?
ia	9
USA	1
Grand Total	10

The Table above shows that 9 respondents live in Nigeria while 1 other lives in the United States of America

Row Labels	Count of What was your mission in the USA before/during COVID-19 lockdown
Business	1
Business and UN	
CSW64	1
Conference	1
Doing my training	1
Family Visit	5
To visit my daughter in school	1
Grand Total	10

When asked about the respondent's mission in the USA before/during COVID-19 lockdown in the Table above, 5 of the respondents indicated that they were in the USA for family visit while others were there for business, United Nations Conference, training, and visit to daughter's school.

Row Labels	Count of What was your experience in the US during the lockdown/State briefly
Could still move around and get essential things	1
Hectic	1
I was also locked down	1
I was in my house, going out to get essentials only	1
I wasn't in lockdown where I lived in the US	1
It is not a good one because all social activities were grounded, and I could not visit the historical and important places of interest.	1
No movement	1
The essential service worker, notably food factory workers kept on working unhindered. Their BRT bus was running fare free	1
The partial restrictions partially affected my ease of movements.	1
Undecided	1
Grand Total	10

Highlighting the experience of the respondents in the US during the lockdown in the Table above, one of the respondents stated that there was no movement; another respondent said the partial restrictions partially affected the ease of movement while one other said it was not a good one because all social activities were grounded. However, another respondent said there was no lockdown where he lived.

Row Labels	Count of How did you know about the Nigerian
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government notice for evacuation to Nigeria?

I got the information through a friend back home in Nigeria who was aware that I was stranded in the USA due to the lockdown...	1
Online	1
Social media	1
Television news	2
Through friends and social media	1
Through NIDCOM's link sent by a friend	1
Undecided	1
Through a friend	2
Grand Total	10

When asked on how the respondents got to know about the Nigerian government’s notice of evacuation to Nigeria, from the Table above, one of the respondents said that the information was gotten from a friend back in Nigeria while another got the information through NIDCOM link sent by a friend; another said from social media. Two of the respondents said the information was gotten from friends and television news respectively.

Row Labels	Count of What procedure was put in place for the evacuation?
Airlifting	1
Chartered Flight	1
Come to Embassy	1
Fill a form, Pay the fare, Come to Airport	1
Government evacuation plan	4

through NIGERIA

Embassy

The last minute 1

Undecided 1

Grand Total 10

On procedures taken for the evacuation exercise, 4 respondents revealed that it was through Nigerian government evacuation plan through Nigerian Embassy; some revealed that it was through airlifting, chartered flight, visit to the embassy, fill a form and pay the fare.

Row Labels	Count of What airline was used for the evacuation?
Ethiopian Airlines	9
Undecided	1
Grand Total	10

From the Table above, the respondents revealed that Ethiopian Airlines was used for the evacuation process.

Row Labels	Count of Was the evacuation flight free?
No	9
Yes	1
Grand Total	10

The Table above shows that the evacuation flight was not free as revealed by the respondents.

Row Labels	Count of If No, how much did you pay for flight ticket?
\$1,790	2
\$1,902	1
\$1,915	1
\$2,000	3

3808 for 2 adults	1
Undecided	1
\$1905	1
Grand Total	10

From the Table above, it was revealed that the respondents paid different fares for the evacuation process ranging from \$1,790 - \$3,808.

Row Labels	Count of Did you have a return ticket back to Nigeria before the lockdown?
Yes	10
Grand Total	10

Prior the lockdown in the US, the respondents revealed that they had a return ticket back to Nigeria.

Row Labels	Count of If yes, did you use the flight ticket to travel back during the evacuation?
No	9
Yes	1
Grand Total	10

The Table above shows that the respondents were not able to use their respective return tickets back to Nigeria during the evacuation process in the United States.

Row Labels	Count of If No, was the flight sum refunded or undertaken to be refunded by the Airline?
No	8
Yes	2
Grand Total	10

The Table shows that the flight sum were not refunded or undertaken to be refunded by the Airline after the evacuation process.

Row Labels	Count of Is the quarantine hotel in Abuja free of cost?
No	3
Yes	7
Grand Total	10

The Table above shows that majority of the respondents revealed that the quarantine hotel in Abuja was free of cost.

Row Labels	Count of If No, how much do you pay per night?
N15,000	2
N18,600	1
Grand Total	3

The Table above shows that the respondents that paid during the quarantine period at the quarantine hotel in Abuja paid between N15,000 – N18,000 per night,.

Row Labels	Count of How long duration is the lodging under quarantine?
14 days	6
15 days	1
16 days	2
Undecided	1
Grand Total	10

The Table above shows that six respondents spent 14 days during the lodging under quarantine; two respondents spent 16 days while one respondents spent 15 days. One of the respondents did not disclose the duration of his/her stay.

Row Labels	Count of Is feeding free during quarantine?
No	3

Yes	7
Grand Total	10

From the Table above, it was shown that feeding during the quarantine was free as indicated by seven respondents.

Row Labels	Count of If no, how much is feeding per meal?
N1,200	2
N3,600	1
Grand Total	3

For those that paid for the feeding per meal during the quarantine period at the quarantine hotel in Abuja, two respondents indicated that they paid N1,200 while the other paid N3,600 per meal.

Row Labels	Count of Do you think that COVID-19 quarantine have negative impacts on Travelers with respect to
No	2
Yes	8
Grand Total	10

The Table above shows that majority of the respondents were of the opinion that COVID-19 quarantine has negative impact on travellers with respect to>>>>>>>>

Row Labels	Count of Do you think that COVID-19 quarantine has negative impacts on Travelers with respect to [The supply of basic needs]
No	3
Yes	7

Grand Total	10
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The Table above shows that majority of the respondents were of the opinion that COVID-19 quarantine has negative impact on travellers with respect to supply of basic needs

Row Labels	Count of Do you think that COVID-19 quarantine has negative impacts on Travelers with respect to [Social life]
No	2
Yes	8
Grand Total	10

The Table above shows that majority of the respondents were of the opinion that COVID-19 quarantine has negative impact on travellers with respect to social life

Row Labels	Count of Do you think that COVID-19 quarantine has negative impacts on Travelers with respect to [Psychosocial trauma]
No	3
Yes	7
Grand Total	10

The Table above shows that majority of the respondents were of the opinion that COVID-19 quarantine has negative impact on travellers with respect to psychosocial trauma

Row Labels	Count of Do you think that COVID-19 quarantine has negative impacts on Travelers with respect to [Lockdown effect on the economic livelihoods of the Travelers.]
No	1
Yes	9

Grand Total	10
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The Table above shows that majority of the respondents were of the opinion that COVID-19 quarantine has negative impact on travellers with respect to lockdown effect on the economic livelihood of the travellers.

Row Labels	Count of Do you think that COVID-19 quarantine has negative impacts on Travelers with respect to [Health Impact]
No	3
Yes	7
Grand Total	10

The Table above shows that majority of the respondents were of the opinion that COVID-19 quarantine has negative impact on travellers with respect to health impact.

Row Labels	Count of Do you think that COVID-19 quarantine has negative impacts on Travelers with respect to [Food Supplies]
No	3
Yes	7
Grand Total	10

The Table above shows that majority of the respondents were of the opinion that COVID-19 quarantine has negative impact on travellers with respect to food supplies.

Row Labels	Count of Do you think that COVID-19 quarantine has negative impacts on Travelers with respect to [Accessibility of Travelers under quarantine to supply of necessities]
No	2

Yes	8
Grand Total	10

The Table above shows that majority of the respondents were of the opinion that COVID-19 quarantine has negative impact on travellers with respect to accessibility of travellers under quarantine to supply of necessities.

Row Labels	Count of Do you think that COVID-19 quarantine has negative impacts on Travelers with respect to [Behaviours and attitudes of Travelers towards COVID-19.]
No	2
Yes	8
Grand Total	10

The Table above shows that majority of the respondents were of the opinion that COVID-19 quarantine has negative impact on travellers with respect to behaviours and attitude of travellers towards COVID-19.

Row Labels	Count of Can you identify the state and non-state institutions/agencies that are assisting in the evacuation and management of COVID-19 Travelers?
FEVIC /NCDC	1
NCDC	4
No	3
No idea	2
Grand Total	10

From the Table above, one of the respondents revealed that it was only FEVIC/NCDC as an institution that assisted in the evacuation and management of COVID-19 travellers. Four of the respondents revealed that NCDC was the only agency that assisted in the evacuation and management of COVID-19

travellers while five other respondents do not know the agencies/institutions involved in the evacuation process.

Row Labels	Count of How would you describe the measures put in place by these institutions toward responding to COVID-19 pandemic Travelers?
Excellent	1
Fair enough by local standards	1
Good	2
It's a good idea. We couldn't have moved	1
Measures improperly coordinated	1
Unsustainable	1
Grand Total	7

The Table above shows that the measures put in place by the agencies/institutions toward responding to COVID-19 pandemic for travellers was good as indicated by two respondents. One of the respondents revealed that it was an excellent measure put in place while one other said it was fair enough by local standards. On the other hand, one of the respondents indicated that the measure was improperly coordinated while one other revealed that it was unsustainable.

Row Labels	Count of Can you explain how adequate are the following measures taken by these institutions/agencies? [Lockdown and restriction of movement.]
Adequate	4
Fairly Adequate	1
No Measure was taken	2
Not adequate	2
Very Adequate	1

Grand Total	10
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On how adequate were the measures taken by the institutions/agencies i.e. lockdown and restriction of movement, five respondents indicated that the measures were adequate; two indicated that the measures were not adequate while two others indicated that no measure was taken.

Row Labels	Count of Can you explain how adequate are the following measures taken by these institutions/agencies? [Accommodation provision.]
Adequate	5
Fairly Adequate	1
Not adequate	2
Very Adequate	1
No Measure was taken	1
Grand Total	10

For the provision of accommodation as a measure taken by the agencies/institutions, six respondents indicated that the measure was adequate; while two of the respondents revealed that the measure was not adequate.

Row Labels	Count of Can you explain how adequate are the following measures taken by these institutions/agencies? [Setting up of isolation centers for suspected COVID-19 patients who are Travelers]
Adequate	3
Fairly Adequate	1
No Measure was taken	2
Not adequate	4
Grand Total	10

For setting up isolation centres for suspected COVID-19 patients who are travellers as a measure taken by the agencies/institutions, three respondents

indicated that the measure was adequate; while two of the respondents revealed that no measure was taken. On the other hand, four respondents revealed that the measure was inadequate.

Row Labels	Count of Can you explain how adequate are the following measures taken by these institutions/agencies? [Provision of hygiene materials such as hand sanitizers, soap, running water etc.]
Adequate	4
Fairly Adequate	1
No Measure was taken	1
Not adequate	3
Very Adequate	1
Grand Total	10

From the Table above, five respondents revealed that the measures taken in the provision of hygiene materials such as hand sanitizers, soaps, and running water amongst others were adequate; one each revealed that the measures taken were fairly adequate, three respondents showed that the car was not in good shape.

Row Labels	Count of Can you explain how adequate are the following measures taken by these institutions/agencies? [Provision of testing kits for COVID-19 suspected cases.]
Adequate	3
Fairly Adequate	1
No Measure was taken	3
Not adequate	2
Very Adequate	1
Grand Total	10

The Table above shows that 4 respondents were of the opinion that measures taken in the provision of testing kits for COVID-19 suspected cases

were adequate; three respondents revealed that provision of testing kits for COVID-19 suspected cases were inadequate; while two others were of the opinion that the measures were not adequate.

Row Labels	Count of Can you explain how adequate are the following measures taken by these institutions/agencies? [Awareness and sensitization programmes on prevention of COVID-19 virus.]
Adequate	3
Fairly Adequate	1
No Measure was taken	2
Not adequate	3
Very Adequate	1
Grand Total	10

The Table above shows that 4 respondents were of the opinion that measures taken in awareness and sensitization programmes on prevention of COVID-19 virus was adequate; three respondents revealed that awareness and sensitization programmes on prevention of COVID-19 virus were inadequate; while two others indicated that no measure was taken.

Row Labels	Count of Can you explain how adequate are the following measures taken by these institutions/agencies? [Enforcement of social distancing protocol.]
Adequate	3
Fairly Adequate	1
No Measure was taken	2
Not adequate	3
Very Adequate	1
Grand Total	10

The Table above shows that 4 respondents were of the opinion that measures taken in enforcement of social distancing protocol was adequate; three respondents revealed that enforcement of social distancing protocol was inadequate.

Row Labels	Count of Can you explain how adequate are the following measures taken by these institutions/agencies? [Enforcement of wearing of face masks.]
Adequate	4
fairly Adequate	1
No Measure was taken	1
Not adequate	3
Very Adequate	1
Grand Total	10

The Table above shows that 5 respondents were of the opinion that measures taken in enforcement of wearing of face masks was adequate; three respondents revealed that enforcement of wearing of face masks was inadequate; while one respondent was of the opinion that no measure was taken.

Row Labels	Count of Can you explain how adequate are the following measures taken by these institutions/agencies? [Treatment and care of infected Travelers by the CPVID-19.]
Adequate	3
Fairly Adequate	1
No Measure was taken	2
Not adequate	3
Very Adequate	1
Grand Total	10

The Table above shows that 4 respondents were of the opinion that measures taken in treatment and care of infected travelers by the COVID-19 was adequate; three respondents revealed that treatment and care of

infected travelers by the COVID-19 was inadequate; while two others indicated that no measure was taken.

Row Labels	Count of Can you explain how adequate are the following measures taken by these institutions/agencies? [Coordination between Travelers and managing Institutions/Agencies]
Adequate	3
No Measure was taken	3
Not adequate	3
Very Adequate	1
Grand Total	10

The Table above shows that 4 respondents were of the opinion that measures taken in coordination between travelers and managing institutions/agencies was adequate; three respondents revealed that coordination between travelers and managing institutions/agencies was inadequate; while three others indicated that no measure was taken.

Row Labels	Count of How would you describe the efforts of Government and the institution? do you also think that they are adequate?
Adequate	2
Fair	2
Good	2
I will say averagely	1
Not adequate	2
Undecided	1
Grand Total	10

The Table above shows that 2 of the respondents indicated that the efforts of the government and the institution were adequate; two each indicated that the efforts were fair, good and inadequate respectively.

Row Labels	Count of Any other useful information:
Information dissemination upon arrival before disembarking from the aircraft (where they are going, duration of the journey to accommodation reservation area). Finally, I will want to commend the NCDC management for the great work and care, God bless you all. Don't mind my spelling and choices of words used.	1
Pls being in quarantine does not make one a felon	1
Sample collection procedures need improvement, results turnaround time poor	1
Synergy between government agencies and the State law enforcement organs	1
The passport needed not to have been seized.	
Everywhere is on lockdown	1
While lockdown is ongoing, government should brief the public on progress on the cure of COVID19	1
Grand Total	6

Discussion of Results

Demographic Data of Respondents

Result showed that there were 8 males and 2 females, majority (4) of them aged between 51-60 years old. 9 of them except one were Nigerians and 7 of them had First degree as minimum educational qualification. They were of different social and professional status and majority were from Lagos while others were from other states. This is a reflection of the fact that the respondents were well educated and professionally engaged in various jobs being mainly citizens of Nigeria from different states and they are matured elites.

Basic Knowledge of COVID-19 Pandemic

Result showed that all the respondents have heard of COVID-19 before, they have basic knowledge of the disease. However, they have divergent opinions on the symptoms, the number of persons affected and the death tolls globally.

Risks Factors to COVID-19 Virus

All the respondents indicated to know the risk factors in the spread of the virus. Majority (7) respondents were of the opinion that travellers are predisposed to COVID-19 infection while 2 of the respondents said travellers

are not predisposed to COVID-19 infection. On the other hand, one of the respondents was indifferent. Following the responses of the respondents, they have diverse opinion on the causes and spread of COVID-19 through close contact and contraction, poor hygiene, touching eyes and nose without washing hands after exposure to infected person or thing and that droplets from people around can infect other people. Respondents also said it is very contagious, people coming from different places with different levels of exposure and hygiene; and reduced social distancing are risk factors that predispose or expose travellers to COVID-19 pandemic.

Impacts of Quarantine on Travellers

Results showed that 9 out of 10 respondents live in Nigeria. Only one lives in the USA. Majority of them were in the US for family visits while others went for business, conference, and training. Respondents had different experiences in the US during the lockdown and information of evacuation to Nigeria were mainly received through friends and the media. Majority of them also said evacuation process were through the Embassy and airlifting was by Ethiopian Airline at personal cost of an average of \$2,000 per evacuee. The respondents were not able to use their respective return tickets bought prior to COVID-19 back to Nigeria during the evacuation process in the United States. Majority of the respondents said the hotel rate was between N15,000 and N18,600 per night and they spent an average of 15 days in the hotel. Majority's responses showed that feeding in the hotel was free while 3 of the respondents said they paid between N1,200 to N3,600 per meal. These experiences had grave financial cost for the evacuee.

Also, majority of the respondents were of the opinion that COVID-19 quarantine has negative impact on travellers with respect to supplies of basic

needs, social life, psycho social trauma, economic livelihood, health, food, supply of necessities, behaviours and attitudes of travellers towards COVID-19. The implication is that participants appeared to have their human needs put on temporary hold upon arriving Nigeria. This is to reflect the fact that we are all operating and living within unusual time. Thus, the psychological, financial, and social impacts cannot be ignored.

Challenges of institutional Quarantine during COVID-19 Lockdown

The majority of the respondents could only identify NCDC as the agency managing the institutional quarantine. There is diverse opinion on suitability, coordination, and sustainability. The majority indicated that the accommodation was adequate. However, participants reported mixed feelings and responses on the adequacy of setting up isolation centers for suspected COVID-19 patients returning to Nigeria from the U.S.A. Such inadequacies include the provision of hygiene, testing kits, sensitization programs on prevention of the COVID-19 virus, enforcement of social distancing, wearing face masks, treatment, and care of COVID-19 patients. Also, there were inadequacies related to coordination between travelers and managing institutions/agencies and the government's efforts.

Implications for Practice and Policy

Over nine months into the detection of COVID-19, the Nigerian government seems to struggle to provide sufficient testing resources to the population and individuals quarantined upon their return from the US. Although, centralized testing sites exist, it is essential to note that these sites

have left many people behind in testing. Also, the centralization of testing has left healthcare workers without enough personal protective equipment (PPE). Due to the lack of enough PPE and limited testing availability, many healthcare workers have refused to provide services due to fear and anxiety of not being protected. Therefore, it is incumbent on the Nigerian government to ensure that testing centers are decentralized and provide sufficient testing resources to community health centers. Furthermore, the Nigerian government should give enough PPEs to healthcare workers who provide medical services to Nigerians quarantined.

The participants' results also appeared to have mixed feelings regarding the provision of a hygienic environment, which is part of preventative techniques during this COVID-19 period. The implication is that the government must provide sufficient clean materials for those quarantined and the population. In other words, the government has the responsibility of giving hygienic materials and providing psychoeducation on hygiene on hand washing, healthy coughing techniques, social distancing, and avoidance of large crowd gathering. Therefore, healthcare *"officials also need to ensure that quarantined households have enough supplies for their basic needs and, importantly, the provision of these basic needs must be as rapidly as possible. Coordination for provision of supplies should ideally occur in advance, with conservation and reallocation plans established to ensure resources do not run out...."* (Brooks, 2020:919). These responsibilities could serve as a preventative approach as well as curative approaches.

Furthermore, quarantine could serve as a preventative technique and strategy. Nonetheless, this is not without some mental health side effects. For instance, "during major infectious disease outbreaks, quarantine can be a

necessary preventive measure. However, "a quarantine is often associated with a negative psychological effect. During the period of quarantine, these negative psychological effects are unsurprising. Yet studies have shown that the psychological effects of quarantine are detectable months or years later. Other studies have shown that psychological effects of quarantine are troubling and suggest the need to ensure that effective mitigation measures be available as part of the quarantine planning process" (Brooks, Webster, Smith, Woodland, Wessely, Greenberg, & Rubin, 2020: 917; Jeong Yim, & Song, 2016; Liu, Kakade, & Fuller, 2012). The implication is that the government is responsible for making policies that will work toward developing mental health sites for individuals under the quarantine period. Doing so will help reduce the short and long-term adverse mental health effects during and after the quarantine period.

It is also crucial that individuals quarantined have access to comprehensive COVID-19 related information with regards to how it spreads, infection rate, physical symptoms of the virus, risk factor and protective factors of the virus, individuals' vulnerability, and many more forms of information. Such information will help to ease the catastrophic fear of many individuals under quarantine. Thus, it implies that the government must provide public health workers with all the necessary educational tools to ensure that individuals quarantined have access to a comprehensive knowledge of the virus. Also, "it is important that public health officials maintain clear lines of communication with people quarantined about what to do if they experience any symptoms. A phone line or online service specifically set up for those in quarantine and staffed by healthcare workers who can provide instructions about what to do in the event of developing illness

symptoms, would help reassure people that will be cared for if they become ill" (Brooks et al., 2020:918; Manuell & Cukor, 2011).

Conclusion

The study concluded that COVID-19 pandemic has affected all the nations of the earth, causing health challenges, death tolls, restriction of movement by lockdown, compulsory compliance with some hygiene tips like washing of hands with soap, application of hand sanitiser, wearing of face masks; and also undergoing mandatory quarantine for travellers. Unfortunately, some people who travelled out of their countries of residence were stranded in their host countries, including some Nigerians visiting and stranded in the US and the logistics of evacuating them back to Nigeria and institutional quarantine for 14 days had huge financial costs on them. Other costs related to social isolation which triggered limited and lack of ability to accomplish their physiological needs, physiological conditions such as food, water, and other basic needs were also experienced.

Recommendations

This study recommends that since travelling from one country to the other cannot be stopped during the COVID-19 pandemic and it has been established that travellers are predisposed to COVID-19 infection in the face of the risk factors in the spread of the virus, it is therefore suggested that all healthcare precautions like sound COVID-19 medical test, prevention protocols of wearing of face masks, social distance, avoiding crowded areas, and good health etiquette of washing of hands among others should be

institutionalised as compulsory for all travellers without compromise at any level.

To alleviate the challenges occasioned by quarantine, the government can subsidize accommodation or negotiate fair price with designated hotel owners, to make hotel bills affordable to people undergoing quarantine; and should also ensure that good food with balanced diet are provided for travellers on quarantine in order to maintain good health status. Household necessities like toiletries, little provisions, basic medicals are also provided for each in their hotel rooms since movement and interactions are completely restricted for them during quarantine.

Moreover, the lockdown situation that led to the evacuation of respondents was sudden and unplanned and the arrangement for airlifting was to salvage unnecessary long stay in their host country (USA), through a designated airline (Ethiopian Airline), which necessitated purchase of new flight ticket, being additional cost. It is suggested that travellers should be allowed to use their original return flight ticket at a later date with their respective airline operators instead of forfeiting it.

Above all, the Nigerian government should ensure that testing centers are decentralized and provide sufficient testing resources to community health centers and also give enough PPEs to healthcare workers who provide medical services to Nigerians who are quarantined.

In addition, the government must provide sufficient clean materials for those quarantined and the population, give hygienic materials and provide psychoeducation on hygiene such as, hand washing, healthy coughing techniques, social distancing, and avoidance of large crowd gathering. This will

address the participants' mixed feelings regarding the provision of a hygienic environment, which is part of preventative techniques during this COVID-19 period.

Above all, it is recommended that the Nigerian government should provide modern and well-equipped medical facility around the country, to address medical and social challenges arising from COVID-19 pandemic, and especially to ensure good provision of sound healthcare for persons infected with COVID-19 disease during isolation and quarantine in Nigeria.

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Migration and Urban Violence in Nigeria: Imperative of Peace Culture

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Abstract

The phenomenon of violence arising from migratory characteristic of urbanisation has invariably constituted an integral dimension of intrastate conflicts in various parts of post-colonial Nigeria. Despite the subsisting approaches for managing the crisis, the menace of urban violence has continued to manifest in varying dimensions with the concomitant implications for societal peace, and security. Employing qualitative method of data collection, this study analysed the nexus between migration and urban violence within the context of the imperative of peace culture as a constructive management instrument. Findings revealed that urban centres have remained the hub of inter-group violence because they are an agglomeration of peoples from diverse cultural, ethnic, linguistic and historical backgrounds. Given the inevitability of migration in all spheres of urban life, the study contended that peace culture has the prospect for managing differences without being indifferent, and responding to inter-group conflicts nonviolently through shared values of mutual identity, equity, unity of purpose and dialogue. Peace education should as a matter of education policy,

be adopted as a channel for inculcating peace culture and ideals of nonviolence in the citizenry, thereby discouraging arbitrary inter-ethnic acrimony, ethno-religious rivalries and socio-political entanglement that have always exacerbated the culture of violence in urban centres.

Keywords: Migration; Urban Violence; Peace Culture; Mutual Identity; Unity of Purpose.

Introduction

Migration has remained a constant source of contact and an indispensable component of interaction among humans in time perspective. Virtually all historical events among humans at both micro and macro levels are either a product of migration or its consequence or both: adventures, empire formation and deformation, environmental hostility, humanitarian crisis, political formation and reformation, religious movements, industrialisation, war expeditions, trade and commerce. Thus, it cannot be overemphasised that migration has always constituted a critical vehicle that drives all aspects of human activities from cradle to gray hair as it has always been at the centre of change, development and transformation in any given society in time and space.

As hubs for socio-economic activities, urban centres provide a variety of possibilities for society mobility. The share of the world's population living in urban areas has risen from under 5% in 1800 to 48% in 2002, and by 2030, 65% are projected, although more than 90% of potential population growth in urban areas in developed countries is expected to be concentrated and a

substantial part of that population would be poorly populated (UNICEF, 2002; United Nations, 2002).

Nigeria has witnessed manifold manifestation and intensity of internal conflicts of various dimensions in its colonial and postcolonial epochs. Most of these conflicts are a product of migration of people from diverse cultural, ethnic, religious, socioeconomic and political backgrounds. A plethora of examples abounds to the effect that urban centres are historically associated with violence during the precolonial, colonial and postcolonial epochs. Mention could be made of Aba Women War of 1929 (See Uchendu, 2007); the 1968-1969 peasant farmers (*Agbekoya*) crisis in southwest Nigeria (Afolabi, 2012) and many pro-democracy protests such as the nationwide demonstration against the annulment of June 12 1993 presidential election and the #ENDSARS protest against police brutality and bad governance in October 2020.

Virtually all the six geo-political zones in the country have increasingly urbanized arising from fast growth of the country's population. For instance, Lacey (1985) acknowledged the rapid growth in numerous urban centres across the various regions of Nigeria. These include Aba, Benin, Enugu and the Port of Harcourt, Sapele, and Warri in South-South part of Nigeria; Ibadan and Lagos, Abeokuta, Osogbo in Southwestern Nigeria; Jos, Kaduna, Kano and Zaria; in Northern Nigeria as well as the Federal Capital Territory. Following from the foregoing, violence in urban centres has continued to intensify and assume varying proportions in Nigeria's postcolonial life. In the fourth Republic, urban violence has constituted a worrisome threat to the thriving of Nigeria's democratic experimentation as no part of the country is absolutely

exonerated from one form of urban violence or the other, thereby making the crisis of urban violence a critical concern about national security.

Appreciable volume of documented information on both micro-study and macro-study avails in extant body of literature about migration history, sociological composition, group contact and human relations (Zandan, 1966; Clarke, 1972; Ajayi & Akintoye, 1980; Tijani, 2006; Falola, 2012; Olaoba, 2015; Strategic Conflict Assessment of Nigeria, 2016). Sociological and demographic studies are also seemingly suffused with human responses to the push/pull factors of migration and social change (Falola & Okpeh, 2008; Akpen, 2019). Other scholars such as Kukah (1993); Babarinsa (2003) and Anifowose (2011) have expressly depicted urban centres as notorious hubs of religious, ethno-communal, electoral and political violence. Nevertheless, scant attention has been concentrated on the nexus between paucity of peace culture and the intensity of violence in Nigeria's urban centres. Indeed, despite Ruth Watson's (2005) identification of violence in urban centres as a major trigger of civil disorder, her work did not examine the place of peace culture in stemming the tide of the social menace. Therefore, this treatise seeks to expand the horizon of scholarship on urban studies by critically exploring the relevance of peace culture as a panacea for urban violence in Nigeria. The study seeks to interrogate the interplay of migration and urban violence in Nigeria in view of the imperative of peace culture as a veritable management instrument. The central argument is that despite the long historical and sociological ties between migration and urban violence, the menace is susceptible to management giving an atmosphere deliberately dedicated to the propagation of peace culture as against the culture of war. A reinforcing component of that axiomatic exploration is that considering widely accepted fact about

protracted conflict as the major impediment to national integration and development, policy makers and other stakeholders in conflict management cannot be well equipped in addressing the menace of urban violence in the country without adequately incorporating the ideals of peace culture into the mainstream of Nigeria's peace policy framework.

Conceptual discourses:

Migration

Migration is one of the central phenomena that explain the peculiar characteristics of humans as social beings. Migration is as old as humans on the surface of the earth because humans are the driving force in the process. Migration is inevitable in the whole gamut of human activities, it is an integral component of all variables that determine the dynamics of change, development, social integration (and disintegration) in human history. The evolutionary process of individuals or a group of people in any given area is organically predicated on migration (Iroju, 2003).

Migration is the driving force of every factor of change in the interaction among humans and their topographic milieu. Knowledge transfer, information sharing, economic activities, cultural composition and social mixture, spread of pandemic, conflict generation and waging of wars, political reformation, religious movements, terrorism spread, etc. are a product of migration. Migration is central to the process of societal evolution and development. This indicates that the histories of many societies around the world are often characterized by tales of migratory movements and human settlements (Mgbeafulu, 2003).

Broadly speaking, migration can be categorised into two, namely: voluntary migration and forced migration. Voluntary migration is inspired by the initiative and the liberal choice of individuals or group of people. It is usually influenced by a combination of factors including economic, political and social. These determinant factors are either in the migrants' locality (determinant factors or "push factors") or in the intending host community (attraction factors or "pull factors"). "Push-pull factors" are the reasons that instigate or attract people to a particular place. "Push" factors are the negative aspects of the country of origin, often decisive in people's choice to emigrate whereas the "pull" factors are the positive aspects of a different country that encourages people to emigrate in search of a better life. Forced migration refers to the movements of refugees and internally displaced people (displaced by conflict) as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects.

Migration can be likened to mixed blessings in terms of its effect on human society. In its positive construct, migration can be a source of a host of opportunities for the individuals and groups involved at both ends of host and settlers. For instance, migration is a driver of growth, development, social transformation and exposure for people as it opens up access to employment, acquisition of skills and qualifications, improvement of life conditions. On the contrary, if not carefully managed, migration as a process can provide an avenue for tremendous inequalities and serious human rights abuses and trigger host/settlers' frictions.

UNESCO emphasises the impact of human migration towards accomplishing its mission on poverty eradication, capacity-building, sustainable development and intercultural dialogue through education, the sciences,

culture, communication and information. It stresses the human face of migration and addresses the implications of the movement of people within its fields of competence, drawing on relevant human rights principles and standards. Thus, human migration is considered central to pursuing and achieving the following objectives:

1. Contribute to a policy environment conducive to the social integration and inclusion of migrants (see for instance activities on internal migration in India);
2. Understand the links between migration and education, and the challenges raised by intercultural education, brain drain/gain, student mobility and the international recognition of qualifications;
3. Address the social dimensions of climate change and migration, particularly regarding governance, conflict, human rights and international law, gender equality, economic and human development and public health. In parallel to these initiatives, UNESCO has always been proactively inclined to the collective efforts of the Global Migration Group (GMG).

It has been asserted that the movement and intermingling of people within and across the borders of their own territories are undoubtedly some of the greatest processes which facilitated the transformation of mankind (Sadik, 1998; Ochonma, 2011; Biney, 2008; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2007; Alubo, 2006; Badru, 1998; Nnoli, 1978).

Thus, the quest for understanding the nature, the evolution and development process of any group of people is dependent upon understanding their migration history. This simply suggests that migration tends to shape the course of events and patterns of social formation and interaction of most

societies. Zanden (1966) aptly captures the whole essence of migration in every aspect of human life when he argues that, “if people were content to live among their own kind in communities that were more or less isolated from one another, racial and prejudice would be virtually unknown”.

Mabogunje (1970), in his Systems approach to the study of rural-urban migration averred that once migration has taken place, adjustments occur in both the areas of origin and destination. These adjustments could be positive or negative as in encouraging more flow from the area of origin or conflicts between the migrants and the host community. However, though migration engenders conflict, migration alone cannot be a sufficient reason or explanation for conflict generation. This fact is subsumed in Nnoli’s (1978) position that it is not the contact between groups that in itself breeds inter-group conflicts but the degree of competing claims among the groups. This degree of competing contest for power, economic resources, social amenities, and the preservation of primordial ties.

Peace culture

Peace is commonly considered as an atmosphere of calm or quietness without disputation, aggression and disruptions in a given society (Hornby, 2006). This line of exploration on the meaning of peace as mere absence of war was so perceived partly as early studies of peace were highly influenced by the consideration of the tragedies of WWII and by a sense of crisis in human survival triggered by a complete nuclear war of the two superpowers (Matsuo 2005). On a broader consideration, peace is perceived as an atmosphere of harmonious coexistence among people through the development of

intergroup or interpersonal skills employed to avoid confrontation. In other words, peace in this light is usually interpreted in matters of social or economic wellbeing as the absence of animosity or the presence of stable and freshly healed stability, acceptance of equal rights and justice in diplomatic relations at any level of human relations in the interaction among humans.

Peace culture is a body of shared values, attitudes, behaviours and ways of life based on respect for fundamental rights and freedom; understanding, tolerance and solidarity; sharing and free flow of communication; and full participation and empowerment of women; non-violent resolution of conflicts and the transformation of violent competition into cooperation for shared goals (Cordesman, 2003). According to United Nations Declaration on Peace culture and Non-Violence, Peace culture is considered as “an integral approach to preventing violence and violent conflicts, and an alternative to the culture of war and violence based on education for peace, the promotion of sustainable economic and social development, respect for human rights, equality between women and men, democratic participation, tolerance, the free flow of information and disarmament.” The Culture of Peace is also defined as a ' collection of values, behaviors, practices and ways of living focused on concepts such as loving life, ending conflict and promotion of non-violence through education, dialogue, cooperation and adherence to freedom principles, justice, democracy, tolerance, unity, cooperation, pluralism, the cultural diversity of dialog and non-violence' (UNESCO, 1999).

Peace education is a formidable vehicle through which peace culture could be propagated. Peace education is required to empower a population towards embracing and imbibing the culture of peace in order to channel young people's attention into developing human civilization through nonviolent

initiatives. The UNESCO paper on the declaration on a culture of peace (UNESCO, 1999) states that since wars begin in men's minds, the building of peace must begin from the minds of men (Olugbuyi, 2006). Beginning the building of peace from the minds of men would enable people to develop expertise for a successful dispute resolution; they will be aware of universal human rights and social inclusion standards; they will value ethnic diversity and respect the dignity of earth. Until international, continuous and comprehensive peace education starts, such learning cannot be accomplished. Conceptually, Peace Culture is a phrase used to describe a state of people's thinking and orientation, irrespective of the differences between the people or between them, to achieve peaceful social relations. Peace culture is a much-wanted situation in which people encourage peaceful living. In the end, continued and formidable peace education among the people could achieve this. Sommerfelt and Vambheim (2008) say that the culture of peace demands that people should be tolerant of each other, show co-operative behaviour, and avoid situations that lead to conflict and violence at intergroup or interpersonal levels. The essence of peace culture is adequately encapsulated by the United Nations (1999) as:

a set of values, attitudes, traditions and modes of behavior and ways of life based on respect for life, ending of violence and promotion and practice of non-violence through dialogue and cooperation, promotion of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, commitment to peaceful settlements of conflicts...efforts to meet the developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations... respect for and promotion of equal rights and opportunities for women and men.

What can be deduced from this is that peace culture is a living way in which individuals and groups in society regard peaceful coexistence as a preferred option to live in the interest of mutually reinforcing intergroup and interpersonal development. In such a situation peace, patriotism, loyalty, tolerance and intergroup harmony are considered by people as their way of life. In that light, any attempt that may trigger or elicit violent confrontation, stiff aggression and war are not considered the appropriate way of life in the interaction among the people.

Urban violence

It is commonly accepted that an urban area is a comparatively large and dense permanent population (Perchonock, 1994). This overview shows certain facets of urban crime and its proliferation with far-reaching consequences. Urbanization typically represents the ways in which culture evolves, and cities are often identified as cradles of civilization and cultural and economic revival outlets (UNICEF, 2002). Harroff-Tavel (2010) has described urban conflict as a solely illegal one in his description of violence and humanitarian acts in urban areas. Harroff-Tavel identifies numerous kinds of urban violence, including civil and political revolt, hunger riot, ethnical and religious identity-based violence, wars between gangs, extremism and actions of migrants' xenophobic violence. However, urban violence has intertwined with different forms of violence in urban areas. This situation was described by Harroff-Tavel (2010: 347):

Urban violence between groups that are generally considered as criminal (territorial gangs, mafia-type groups, etc.), or between those groups and

government forces or private militias, raises some complex legal and political problems. This is particularly the case when the clash is between groups engaged in a collective confrontation of major intensity, which testifies to a high degree of organization.

Analysing urbanization patterns in Africa, Annez, Buckley, and Kalarickal (2010: 222) observed that [translation] "urbanizing in Africa is 'flight' that reflects choice under pressure, rather than migration to unnecessarily attractive towns." However, this observation does not take cognizance of the dynamic change in urbanization arising from natural population growth and voluntary or accidental migration. There are unprecedented numbers of violent attacks and organized crime in the world.

The continued density of population growth in urban areas is, in part, provoked by poverty, the breakdown of tradition and cultural value systems in the society. Racial discrimination, unhealthy competition, systemic corruption, political turmoil and resource management agitation are among the push-pull factors that make violence in urban communities a recurring decimal with the domino effect on socioeconomic and political situations in the country. This has invariably encouraged the formation of new social class that indulge in making immense gains from the supply of guns and explosives for warriors in places vulnerable to aggression (Bamgbose, 2009; Odoemene, 2008; Erinosh, 2007; Obi, 2006; Adejumobi, 2005).

As conceptualized in the present study, both types of urban crime, regardless of their nomenclature, are a significant societal issue. Any violence which is a threat to the protection of lives and property of many residents in an urban

community is known as urban violence. This conception is based on understanding that dynamics of push-pull factors have always generated violence of varying genre in urban communities given its agglomerating characteristic. Since the introduction of colonization by the British government, numerous waves of urban conflict have arisen in Nigeria.

Theoretical Underpinning: Social Identity Theory

Social identity theory is one of the major theories that provide explanation for inter-group relations. The theory was originally formulated by Henri Tajfel in the 1970s. Other exponents of this theory include Flament (1971) and John Turner (1982). The Social identity theory is predicated on the assumption that an individual develops their self-concept on the basis of their attachment to a significant group (Hogg, 2006). In other words, the self-awareness of an individual is situated within identifying with membership to a specific group. By the individual's membership to the significant group, the individual's self-concept is developed and actualized. This implies that an individual is a reflection of their group membership. When an individual takes cognizance of the social identity to which they belong, their perceptions, inclinations, and behaviour can change dramatically. First, they become more inclined to embrace the beliefs and demonstrate the values that epitomize their group. Second, they become more likely to perceive individuals who belong to other groups as demonstrating qualities that typify members of the group Hogg (2000), Ellemers and Spears (2002).

Therefore, an understanding of the individual's actions and/or behaviours demands a commensurate understanding of their group membership actions and/or behaviours. From the viewpoint of social identity theory, the perceived

individual's behaviour is patterned by the group's behaviour acting on the individual as a significant other (Frisch, Hausser, van Dick, & Mojzisch, 2014). More so, this patterned behaviour emanates as a result of the social bond between and among members of the group. This goes further in reinforcing the social bond and solidarity among the members of the group. This reinforcement consequentially creates a "we-feeling" for the in-group and a "they-feeling" for the out-group members arising from self-categorization.

This view has been corroborated by Brewer (1986), in his study of the minimal and maximal group. Brewer argued that the only thing necessary to create prejudice and discrimination between groups is a relevant and salient self-categorization or social identity. He emphasised that it is the individual's identification with their in-group that significantly shapes their self-image and the associated behaviour pattern which invariably determines their interactions with other members of the out-group. It is crucial to remember in-groups are groups we identify with, and out-groups are the ones that we do not identify with, and may discriminate against (McLeod 2008). In affirmation to this, Brewer (1986) posits that just the awareness of belonging to a group that is different from another group is enough to create prejudice in favour of the in-group against the out-group. It may sound strange as revealed from the above assertion that just the mere membership of one in an in-group is just but an enough justification for one to exhibit prejudice and discrimination against a member of an out-group. It is a truism, therefore, that the mere fact that an individual has an affinity and so can be identified with a group is a potential factor for inciting enemy image with the members of the other group.

This study adopts social identity theory to provide a theoretical underpinning for explaining the trajectory of the interplay of human migration and the

attendant dynamics of urban violence in Nigeria. The sophisticated instruments of conflict management inherent in peace culture is therefore presented as a veritable mechanism for managing urban violence considering the fact that human migration is an inevitable social phenomenon in any given society. The deduction from the foregoing is that the robust nature of conflict management instruments inherent in peace culture is capable of promoting inter-group peace within context of shared identity of various component groups that characterise the agglomeration of urban formation.

Dynamics and manifestation of urban violence in Nigeria

Nigerian experience of urban violence is analogous to instances of urban violence in many African countries. A number of factors have been identified in extant literature as accounted for the causes, dynamics and manifestation of urban violence in Nigeria. Given the intensity and magnitude of violence associated with the military era in politics, there is no doubt that that era marked a watershed in the history of urban violence in the country. For instance, Nigeria was plunged into a three-year civil war (1967-1970) during the military era. This was complicated by unprecedented outbreak of ethno-religious violence and civil unrest majority of which turned some major cities in the country into battlefield.

Evidence from the Nigeria Watch database from 2006-2019 reveals that crime is one of the causes of urban violence in Nigeria, as armed robbery is heavily concentrated in the South and Middle Belt regions, especially in highly populated areas like Lagos, Abuja and Port Harcourt.

All the factors identified as causes of urban violence are symptomatic of the crisis of governance, which has made the problem of urban violence seemingly

unmanageable in Nigeria. Based on their observation of urban-based crisis, scholars such as Goldmann *et al*, (2011) have attributed the prevalence of urban violence to poverty in the country. This suggests a high magnitude of exposure to the trauma of urban violence in economically disadvantaged urban areas.

Urban violence has resulted in mass destruction of lives and property in Nigeria. Thus, the country has suffered from wanton destruction of persons and properties following its attainment of political independence in 1960. The country has encountered a dramatic intensity of intra- and inter-group violence in its urban centres such as Lagos, Ibadan, Kaduna, Kano, Port-Harcourt and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja.

Port Harcourt is both the capital of Rivers State and the hub of oil sector activities in Nigeria. Despite its economic and political relevance to the Nigeria Project, Port Harcourt is a notorious hub of communal and inter-group violence. The fluidity of violence in the urban city of Port Harcourt has remained alarming and frightening, and manifested in various dimensions including gangs in oil theft, extortion, kidnapping of expatriates, electoral violence and rivalry wars. Cult gangs and ethnic militias have at one time or the other been responsible for the perpetration of specific violent activities in the city of Port Harcourt and its neighborhood communities.

Urban gangs such as the Delta Vigilante group of Niger (NDVG) and the Volunteer Force of the Niger Delta (NDPVF) and their violent engagement against rival groups, innocent persons, and politically associated killings are a recurrent decimal in Port Harcourt (Hagedom, 2005). Acclaimed leaders of these groups have always claimed that they are committed to the liberation agenda of their respective domains in the interest of their communities. These

groups have triggered the perpetration of various dimensions of urban violence such as political associations, clash with the police, traditional chieftaincy tussles and simple ego trips (Albert, 2004).

Lagos has also been affected by various dimension of conflict including electoral, communal and ethnic violence. There, ethnic violence and the transition to a multi-party rule in 1999 increased. Thus, Lagos has remained a place of violence and intimidation related to elections, in addition to ethnic conflicts. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Lagos residents faced endemic security apathy due to high rates of urban violent crime as well as politically motivated urban violence and ethnic clashes perpetrated majorly by cult gangs and the Odua People's Congress (OPC). Attacks on ethnic minority groups by militia groups in Lagos resulted in increased violent activities in Lagos against other ethnic minorities from other parts of the country (Ikelegbe, 2001; Ukiwo, 2003, Guichaoua, 2009). Given its violent confrontations with the police and security agencies, OPC was proscribed under the Olusegun Obasanjo administration in the fourth republic.

Since the 1980s, violent ethnic and religious conflicts have become more pervasive and have assumed a wider scale in some urban centres in Northern Nigeria. For instance, violent confrontations which occurred in Kaduna (1982-2000); claimed 14,177 lives (Akeze, 2009). This provoked a reprisal attacks erupted in Kano and Lagos. In Lagos, clashes between the Odua People Congress and militia groups of northern extraction resulted in colossal loss of lives and property in the popular Mile 12 market (Abimboye, 2009).

In Kaduna, cases of urban violence abound. For example, attempts to introduce Sharia law in the year 2000 under the administration of the state Governor of

Kaduna, Mohammed Makarfi degenerated into series of attacks. This development influenced the protraction of violent confrontations between Muslims and non-Muslims resulting in thousands of deaths (Abimboye, 2009). Furthermore, in November 2002, a mob took to the streets to riot after a newspaper published remarks about Prophet Muhammed and the beauty queens of the Miss World Pageant, which Nigeria was hosting. The conflict spread to Abuja and about 5,000 lives were lost to the violence (Abimboye, 2009). The religious disturbance moved to Maiduguri in February 2006. Muslims had come together in the district of Ramat to protest the cartoon of a Danish newspaper on Prophet Muhammad. Young people were captured, murdered, and mutilated as Christians (Abimboye, 2009). No doubt, it is evident that urban violence is vast in the country with far-reaching consequences on the corporate existence of Nigeria and its overall development process.

Managing Urban Violence in Nigeria: Imperative of Peace Culture

The reign of terror characterizing most urban communities in Nigeria has undermined Nigeria's pride in unity in diversity. This has invariably cast blight on the image of Nigeria among the comity of nations. Since migration is an indispensable phenomenon in human existence, there is the need to fashion out mechanisms for managing conflicts proactively in urban centres. There is no gainsaying the fact that application of force cannot contain the dynamics of violence in various parts of the country. Hence, the imperative of peace culture in managing urban violence in Nigeria. Peace culture is an indispensable tool for sustaining societal stability in any human society, not only because it is a basic prerequisite for meaningful living but also because it is a bedrock of

sustainable inter-group bonding and integrated development. Despite the enshrinement of the importance of peace in national integration and sustainable development in the Nigerian Constitution, it is unfortunate that successive governments have yet to do enough in managing the country's affairs through the instrumentality of peace culture.

The quest for peace culture as a veritable instrument for managing urban violence becomes more imperative considering the fact that coercive approaches by the police sector and related conventional security initiatives over the years have been insufficiently effective principally arising from lack of will power to clamp down on the growing army of miscreants tormenting Nigeria's urban communities (The Punch,7/3/2014). It is quite disheartening that most of the non-coercive mechanisms put in place by the state actors have not been adequately nurtured towards achieving consistent peaceful co-existence in the interest of sustainable development in Nigeria. Suffice one to argue that considering the inadequacies of subsisting mechanisms for peace project in Nigeria, urban violence has continued to thrive because the deserved attention has not been accorded the values of peace culture.

Peace culture would go a long way in the inculcation of relevant cultural norms, ethics and values that promote and enhance mutual understanding, tolerance, unity in diversity, respect for the dignity of humans as well as respect for the sanctity of blood. Embracing peace culture would enable peoples from diverse ethnic, cultural, communal, historical, religious and political backgrounds to appreciate the ideals of unity and oneness in diversity and equip all and sundry to appreciate the invaluable strength inherent differences rather than being regarded as potential sources of indifference. In other words, inculcation of peace culture is imperative for attaining peace

through its potency to effectively managing human differences without being indifferent.

Peace culture has the capacity to discourage violent reactions to conflicts by reinforcing the values and virtues of tolerance, accommodation, forgiveness, and unity in the interaction among peoples. Extant theoretical frameworks and applied programs in peace culture have revealed that though conflict is inherent in human nature, it could be monitored and controlled through a deliberate learning programme capable of changing aggressive narratives that reinforce win-lose approach to conflict handling (Van Slyck, Stern & Elbedour, 1999; Salomon, 2003).

Peace culture has the inherent instruments to relate with differences through improved communication skills such as listening, empathy, love, care, passion, and positive perceptions in relationships, thereby downplaying incessant inter-group violent attacks and the attendant social unrests (Harris, 1999). Hence, peace culture remains the veritable instrument for managing urban violence in any given human society.

Conclusion and Recommendations

This treatise has analysed the synergy between peace culture and productive management of urban violence in Nigeria. Findings have shown that Nigeria's public life and socio-political space have been characteristically engrossed by urban violence, and that subsisting efforts towards addressing the problem in the interest of peaceful co-existence among the people have yielded little results. The argument, therefore, is that peace culture is considered as a veritable tool to build a mutually reinforcing society where differences are

managed without being indifferent, thereby accomplishing sustainable peace and security through shared value of equity, equality, unity of purpose and dialogue. In other words, this study stresses the imperative of peace culture as a veritable option for combating urban violence, thereby strengthening the collective existence of Nigeria within the spectrum of its heterogenous composition and complexity.

Following from the foregoing, the study advances the following recommendations:

1. Advocacy for the promotion of peace education as a veritable tool for entrenching peace culture: The advocacy for peace culture through the instrumentality of peace education and capacity building is capable of bringing about a united Nigeria free from arbitrary inter-ethnic acrimony, ethno-religious rivalries and socio-political entanglement that have turned many urban centers into the hub of violence.
2. Peace culture is capable of inculcating the ideals of civil policing in the Nigeria Police as major preservers of urban peace and security. This would invariably reinforce cordial relationship between the police sector and members of the public in the process of combating crimes and criminality in urban centres.
3. Peace culture has the prospect to provide an avenue for urban dwellers across political, socioeconomic and cultural dichotomy to be mutually reinforcing stakeholders in the process of building a peaceful, integrated, progressive, just and egalitarian society without undue preference for ethnic cleavage, political affiliation or religious enclave.

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Exile and Migration: Ancient Israel's Experience and its Relevance to Nigeria's Socio-Economic and Political Development

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Abstract

Migration as a global phenomenon has been variously considered from the socio-political and economic perspectives with the view to finding how it could facilitate development and improve opportunities for all. Incidentally, Nigeria ranks among the highest in international migration and it is already impacting negatively on the nation's development. This paper is an attempt to assess possible impacts of migration on development from the theological perspective using ancient Israel's experience of exile as a locus for discussion. Therefore, it is the objective of this paper to survey ancient Israel's exilic history, evaluate its impacts on the socio-

political and economic development of ancient Israel, appraise contemporary migration challenges in Nigeria and examine possible lessons from ancient Israel's experience for Nigeria's development. A qualitative research methodology which employs the tool of historical analysis and historical-grammatical hermeneutics has been adopted for this paper. Anchored on the historical-structural model of dependency theory, migration is seen as detrimental to the economies of developing countries as well as one of the very causes of underdevelopment, instead of a path towards development. However, Israel's experience of forced migration was not a total disaster as it equally gave birth to the new Israel that is still soaring high today. Thus, Nigeria can overcome the challenges of international migration by adopting ancient Israel's strategies.

Keywords: Migration, exile, ancient Israel, socio-Economic and political development

Introduction

Migration as a global phenomenon has been variously considered from the socio-political and economic perspectives with the view to finding how migration could facilitate development and improve opportunities for all. This paper written from the perspective of a biblical scholar, examines Israel's response to the socio-political and identity crisis of the exile. The intention is to engage this experience from a very different historical and cultural setting conversant with present-day migration challenges of Nigeria and its national development. The term 'exile' has been translated from the Hebrew *galah* as a way of expressing the tragedy of Jewish forced migration. Thus, the biblical exile provides helpful motifs from which to develop this thought since these events mirror the experience of migrations in many ways. Therefore, it is the

objective of this paper to survey ancient Israel's history of exile, evaluate its impacts on the socio-political and economic development of ancient Israel, appraise contemporary migration challenges in Nigeria and examine possible lessons from ancient Israel's experience for Nigeria's development. A qualitative research methodology which employs the tool of historical analysis and historical-grammatical hermeneutics has been adopted for this work. The purpose is to lend a theological voice to the ongoing discussion on the global phenomenon of migration as it affects Nigeria's development. The work will invariably add to knowledge both in the field of social sciences generally and increase the volume of literature in migration studies and biblical scholarship.

Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

Migration takes place either nationally or internationally when people move from one area to another for the purpose of establishing permanent, temporary or seasonal residence¹. This paper focuses mainly on the historical-structural theory and its related models. Historical-structuralism provides a radically different interpretation of migration paradigm on development, having its intellectual roots in Marxist political economy and in world systems theory.² In current scholarship, historical-structural theory is seen as a response to neo-classical theory which assumes that labor markets and economies move towards equilibrium in the long run through trade and migration. Hence, migrants move from societies where labour is abundant and wages are low, to societies where labor is scarce, and wages are high (European Union). According to De Haas, historical-structuralists postulate

¹ "What is Migration?" "Internet Geography," <https://www.internetgeography.net/topics/what-is-migration>

² S. Castles and M. J. Miller, *The Age of Migration* (London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 2003), 25.

that economic and political power is unequally distributed among developed and underdeveloped countries, that people have unequal access to resources, and that capitalist expansion has the tendency to reinforce these inequalities. Instead of modernizing and gradually progressing towards economic development, underdeveloped countries are trapped by their disadvantaged position within the global geopolitical structure.³

A group of loosely related theoretical models have been traced to the historical-structural theory including the dependency theory first linked to Adre Gunder Frank's notion of the 'development of underdevelopment.'⁴ Instead of a path towards development, the dependency school views migration as detrimental to the economies of underdeveloped countries as well as one of the very causes of underdevelopment. This can be explained by the fact that while migration is both from the developed and under-developed countries, however, migrants from developed countries come to their host under-developed countries as expatriates to tackle technological, leadership, scientific, education and economic problems. Migration in this case is not born out of joblessness, poor salary, and condition of service as is the case with under-developed countries.⁵

Migration can be voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary migration involves mainly the movement of human resources from places of poor economic

³ Hein De Haas, "Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective," paper presented at the conference on 'Transnationalisation and Development(s): Towards a North-South Perspective', Center for Interdisciplinary Research, Bielefeld, Germany, (May 31- June 01, 2007),15. <http://www.comcad-bielefeld.dehaas>

⁴ Adre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969).34 and Adre Gunder Frank *Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment* (London: Macmillan, 1978).56.

⁵ Ojo, O. D. N. O. A. Ugochukwu and E. J. Obinna "Understanding the Escalation of Brain Drain in Nigeria from Poor Leadership Point of View," *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*. 2, no. 3 (September, 2011): 434-458, <https://www.mcser.org>

conditions to seek better economic conditions. By contrast, forced migration occurs as a result of war or enslavement hence Paul Tabori defines exile as:

a person compelled to leave or remain outside his country of origin on account of well-founded fear of persecution or for reasons of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion; a person who considers his exile temporary (even though it may last a lifetime), hoping to return to his fatherland when circumstances permit – but unable or unwilling to do so as long as the factors that made him an exile persist.⁶

Drawing from Tabori's definition, the term exile refers to a person who has been separated from the country of origin involuntarily, as well as to the act and state of being separated, the condition(s) leading to the separation, and period of separation. Thus, exile refers to both the person and the circumstance. Involuntary exiles may also include those people who leave seemingly of their own accord but really because of circumstances beyond their control. The exile is reluctant to leave, and only does so when "leaving is only just better than staying."⁷ In this study therefore, exile refers to both involuntary (forced) migration and migrant experiences of ancient Israel. Lim⁸ has expanded involuntary exile to include the following sub-categories:

- i. Derivative forced migration resulting from geopolitical rearrangement. This is mirrored in the conquest of Judah by Babylon

⁶ Tabori, P, *Anatomy of Exile: A Semantic and Historic Study* (Michigan: George G. Harrap and Co. Ltd, 1972), 36.

⁷ Berg, N. E., "Exile from Exile: Israeli Writers from Iraq" *SUNY Series in Israeli Studies* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), 4.

⁸ B. O. Lim, "Exile and Migration: Toward a Biblical Theology of Immigration and Displacement. *The Covenant Quarterly*, 74, No. 2 (May, 2016), 7-8) <https://www.covquarterly.com/index.php/article/view>. Accessed 15th July, 2020.

in 597 BCE (2 Kgs 24:10-17). Geographical movement was not connoted in this exile; ancient Israel remained in their land but lost their sovereignty due to foreign conquest. Another form is viewed from the post-exilic period, when ancient Israel was allowed limited autonomy in their homeland by Persian authorities.

- ii. Purposive forced migration refers to people being forced to relocate physically at the hands of a dominant power. The events of 587 BCE when Jerusalem was destroyed and Judeans transported to Babylon would fall under this category of migration (2 Kgs. 25:8–21).
- iii. Responsive forced migration describes people fleeing voluntarily to escape tyranny, oppression, poverty, and other threats to their security. Jeremiah’s flight to Egypt with a group of Judeans in 582 BCE is an example of this form of migration (Jer. 41:16–43:7).

The above categorization suggests different experiences of ancient Israel. Ahn⁹ employs the categories to distinguish between the various exilic experiences of ancient Israel as follows.

- i. Israel’s movement into Egypt in the days of Joseph (Gen. 46:1-34).
- ii. Following the Old Testament’s eschatological hope exile includes every Jew scattered among the nations outside of Israel beginning with the Assyrian conquest of the Northern Kingdom in the eighth century (see 2 Kgs 17-18).
- iii. The idea of exile in 2 Kings 24 and 25 (24:14, 15; 25:11, 21) is expressed in Babylon’s use of cross-deportation which resulted in mass deportation of Israelites to Babylon. The exile in this picture

⁹ J. J. Ahn, “Forced Migrations Guiding the Exile: Demarcating 597, 587, and 582 BCE,” *By the Irrigation Canals of Babylon: Approaches to the Study of Exile*, ed. J.J. Ahn and J. A. Middlemas, (London: T&T Clark, 2012), 173-89

continues even to the present times since with the Cyrus' edict of return in 539 BC, many Jews continue to live out the Promised Land. It is therefore necessary to situate this work within the experience of exile pictured in the fall of Jerusalem in 587 BC and the Return in 539 BC.

Reflections on Ancient Israel's Experience of Exile between 587 and 539 BC

There are several biblical texts on ancient Israel's exilic experiences out which the following five passages: 2 Kings 24 and 25 (24:14, 15; 25:11, 21), Jeremiah 29:4, Daniel 6, Ezra 3 – 6 and Nehemiah: 1 and 2 have been chosen for the purpose of this study.

- i. 2 Kings 24 and 25 – the fall of Ancient Israel to Babylonian Empire
Babylon was one of the world's most ancient cities and the center of the Babylonian civilization; and by the late 600 BC was the dominant power in the Near East. Babylon captured Nineveh the capital of Assyria around 612 BC and finally defeated her around 605 BC. This conquest was further extended by Nebuchadnezzar II (605-562) whose campaigns led to the fall of Jerusalem around 587 BC. Consequent upon his conquest, Nebuchadnezzar:

Took Jehoiachin prisoner... carried away all the treasures from the LORD's Temple and the royal palace. He stripped away all the gold objects that King Solomon of Israel had placed in the Temple. King

Nebuchadnezzar took all of Jerusalem captive, including the commanders and the best of the soldiers, craftsmen, and artisans – 10,000 in all. Only the poorest people were left in the land. Nebuchadnezzar led King Jehoiachin away as a captive to Babylon, along with the queen mother, his wives and officials, and all Jerusalem's elite. He also exiled 7,000 of the best troops and 1,000 craftsmen and artisans all of whom were strong and fit for war (2 Kgs. 24:12-16).

What can be garnered from this passage is that King Nebuchadnezzar chose people from the royal class, the elites, able bodied and best soldiers, craftsmen, artisans, and costly treasures from the Temple but left the poorest in the land. This way, he stripped Israel of her best brains and robbed her of the needed manpower for redevelopment. Israel's situation fits into the concept of brain drain or brain waste saga in Nigeria. Fundamentally, brain drain involves the transfer of knowledge, experience, skill and expertise from one region, country or geographic location to another. Brain waste refers to skill downgrading, where an individual is working in a job that requires a skill level lower than the one, he/she has acquired¹⁰ (Pires, 2015:2).

An example is Jeremiah's Letter to the Exiles (Jeremiah 29:1-7). This passage contains a letter believed to have been written by Jeremiah and was sent to Babylon through his friends encouraging the exiles in Babylon to settle down.

¹⁰ Armando J. Garcia Pires, "Brain Drain and Brain Waste" *Journal of Economic Development*, 40 no. 1, (March, 2015), 2. <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4027850>.

Jeremiah 29:1–7 describes long-term projects by the use of the phrases: building houses, planting gardens, and benefiting from the land.¹¹ Ahn¹² believes the letter instructs Judean exiles to create long-term ethnic enclaves in Babylon. His translation of Jeremiah 29:4, “Thus says the Lord of hosts, the God of Israel, to all the immigrants whom I have sent into forced migration from Jerusalem to Babylon.” Verse 7 “And work for the peace and prosperity of the city where I sent you into exile. Pray to the LORD for it, for its welfare will determine your welfare;” places responsibility on the exile to bless the land. This may include working, paying their taxes, studying hard, and showing themselves worthy of trust. Rightly viewed, the goal of the letter was to motivate them to make the most of the exile.

ii. **Daniel 6 – Daniel a Symbol of Israel’s Excellence in Exile**

As an administrator in the Babylonian empire, Daniel distinguished himself as the most capable of all the administrators and maintained high level of integrity. Daniel as a character among other Jews shows that the letter written by Jeremiah really impacted positively in the lives of the exilic community.

iii. **Ezra 3 – 6 – Cyrus Edict of Return**

After conquering the Babylonian empire in 539 BC, King Cyrus II of Persia allowed exiled peoples, including the Jews to return to their homelands (1:3). The returned exiles approached the work of rebuilding their homeland as a unified group. They started with the rebuilding of the altar, then the construction of the new Temple.

¹¹ D. Wiseman, “Jeremiah” in *New International Bible Commentary*. Gen. Ed. F. F. Bruce (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1979), 782.

¹²J. J. Ahn, *Exile As Forced Migrations: A Sociological, Literary, and Theological Approach on the Displacement and Resettlement of the Southern Kingdom of Judah*, BZAW 417. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011), 138.

However, the Wall of Jerusalem remained in ruins until 445 BC when it was rebuilt under Nehemiah's leadership as can be seen below because more hands were needed.

iv. Nehemiah :1 and 2 – Nehemiah a Symbol of Patriotism

Nehemiah was still living in Susa the capital city of Persia after King Cyrus's edict. As a migrant, he served as cup-bearer in the royal court. This is another position of honour and trust taken up by the exile in the foreign land still indicating that they were truly prepared for the period. The passage reveals Nehemiah's devastation from the news that Jerusalem's wall was broken and the people there were living in utter disgrace. He became emotionally attached to the problem, prayed and then acted by requesting and getting the King's approval to restore the hope of Israel by rebuilding Jerusalem's wall. By rebuilding the wall, a sense of security was restored for both those in the land and those still in Diaspora who may wish to come back.

In all, Israel's experience of migration buttresses King's¹³ assertion that population movements have been the carriers of innovation from one region to another. The land became desolate because the exiled population carried with them the economic and social political strength of the nation. They became the strength of their host nations and occupied both leadership and economic positions.

¹³ R. King, *Theories and Typologies of Migration: An Overview and a Primer* (Malmo: Malmo Institute for Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare, Malmo University, 2013), 87.

A Brief Survey of Migration in Nigeria and Lessons from Ancient Israel's Experience of Exile

Nigeria and ancient Israel are two different nations with their uniqueness. Israel for instance, was a theocratic and mono-ethnic nation. More so, there were religious connotations to their exilic experience which has not been emphasized in this work while Nigeria is not. Moreover, Israel's exile/migration was occasioned by the Babylonian conquest. Nonetheless, Nigeria's current experience of migration is very similar to ancient Israel's experience of responsive forced migration/exile.

As of 2017, the United Nations' Population Division report estimated the number of international migrants worldwide at almost 258 million (or 3.4 percent of the world's population). The UN migration data portal reveals that there were 1.3 million emigrants from Nigeria in 2017, which represented 0.6% of the total population (net migration is 300,000 in the last 5 years).¹⁴ Though the official records do not include those born of Nigerian parents in the Diaspora and therefore, hold citizenship of their birth countries. Unofficial reports state that there are about 15 million Nigerians in the Diaspora.¹⁵ Within the embers of the unofficial reports, Ikuteyijo has ascertained that young Nigerians make up the largest population of the growing flow of irregular migrants from Africa to developed countries.¹⁶ Busari discloses that more than twenty thousand (20,000) involved in the crossing of the

¹⁴United Nation Population Division, 2017 Report, un.org/development/desa/population/data/estimates17

¹⁵ A. S. Nevin and O. Omosomi, *Strength from abroad: The economic power of Nigeria's Diaspora*. PricewaterhouseCoopers Limited, (2019), 31. <https://www.pwc.com> › pdf › the-economic-power-of-nigerias

¹⁶ L. O. Ikuteyijo, "Irregular Migration as Survival Strategy: Narratives from Youth in Urban Nigeria" *Researchgate* (2020),1 <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/336697660>.

Mediterranean Sea were reported to be from Nigeria in 2017. In addition, between 2017 till late 2019, hundreds of Nigerian migrants were deported from various destinations including Italy, Libya and South Africa. These young people undertake very risky journeys across the globe, and casualties continue to be on the increase on a daily basis.¹⁷

The large number of emigrants from Nigeria explains the reason for the nation accounting for the largest inflow of remittances into Africa in 2017 but dropped to second place behind Egypt in 2018.¹⁸ The actual amount of remittance flows into the country is arguably higher if many of the unrecorded transactions that take place through irregular (informal) channels are recorded. It has also been noted that in 2018, migrant remittances to Nigeria equaled US\$25 billion, representing 6.1% of GDP, a figure that translates to 83% of the Federal Government budget in that year.¹⁹

However, the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) (2000) report reveals that the African continent is losing the most important people it needs for social, economic, technological and scientific development. Accordingly, Carrington an economist at the U.S. Bureau of Labour and Statistics, Washington, DC, has observed that over three million Nigerians are in the United States and Canada. He notes that people rather than commodities constitute the greatest export of Nigeria from which U.S. and other countries of the world profit. Carrington went on to describe Nigerians in the U.S. as accomplished immigrant group due to the fact that they

¹⁷ S. Busari, "In 2017, Hundreds of migrants stranded in Libya are returned to Nigeria" CNN News, November 2017, <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/29/africa/nigeria-migrants-returned-libya/index.html>

¹⁸ A. S. Nevin and O. Omosomi, 32

¹⁹ A. S. Nevin and O. Omosomi, 32

excellently contribute to all sectors of the U.S. economy. He further states that Nigerians in Diaspora are the most educated and talented black people to be found anywhere on earth and that they choose to remain the U.S. because of the fear of corruption and insecurity in their country.²⁰ Adding weight to Carrington’s revelations is the speech given by Obasanjo – former Nigerian President, given at a gathering of Nigerian Diaspora, who states:

Many of our best men and women for lack of opportunity and challenge at home have had to work outside our shores. We should challenge them to return by putting in place the enabling environment and the tools, with which they will be able to give this country the full benefit of the education, training and experience....²¹

The reasons for both regular and irregular migration are similar echoing the push factors inherent in the Nigerian society. World Poverty Clock (2018) report reveals that Nigeria has more people living in extreme poverty than any other country in the world. The poverty rate goes in hand with the high rate of unemployment. According to the the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). In the fourth quarter of 2020, the unemployment rate in Nigeria reached 33.28 percent. Between 2015 and 2020, the unemployment rate grew. In particular, in 2017 the unemployment rate registered the fastest growth, increasing by about six percentage points during the year.²² These economic trends, coupled

²⁰ W .J. Carrington, “Brain drain, corruption, insecurity damaging Nigeria,” *Daily Independent* (2013), 164. <http://dailyindependentnig.com/2013/10/darin-brain-corruption-insecurity-damaging-nigeria-carrington>

²¹Cited in J. Ibieta and S. Joshua, “Leadership and the Failed State status of Nigeria (2010-2012): An enquiry” *Acta Universitatis Carutius Administratio*, 5(1), (2013), 49-69.

²² Simona Varrella “unemployment rate in Nigeria 2015-2020” *Quarterly* (March 19, 2021) <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1119375/unemployment-rate-in-nigeria-by-quarter/>

with other variables such as political instability and rising waves of conflict, higher wages in the destination country, career advancement and/or training, access to the best facilities and technologies have led to the rising rate of migration from the country.²³

Lessons from Ancient Israel's Exile Experience

The study so far argues that Nigeria's highest export is in human resources and its adverse effect on national development. The study also reveals a justification of the historical-structuralist theory which maintains that migration breeds unequal distribution of economic and political power in which case, the underdeveloped countries are ensnared by their disadvantaged position within the global geopolitical structure. However, the study does not present a total disaster on the part of Israel as she was able to rise from the dungeon of the exile into a great nation. The following lessons can be learnt from Israel's experience:

i. International Exposure with High Sense of Responsibility

Living in Diaspora may pose cultural, food, clothing, religious and integrity challenges as Daniel exemplifies. Yet, Nigerians in Diaspora can learn to be dependable, skilled in their work, work hard towards the development of host nations. This will guarantee acceptability and favorable ground to tap into the economic and political strength of their hosts with the view of coming back home in the long run to contribute to the development of the country with the

²³ L. O. Ikuteyijo, "Irregular Migration as Survival Strategy: Narratives from Youth in Urban Nigeria" *Researchgate*, (2020), 66-72.

acquired skills. Apart from returning, migrants can improve the country's political institutions by transferring political norms, voting from abroad or return home to vote in case absentee voting is not permitted and lobbying activities from abroad through their financial remittances.

ii. Need for Manpower Development

Israel's experience echoes the fact that the wealth of a nation depends largely on the constitution of her human resources. The demise of the best brains in ancient Israel led to the disastrous fall of the nation. In as much as Nigeria needs the high remittance flows, more than that, she needs human beings with the needed skills to build the socio-economic and political organizations for national development. Adeyeye posits that while capital and natural resources are passive factors of production; human beings are the active agents who accumulate capital, exploit natural resources, build social, economic and political organizations, and carry forward national development.²⁴ If human beings are not central to the growth of any nation, why is it that developed countries have very low remittance flow yet very strong economy? The answer is simple; they have the needed skilled manpower for development.

Social Protection Policies

The Persian Edict of Return could be viewed as policy statement to end the exile. The country must endeavour to control migration through policies that are human oriented, focused in terms of security of lives and property,

²⁴ T. C. Adeyeye, "Manpower Development and Economic Growth in Nigeria" *Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development* 6, No. 9 (2015), 26, <https://www.iiste.org>

economic and political stability among others. The social protection policies can be classified as one of such polices. Social protection policies mean:

All public and private initiatives that provide income or consumption transfers to the poor, protect the vulnerable against livelihood risks and enhance the social status and rights of the marginalised; with the overall objective of reducing the economic and social vulnerability of poor, vulnerable and marginalised groups”²⁵

While social protection policies have been in existence in Nigeria before its independence, it has been observed that it is characterized by a lack of coverage, poor financing and administration, lack of trust in government, and corruption.²⁶ It can be argued that deteriorating living conditions have created a “migration culture”, whereby people regard the malfunctioning social protection system as incapable of solving their overwhelming and ubiquitous problems and see in migration the only solution. Social, economic and political ills bedevil the entire country, leaving people with few options for securing a dignified future. If fully tapped, social protection could ensure that basic needs are met and subsequently also reduce the high levels of inequality. This in turn might lead to greater satisfaction and reduce the need and inclination to migrate.

iii. Patriotism

²⁵ S. Devereux and R. Sabates-Wheeler, “Transformative Social Protection” *Institute of Development Studies*, Brighton (2004), 1, <http://www.ids.ac.uk/publication>

²⁶ E. Schüring and others, *Social Protection as an Alternative to Migration? An assessment of the role of social protection in reducing push factors for migration in different country contexts* (Berlin: H. HEENEMANN GmbH & Co. KG 2017), 59.

Nehemiah's story is an important reminder of migrants' responsibility to their home country. As has been shown above, the Nigerian diaspora is made up of people of rich and varied skills. However, this is not to undermine the fact that there are many more people of low and no skills as well as those who are inclined to crime in diaspora. If they were to remember their own people, Nigeria could see great socio-economic and political development. The establishment of Nigerians in Diaspora Commission (NiDCOM) is a step in the right direction. However, the vision of utilizing the human, capital and material resources of this demography in the socio-economic, cultural and political development of Nigeria should not be given a still birth.

Conclusion

This paper has considered the concept of migration from the biblical or theological perspectives. It demonstrated that ancient Israel's experience of exile provides helpful motifs from which to develop a theological perspective to contemporary migration challenge in Nigeria since this event mirrors the migration experience of underdeveloped countries in many ways. Israel's experience of exile agrees with the historical-cultural theory anchoring largely on the dependency theory that views migration not just as detrimental to the economies of underdeveloped countries but also as one of the very causes of underdevelopment, rather than as a path towards development. Exile stripped Israel of her very best thereby leaving the land desolate all through the period. Those left in the land were without the needed skill to develop the nation both socio-economically and politically; hence the returned exiles' immediate challenge was the rebuilding of the land. The exiled people were well prepared to make the most out of the period by seeking the peace and the prosperity of the land through hard work, tax payment, studying hard, and exhibiting high

sense of responsibility. As a result, they found themselves at the corridors of power in the foreign land and acquired the skills necessary for the development of any nation. At the return, they put the acquired skills to work and the nation bounced back. Hence, for Israel, the exilic history was not a total disaster. Or better put a disaster that lasted only for some time until the people rose to the challenge of rebuilding their nation. Arguably, the study has shown that the rate of migration from Nigeria is alarming. However, the nation can draw from the positive impact of the exile on ancient Israel by re-strategising through governance and governmental policies that are built towards making use of the current migration population as a tool for socio-economic and political development. This calls for the need to revisit social protection policies to widen the coverage, ensure proper funding and administration, rebuild people's trust/confidence in government, eliminate corruption and guarantee that basic needs are met and subsequently also reduce the high levels of inequality. This might lead to greater satisfaction and reduce the need and inclination to migrate.

Secondly, the National Orientation Agency should come up with campaigns that will prepare migrants to be their best in the host countries as well as instill in them the yearning to contribute towards the development of their own country; for there is no place like home.

Lastly, patriotism is highly needed if the nation must be made great again. Those who have found the greener pasture oversea should not forget home. The government on her part should appreciate those who are here trying to make the country work by implementing policies that will relax the push factors for migration in Nigeria.

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States Non-Governmental Relation and Migrant Fatalities on The Mediterranean

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Abstract

Global forced displacement has seen accelerated growth over the years and since 2013, it has reached unprecedented levels. By the end of 2014, 59.5 million individuals were forcibly displaced worldwide as a result of persecution, conflict, generalized violence and human rights violations. This is 8.3 million persons more than 2013 and the highest annual increase in a single year (UNHCR Report, 2015). This number increased as the years progressed with 65.6 million people recorded as being displaced at the end of 2016. The growth of refugees and internally displaced persons was concentrated between 2013 and 2015, driven mainly by the Syrian conflict along with other conflicts in Africa and the Middle East. This situation is relatively the same in countries like Nigeria, D.R. Congo, Libya, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Somalia, Eritrea,

Yemen and recently Northern Cameroun, Ethiopia with the Tigray crisis (The Guardian, 2015).

Keywords: Migrants; Relation; IDP; Conflict; Africa; Refugees

Introduction

Discourse in global displacement and refugee situation are mostly concerned with people displaced for several reasons and hosted in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey amongst other countries. This article, however, analysed the plight of refugees fleeing troubled spots in Africa and the Middle East, as well as, the consequences of their legality in the new host countries. This is an area yet to be fully underscored by scholars. A vast majority did not have the right to work in their countries of asylum as none of them were formally recognized as refugees. Meanwhile, Gulf countries who are geographically closest and financially more viable are willing to provide funding but reluctant to host refugees (IOM Report, 2016). This means that those fleeing were limited in their choice of safe havens in that geographical landscape. To make matters more desperate, a huge shortfall in UN funding led to cuts to the hand - outs given to refugee families every month. This made the Middle East an increasingly untenable place for them to stay (The Guardian, 2015).

The inability to access the rights, benefits, security and opportunities befitting of a refugee in the Middle East, as enunciated under the 1951 Refugee Convention, led to large scale migration towards Europe. The International Organization for Migration estimates that more than 1,011,700 migrants had arrived in Europe as at 21 December 2015. This compares with 280,000 arrivals for the whole of 2014 (IOM, 2016). It is expedient to note here that

these figures do not include those who emigrated undetected. Many of these migrants arrived on the shores of Europe heralding the European Migrant Crisis, as countries struggled to cope with the influx and creating division in the European Union (EU) over how best to deal with resettling people. It is pertinent to add here that the situation is relatively the same today. According to IOM reports (2016), illegal border crossing at the EU external borders increased sharply in 2014 to over 2,045,42 arrivals in Italy, Greece and to a lesser extent Malta. This situation led to stricter border control in most of Europe and the attendant search for alternatives with many favouring the Mediterranean Sea as a pathway to reaching Europe.

Boat migration to Europe across the Mediterranean is not a new phenomenon. However, it has been growing steadily recently due to the ongoing crises and worsening economic conditions in Africa and the Middle East which are prompting outflows of migrants and refugees. Although it is not the only route for irregular migration to Europe, boat migration across the Mediterranean captured more attention due to the tremendous human tragedies it involves and the complexities of addressing it. According to the IOM Missing Migrant Project, between Jan 2014 and June 2017 about 14,767 persons lost their lives on the treacherous journey (IOM Reports, 2016). The issue of fatalities related to Mediterranean crossings began dominating current debates at all levels, leading the Italian government in October 2013, to commission *Operation Mare Nostrum*, a Search and Rescue (SAR) operation. *Operation Mare Nostrum* saved more than 100,000 lives however, the operation was criticized as being a pull factor for irregular migrants to cross the Mediterranean (Death by Rescue 2016). In November 2014, the Italian government ended the Operation citing operational funding as a major

challenge while stating that the EU ought to pay for what is essentially a European problem (FRONTEX 2016).

The EU responded by establishing Operation Triton led by FRONTEX, the European Union's border security agency. Operation Triton did not come close to Mare Nostrum's Mediterranean-wide rescue effort. Besides, Triton's 2.9 million Euros per month budget was only a third of what Mare Nostrum received and this was evident considering their limited maritime presence (Kimberly, 2017). Based on the foregoing, Civil Society and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) expressed very critical views about FRONTEX operations stating that even though the military are not deliberately killing migrants, they do not make efforts to save them and do not demonstrate a human approach (Kimberly, 2017). This situation has led to Civil Society Organizations, particularly the more structured NGOs such as Dutch Boat Refugee Foundation, Migrant Offshore Aids Station (MOAS), Sea Watch, Médecine Sans Frontières (MSF), playing a pivotal role in the provision of Non-Governmental Search and Rescue (SAR) Operations in the assistance of migrants. The activities of these NGOs in the central Mediterranean has received a lot of back lash from the countries concerned with some calling their operations a pull factor for the unending migrant crisis. Lately, some government coast guards have resorted to taking aggressive actions towards the SAR NGO vessels in a bid to halt their activities. It is against this tangled Politics of Search and Rescue Operations in the Mediterranean that this study will assess the state – NGO relations with regards to migrant fatalities on the Mediterranean.

Research Justification

In the wake of the events of 9/11 2001 and successive similar events across Europe, coupled with the recent COVID-19 Pandemic, the wave of immigration was curtailed. These events and rising trend of European conservatism make immigration towards Europe increasingly selective in general. Europe erects restrictive immigration barriers and laws and growingly favourable only to skilled labour (an institutionalized form of brain drain). Restrictive immigration rules were intended to protect Europe from the influx of migrants though because of rising security concerns. Such climate strengthens window of opportunity for smugglers wanting to exploit the desperation of immigrants from poor and warring countries. Illegal migration has thus garnered momentum through chains of organized traffickers; though a trend complemented by the political instability and worsening economic conditions in Africa and parts of the Middle East. The recent refugee crisis is reported to be the largest movement of people since the World War II. According to the UNHCR (2015), the Syrian refugees are estimated to be round 4.8 million, while around 8.7 million was expected to be displaced inside Syria by the year 2016, a figure that increased in the following years, as a result of the on-going war.

Studies such as those conducted by the Centre for European Policy Studies on The 2015 refugee crisis in the European Union, have concentrated on the socio-economic and political dimensions of the mass exodus paying little attention to the future of the relationship between NGOs spearheading the Mediterranean Search and Rescue (SAR) and the States embroiled in the refugee crisis. Many of the studies have dwelt extensively on the origin and causes of the refugee crisis while some focused on the role of the media and

political orientations of the crisis. Scholars and practitioners have extensively investigated the role of NGOs in mitigating large-scale suffering caused by conflict, natural disasters and extreme poverty. However, studies have overlooked maritime humanitarian operations, implicitly identifying the humanitarian space with the provision of aid to those suffering during crises taking place on dry land. Consequently, while humanitarian action on land is regulated by best practices and codes of conduct, no guidance exists on the prerogatives of humanitarian actors at sea and how to ensure coordination and conflict amongst NGOs, coast guards and navies. Hence, investigating humanitarian intervention at sea is important from both theoretical and policy standpoints and it is against this backdrop that this paper seeks to assess the relationship between states and NGOs involved in the migrant fatality crisis.

Conceptual Definitions, Theoretical Application and Analysis of Relevant Studies

This section borders on conceptual clarifications, the review of some related literatures and the presentation of relevant theory that aid the explanation of migrant fatalities on the Mediterranean with emphasis on the relationship between States and Non-Governmental Organization.

Conceptual Clarifications

The concept to be clarified includes; Migration, Migrant, Fatalities, Migrant Fatalities, The State, Non-Governmental Organization, Relationship.

Migration

According to Demko (1970, see Sinha, 2005) migration is the most complex component of population change. It provides an important network for the diffusion of ideas and information and indicates symptoms of social and economic change and can be regarded as a human adjustment to economic, environmental, and social problems (Also see Ogen, 2021). In addition, migration is the component of change most difficult to project because of the uncertainty associated with the decision to change one’s place of residence. Migration is viewed as a form of individual or group adaptation to perceived changes in environment. Chapman (1979, cf; Sinha, 2005) considered migration as a good example of relocation diffusion since nobody can literally be in two places at once. However, to regard migration as an example of relocation diffusion does not explain the forces underlying the individual decisions to move. In the words of Zelinsky, (1966), migration is a cultural phenomenon and a dynamic element, probably more than fertility and mortality, in population. Migration is a result of overall design of a society within which economic, social, demographic and other types of behaviour are enfolded. Similarly, migration can be considered as a means of spatial interaction too. Hence, migration in this study will be conceptualized as the perceptible and simultaneous shifts in both spatial and social locus. It implies a permanent or semi-permanent change of residence.

Table 1: Key Global Migration Figures 2017-2021

<p>Migrant Population</p> <p>About 281 million people were estimated to have been international migrants</p>	<p>Migration Governance</p> <p>As at 31 December, 2020, 83 countries and 30 Local Authorities have embarked on Migration Governance Indicators (MGI)</p>
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<p>Female Migrants</p> <p>By the mid of 2020, 48% of the global migrants were women</p>	<p>Child Migrants</p> <p>About 12% of international migrants in 2019 were children below 18 years</p>
<p>Labour Migrants</p> <p>The 2017 ILO sources estimated that 164 million persons were migrant workers.</p>	<p>Migrant Remittances</p> <p>In 2019, migrant remittances reached \$554 Billion</p>
<p>Refugees and Asylum Seekers</p> <p>Sources from UNHCR 2020 reported that as at 2019, there were estimated 26 million refugees and 4.2 million asylum seekers globally.</p>	<p>Refugees</p> <p>By 2019, there were 33.4 million internally displaced persons around the world. Out of this number, 24.9 million were displaced as a result of natural disasters while 8.5 million were displaced as a result of conflict.</p>
<p>Migrant Resettlement</p> <p>Citing government statistics, UNHCR in 2020 estimated that by 2019, 107,800 refugees sought for resettlement in 26 countries.</p>	<p>Trafficked Migrants</p> <p>The Counter Trafficking Data Collaborative (CTDC) reported that 108,613 persons were victims of trafficking between 2002 and 2019.</p>
<p>Migrant Returnees</p> <p>IOM reported that 64,958 migrants were willing to return to their countries as at 2019.</p>	<p>Dead/Missing Migrants</p> <p>The 2021 IOM report has it that 40,189 migrants were declared either dead or missing between 2014 and 2020.</p>

Sources: IOM UN MIGRATION and IOM Global Migration Data Analysis Centre. <https://migrationdataportal.org/themes/migrant-deaths-and-disappearances>. Accessed 16 August, 2021.

Migrant

According to the 1998 United Nations Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration, a migrant is defined as any person who changes his or her country of usual residence. Furthermore, an international migrant is a person who is living in a country other than his or her country of birth (UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2016). For the purpose of this study, a migrant is conceptualized as anybody, who is living in a country other than his or her country of birth.

The State – A state is any politically organized community living under a single system of government. According to the Global Policy Forum, a state is the means of rule over a defined or sovereign territory. State is a country considered as an organized political community by one government. Sometimes, a republic or federations forming part of a country are also called states where as they cannot be termed as states in the political sense. Anyhow when we use the term state in the field of international relation, it has the symbolic sense of signifying the existence of an independent sovereign entity and will be conceptualized thus in this study.

Non-Governmental Organization – The term, “Non-Governmental Organization” or NGO, came into currency in 1945 because of the need for the UN to differentiate in its Charter between participation rights for

intergovernmental specialized agencies and those for international private organizations. At the UN, virtually all types of private bodies can be recognized as NGOs. They only have to independent from government control, not seeking to challenge governments either as a political party or by a narrow focus on human rights, non- profit-making and non-criminal (Peter, 1996). Vakil (1997; David, 2010), defined NGO as self-governing, private, not-for-profit organizations that are geared towards improving the quality of life for disadvantaged people.

Literature Review

The Advent of the Mediterranean Sea as a Humanitarian Space

The notion of humanitarian space primarily refers to those crisis scenarios where humanitarian agencies provide relief assistance. The concept, however, is not merely used to delimit any physical area where large-scale suffering occurs, but also identifies a symbolic space separated from politics where aid workers can operate in compliance with humanitarian principles (Eugenio, 2017). In 2015, over one million migrants crossed the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe. The death toll was large, amounting to 3771 estimated casualties. In 2016, migrant arrivals by sea decreased to around 360,000. Casualties, however, grew dramatically. Owing to the larger number of transits through the Central Mediterranean route, increasingly dangerous due to human smuggler's use of more rickety and overloaded boats, migrant casualties reached 5076, (a whopping 34.6 percent increase to the previous year) making 2016 the deadliest year in the recent history of migration movements to Europe. Such a large number of deaths at sea have turned the Central Mediterranean into the theatre of a complex humanitarian

emergence. According to the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), both international non-governmental organizations and smaller, ad hoc charities have attempted to mitigate the humanitarian crisis arising from the absence of large-scale state Search and Rescue (SAR) operations by conducting migrant rescuing missions offshore (ODI, 2010). The nature of international waters, as a space where all seafarers enjoy a right of innocent passage and no state jurisdiction applies, may prompt the perception that the sea provides an area for NGOs to operate in full compliance with humanitarian principles.

The operations of both large international NGOs and small local charities have played a key role in addressing the suffering and dangers caused by large-scale migrations. The direct involvement of humanitarian organizations in the provision of Mediterranean SAR, however, is a more recent phenomenon. The German NGO Cap Anamur was the first organization to conduct a migrant rescuing operation in Sicily in 2004. Upon disembarking migrants to Italy, Cap Anamur's personnel were prosecuted for abetting illegal immigration, which forced the NGO to suspend its activities. Italy's approach to migrant rescue changed by October 2013, when its navy launched the large-scale SAR Operation *Mare Nostrum*. A year later, *Mare Nostrum* was replaced by FRONTEX Operation Triton, a mission focusing primarily on border control which only operated within 30 miles from Italian territorial waters (Pierre, 2011).

Humanitarian Principles in Maritime Migration

The humanitarian space is gradually shrinking. The growing threat to the safety of humanitarian personnel has reduced their ability to access crisis areas. Humanitarian organizations have traditionally considered their

adherence to humanitarian principles as a guarantee for their acceptance by local communities and warring parties. Humanitarian principles embrace humanity, which is the effort to protect human life and dignity anywhere they are threatened, hence the effort to refrain from taking part in hostilities and political controversies and impartiality. In other words, aid and rescue should be delivered based on need alone, irrespective of the race, nationality and political status of those in need. Humanitarian intervention should also be guided by the principle of independence, which is the commitment to operate autonomously from political actors and refrain from supporting their economic and security agendas (UNOCHA, 2012). However, due to the growing politicization and militarization of aid, increasingly tied to political conditionality or seen as a vehicle to achieve the strategic objectives of military campaigns, it has become difficult for humanitarian agencies to remain independent, especially from the agendas of Western governments and present themselves as truly neutral, impartial and independent actors (Pierre, 2011).

Peter (2004) opined that the provision of humanitarian aid at sea is less constrained by logistic and security hurdles than most complex emergencies on land. History has shown that accessing, supplying aid to and conducting relief operations in landlocked conflict-ridden territories is a complex and costly endeavour which frequently endangers the safety of humanitarian workers. However, achieving access to maritime migrant routes could be relatively less demanding. Procuring a small vessel has proved feasible and financially viable even for small, newly established charities entirely run by volunteers like Sea-Watch and Sea-Eye. Furthermore, conducting maritime rescue operations is less dangerous for humanitarian workers. This relieves

humanitarian organizations of the hurdles imposed by tight security protocols put in place for the safety of humanitarian workers. Also, NGOs operating in conflict scenarios have frequently been forced to compromise on independence and neutrality by seeking the protection of military forces, negotiating with local strongmen, or hiring private security companies. Such constraints do not apply at sea, where humanitarian personnel are relatively more secure than amid most crises taking place on dry land (Humanitarian Policy Group Report, 2008).

Relations between States and SAR NGOs in the Wake of Migrant Fatalities on the Mediterranean

Unlike MSF, both Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS) and Sea-Watch were established for the specific purpose of rescuing migrants in the Mediterranean. Also, while MOAS and MSF both rely on the work of paid professionals, the Sea-Watch crew is made of volunteers. The Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been gradually changing the Search and Rescue (SAR) methods on the Mediterranean. In August 2014, the Migrant Offshore Aid Station, a Maltese foundation created by Christopher and Regina Catrambone, an Italian–American couple, with the launching of a rescue operation with their ship MY Phoenix. The mission had to be stopped after two months because of financial constraints, but in 2015 the Amsterdam operational centre of the medical-humanitarian organization MSF allowed MOAS to resume activities by providing the necessary funding and medical staff. Also, in 2015, the MSF operational centres of Barcelona and Brussels (the latter also including Rome), as well as Sea-Watch, a German association created by private citizens in 2014, each set up their own vessel: the Dignity I, the Bourbon Argos and the Sea-Watch, respectively. In terms of funding, MOAS

and Sea-Watch depend entirely on private donations. The MSF receives 92% of its funding from private donations, while the remaining, state-funded 8% is only dedicated to 'apolitical' projects e.g. post-earthquake and flood disaster humanitarian assistance.

By the end of 2015, the three organizations had rescued 20,063 of the total 152,343 people rescued on the Mediterranean (*Guardian*, 2016). In 2016, these NGOs resumed activities with some changes regarding both the partnerships and the vessels. Sea-Watch replaced the old boat with a larger one; MOAS ended its cooperation with MSF and launched its third SAR season with two ships (the Phoenix and the Responder), in partnership with the Italian Red Cross. The MSF, besides running the Bourbon Argos and the Dignity I, also provided the medical staff for the SOS Méditerranée's MS Aquarius. Other NGOs involved in the Mediterranean SAR operations included Sea Watch, JugendRettet, Proactiva Open Arms, Cadus/Lifeboat, Boat Refugee Foundation and Save the Children. Thus, the number of non-governmental SAR vessels rose from four in 2015 to thirteen in 2016, while the number of people rescued reached 46,796 out of a total of 178,415 rescued (MSF Report, 2015).

According to *Telegraph News* (2017), NGOs had saved tens of thousands of migrants who likely would have died on the Mediterranean. Over Easter weekend in 2017, search and rescue boats saved more than 8,000 people from drowning. However, even while alleviating the responsibility of governments to save migrants, the politics of search and rescue remains controversial and now these same NGOs find themselves in the crossfire. As the scale and impact of NGO operations grew, their role in SAR operations increasingly faced mounting criticism as a pull factor for illegal migration, a facilitator of human

smuggling, and an obstacle to the identification of smugglers and asylum seekers. In fact, both European and Libyan officials have likened the NGO ship to “migrant taxis”, blaming the search and rescue operations for the continued crossings. The attendant de-legitimization and criminalization campaign against these NGOs has not only involved FRONTEX, high-level politicians, and the media, but has also led to the opening of several exploratory inquiries by prosecutors in Italy. Meanwhile, despite the fact that Italy no longer conducts SAR, Italian ports are still the primary destination for migrants rescued by NGOs. That is because most other EU member states have closed their borders, both by land and by sea. Besides, in a bid to self-regulate, the NGOs cooperate with the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) run by the Italian Coast Guard. In the case of those picked up by FRONTEX as part of Operation Triton, they are required to go to Italian ports as part of the protocol initially agreed upon in 2014. Consequently, Italy is still principally at the centre of the rescue framework (FRONTEX Report, 2014).

According to the IOM (2017), more than 93,000 migrants had arrived in Italy out of 111,000 migrant arrivals in the entire Mediterranean in July 2017. The assessment here is, should the arrivals continue at this pace, 2017 could be a record year for migrants reaching Italy surpassing 2106 when 181,000 were rescued and brought to Italian shores. Based on these records, the opinion here is that much like Greece, the strain on Italian government and social service system would certifiably be unsustainable. In order to stem this tide, the government of Italy came up with an EU backed code of conduct which outlined the guidelines to be followed by the NGOs conducting SAR in the Mediterranean. The 11-point plan included a categorical ban on NGOs entering Libyan waters, giving away their position by using maritime radar or using

flares to pinpoint their position. Both the Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch warned that the code of conduct could have a disastrous impact on the NGO missions as attempts to restrict NGO SAR operations risk endangering thousands of lives by limiting rescue boats from accessing the perilous waters near Libya (Euro News, 2017).

The Italian government responded by threatening to shut its ports to NGOs that did not sign the code of conduct. MOAS, Proactiva Open Arms and Save the Children agreed to the conditions but, Sea-Watch, JugendRettet, MSF, and SOS Méditerranée declined. In addition to the foregoing, the Italian initiative was also included in the “Action Plan on measures to support Italy, reduce pressure along the Central Mediterranean route and increase solidarity” submitted by the European Commission in July 2017. The Action plan also included an EU Trust Fund program for Africa to reinforce the integrated migration and border management capacities of the Libyan authorities. The program steps up activities in support of the Libyan Border and Coast Guards, to enhance their capacity to effectively manage the country's borders. In a related development, the Libyan government announced an expansion of its maritime rescue zone as part of measures to deal with the crisis in August 2017. The measures included the Libyan government asserting its right by ordering foreign vessels to stay out of its search and rescue zone of 12 nautical miles. It is worthy to note here that the Libyan authorities do not have a MRCC from which to coordinate SAR operations. Also, NGO - SAR operations offshore Libya usually take place in international waters where no state jurisdiction applies, which should further magnify NGOs’ ability to operate free of political interference. However, tensions have risen between these NGOs and the Libyan Coast Guard in recent

months with clashes being reported between both parties during migrant rescue operations. The Sea Watch, Sea Eye, Save the Children, JugendRettet, SOS Mediterranean and MSF have all reported altercations with the Libyan Coast Guard including forceful boarding, attempting to sink and firing shots upon these NGO ships despite being outside Libya's territorial waters (Mazen, 2009).

The intervention of Libyan coastguard units in the past year has repeatedly put the safety and lives of both NGOs' crews engaged and refugees and migrants in danger, both because they have resorted to firearms and violence and because of their operating at sea in plain disregard of basic security protocols and standards. These incidents raise the glaring concern that the Libyan coastguard is disregarding the following basic safeguards of operating at sea. Hence, it is glaring that the methods applied by the Libyan coastguard suggest that their priority is not ensuring the safety of lives, but rather returning people to Libya. As a fall out of the foregoing, many NGOs involved in migrant rescue operations in the Mediterranean announced a suspension of their activities due to widespread threats and intimidation both legal and physical from the major stakeholders in the region (Amnesty Report, 2017).

The unpredictability of Libyan security forces is yet another conundrum. On 17 August 2016, a Libyan coast guard patrol repeatedly fired at and then boarded MSF's Bourbon Argos. As a result of the attack, the majority of NGOs suspended their activities for almost two weeks, while resuming SAR only after devising tighter security protocols. At the beginning of September, however, two Sea-Eye personnel were arrested by the Libyan coast guard and subsequently released. In October 2017, a Libyan coast guard patrol

aggressively prevented Sea-Watch from conducting a rescue mission, causing about 4 migrants to drown. (The Guardian, 2016) The assertiveness of the Libyan coast guard, wary of foreign interference in its territory and increasingly pressed by EU authorities to conduct anti-smuggling and interdiction missions, has limited NGOs' access to the 'dead zone', prompting them to move further away from Libyan territorial waters or seek the protection of EU military assets deployed in the area. This may further reduce humanitarians' ability to conduct timely SAR missions and impact on their perceived independence. By and large, the conclusion here is that Europe is paying a heavy price for the upscale in migration patterns of movements from especially African countries to other parts of the world as a result of the conspiratorial elimination of Mu'amar Ghadaffi in 2011.

Reports also showed that from January to July, 39,224, 24,359 and 43,401 migrants reached the shores of Europe in 2019, 2020 and 2021 respectively. Migrants declared dead or missing numbered 615 in 2019, 389 in 2020 and 896 in 2021. In 2019, Turkey intercepted 12,955, Libya intercepted 3,750, Tunisia intercepted 1,266 migrants. In 2020, Turkey intercepted 11,727, Libya intercepted 5,476, Tunisia intercepted 3,977 while Algeria intercepted 1,937 migrants. In 2021, Turkey intercepted 6,982, Libya intercepted 15,330, Tunisia intercepted 7,541 while Algeria intercepted 1,712 migrants (IOM Global Analysis Migration Centre, 2021).

Maritime Migration and the Sea as a Humanitarian Space

In the new wave of global migration, a substantial number of the migrants are showing extraordinary resilience and courage as they make dangerous and difficult journeys and adapt to new environments. In the last

decades, faced with limited opportunities for safe and regular migration, migrants often relied on the services of smugglers and embark on dangerous sea and land voyages to make unauthorized border crossings (IFRC, 2015). We must however, reiterate here that the two huge shipwrecks that occurred on the 3rd and 11th of October 2013 near the island of Lampedusa, causing the death of 636 people in total, restaged the channel of Sicily and Lampedusa and raised serious concerns about humanitarian intervention on the Mediterranean Sea (Tazzioli, 2016).

Eugenio (2017), opined that the notion of humanitarian space primarily refers to those crisis scenarios where humanitarian agencies provide relief assistance. The concept, however, is not merely used to delimit any physical area where large-scale suffering occurs, but also identifies a symbolic space separated from politics where aid workers can operate in compliance with humanitarian principles. As a country, Nigeria has had its fair share in the death of migrants on the Mediterranean. In November 2017 the bodies of 26 Nigerian women and girls some believed to be as young as 14, were recovered and brought to Italy. The bodies were recovered by Cantabria, which works as part of the EU's Sophia anti-trafficking operation, from two separate shipwrecks – 23 from one and three from the other. The women and children were suspected to have been abused and murdered while attempting to cross the Mediterranean.

Such a large number of deaths at sea have turned the Central Mediterranean into the theatre of a complex humanitarian emergency. Both international non-governmental organizations and smaller, ad hoc charities have attempted to mitigate the humanitarian crisis arising from the absence of large-scale state Search and Rescue (SAR) operations by conducting migrant

rescuing missions offshore (Marin, 2011). The offshore of Western Libya has ominously been labelled the 'dead zone', a geographical space where a severe humanitarian emergency has taken place. Based on the foregoing, the Mediterranean has emerged as a new epitome of humanitarian space, claiming the lives of inestimable number of persons. As a matter of fact, migrant fatalities on the Mediterranean has experience an upsurge between 2017 and 2021. Accordingly,

In the half of 2021, at least 1,146 people lost their lives on maritime routes to Europe. This is a substantial increase compared to the fatalities recorded in the same period in 2020 (513) and 2019 (674). The Mediterranean Sea was the main site of these fatalities: 896 people are known to have died attempting to reach Europe across this water from January to June 2021, representing a 130 per cent increase compared to the same period in 2020. The most lives lost were recorded on the Central (741) and Western (149) Mediterranean routes, whereas six people died taking the Eastern Mediterranean routes from Turkey to Greece. In the same period, at least 250 died attempting to reach Spain's Canary Island on the Western African/Atlantic Route. The available data shows that out of the 1,146 people who lost their lives on maritime routes to Europe, 409 were men, 104 were women and 50 were children.... Most of them were nationals from Northern Africa (139) followed by Western Africa (120), and other regions (10). However, the nationality of 872 individuals remains unknown (IOM, 2021: 4).

In 2019, IOM report showed that 57,810 migrants reached their points of destination in Europe while 615 lost their lives. In 2020, the number of

migrants reduced to 47,865 while 389 lost their lives. This reduction can be attributed to the COVID-19 Pandemic which to a large extent restricted the movements of persons attempting to emigrate from their countries. The year 2021 experienced a significant increase in the number of migrants with 75,563 reaching Europe while 896 lost their lives (IOM, 2021).

Humanitarian principles on the Mediterranean

The duty to rescue, which represents the technical and specific way of saving migrant lives at sea, is currently the landmark of activist groups, human rights campaigns, and national authorities involved in maritime patrolling. Fassin (2011), opined that the humanitarian rationale in supporting migrant movement is termed as the 'humanitarian technology of government'. As far as the government of refugees at sea is concerned, in the face of massive migrant deaths the humanitarian logic grounded on the duty of rescuing lives in danger has also permeated activist groups while saturating the space of intellectual and policy discourses (Tazzioli, 2016).

According to IFRC, (2015) the overarching approach of civil society actors, aims at reducing the vulnerability of migrants through a coordinated and trans-regional support to migrants along the length of their migratory routes. States are called on within the framework of applicable international law, to ensure that their national procedures at international borders, especially those that might result in denial of access to international protection, deportation or interdiction of persons, include adequate safeguards to protect the dignity and ensure the safety of all migrants.

Relationship between the State and Search and Rescue Non-Governmental Organizations

Marin (2011), asserted that the recent events occurring in the Mediterranean as well as in the Balkan region demonstrates that Europe is, undoubtedly, a region of immigration and this has political implications. It is clear that the issue of external migration represents a political test for the EU and its values, a test to assess EU's practical adherence to its founding values of respect for "human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights." (Article 2 of Treaty on European Union}

The complicated relations between the state and SAR NGOs involved with Mediterranean migrant fatalities have risen to the extent where most EU member states have closed their borders, both by land and by sea to vulnerable migrants hence making the SAR operations by NGOs a herculean task. In order to stem the tide of Mediterranean migration, the government of Italy came up with an EU backed code of conduct which outlined the guidelines to be followed by the NGOs conducting SAR in the Mediterranean and threatened to shut its ports to NGOs that did not sign the code of conduct. The 11-point plan included a categorical ban on NGOs entering Libyan waters, giving away their position by using maritime radar or using flares to pinpoint their position. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch gauged that the code of conduct could have a disastrous impact on the NGO missions as attempts to restrict NGO SAR operations risk endangering thousands of lives by limiting rescue boats from accessing the perilous waters near Libya (Euro News, 2017).

The limitations that NGOs themselves confront and the conditions in which they are allowed to operate, are other aspects of concern in their

relations with European states. The impact of NGOs on EU policies is generally difficult to measure. In migration policy, it is even more fragmented and controversial, given the dominant roles of the Member States and the strong influence of intergovernmental preferences. Hence, majority of NGOs have continued to work within traditional field of assistance, by developing a wide variety of approaches. Some of those that had initially worked on migration responded to the end of legal immigration and to the growing dominance of control and admission issues by shifting their focus to integration, anti-racism or multiculturalism. NGOs claim that people die because of the policies of the state. They consider that border controls are a form of military war against migrants. They stressed that even though European country militaries are not deliberately killing migrants, they do not make efforts to save them either.

From a practical point of view, NGOs' search and rescue operations already constitute a relevant tool that is mitigating the effects of the crisis. Cooperation between states and NGOs is not a new phenomenon; it already works in several other policy fields and is a sign of how the global system has changed deeply in recent years. However, in this case, the problem is that NGOs are the unintended vacuum fillers of specific tasks that the EU cannot fully accomplish on its own.

Conclusion

The Mediterranean is far from being an ideal locus of humanitarian action. Operating at sea reflects or even reinforces some of the thorniest dilemmas humanitarian actors encounter, forcing NGOs to accept uneasy compromises on the principles of independence, neutrality and impartiality in order to conduct operations. Moreover, there have been growing concerns

over the unintended consequences of non-governmental migrant rescuing, ranging from incentivizing an abdication of states' responsibility to the facilitation of smuggling strategies that are responsible for the growing number of casualties along the Central Mediterranean route.

Migration issues are dominating current debates at all levels. The perception of migrants as a threat quite often prevails over the human dimension and is associated to the immediate emergency management phase, particularly in respect of recent developments in the Mediterranean. The analysis of the roles of NGOs, a combination of traditional assistance to development and social integration and more active interventions in the place of Search and Rescue operation in the Mediterranean offers some interesting insights in their operations but their relationship with Member States have in a long way hampered their effectiveness on the Mediterranean. The need to guarantee the security of EU borders by Member States and to ensure legitimate cross-border mobility on the one hand, and the urgency to foster irregular migration and human trafficking on the other, has produced differing institutional experiments and political innovations. However, in the face of contemporary events, this ambitious balance has demonstrated the structural weaknesses of states. Thus, the security paradigm, which conceives migrants as a threat, seems to prevail over the legal obligations which impose protection of human beings, particularly with respect to recent developments in the Mediterranean.

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Migration and Conflicts in Nigeria: Issues and Management Strategies

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Abstract

Migration and its attending crisis have been an issue of national and internal discourse in the recent times most especially as regards how it is causing serious insecurity all over the world. In as much as it will be impossible to stop the movement of persons from one place to another, the concern in this regard is how such movement can occur without necessarily causing any form of mayhem or harm to the people and the environment generally in the process. It is therefore in this regard that this study sets out to examine the issue of migration and how it can occasion conflicts in Nigeria vis-à-vis

dealing with such issues in order to maximally reduce the negative impact. One major factor that has contributed to the issue of conflict arising from migration is that of uncensored movement and porous borders both within and into the country. Analytical method of research using qualitative approach was employed in this study. This study postulates that holistic approach must be adopted by the Government in dealing with issues of illegal and uncensored migration into the country in order to curtail the negative impact of migration both within and into the country.

Keywords: Conflict, Insecurity, Migration, Management

1.1 Background of the Study

The dynamism of human nature projects the need for movement from one place to another at different times and for different reasons which could either be positive or negative in nature. Such movement could either be a local or international transit and when this kind of movement occurs, we say there is migration. Migration has been described as a spatial phenomenon involving movement between distinct places, locations imbued with meaning and power (Cresswell, 2006). It is referred to as people changing their place of residence, where they live on a habitual basis, embracing not only the actual physical structure, but also in some sense the wider community in which they live (Skeldon, 1997). People move for a wide range of reasons. Migration for labour market opportunities is crucially important and is probably most prominent in academic and policy discussions (Anna Lindley, 2014). Reasons for migration may include but not limited to, educational opportunities, adventure, climate change, cultural preference, disasters and security issues. Various factors are known to come into play over time in shaping migration

decisions, from more structural elements, to predisposing factors, immediate triggers, and intervening factors including social networks and immigration regimes elsewhere (Van Hear, 1998). Migration has both its advantages and disadvantages. There are instances where migration to a new settlement has been of immeasurable promotion to a better life among the people and there have been instances where such transit has occasioned several problems and some even lead to violent conflicts or severe crisis. It is worthy of note, that crisis and migration have a long association, in popular and policy discourse as well as in social scientific analysis. Many crisis situations are associated with significant out-migration and displacement, and in-migration is often associated with tensions or conflict at destination. Despite the relatively recent emergence of more nuanced and even celebratory accounts of mobility, the tendency to link migration with crisis in a strongly negative fashion remains deeply entrenched and vigorously persistent (Anna Lindley, 2014).

Since conflicts have remained inherent in human relationships over time whether at the interpersonal, organizational, societal, national or international levels, it will therefore nonetheless be found applicable on issues bothering on migration. Transit episodes has been known to occasion several forms of conflicts resulting to severe crisis in some cases, though certain benefits have been known to accrue from it most particularly in Nigeria, where conflicts have contributed immensely to the making and shaping of the histories of its people. Both Conflicts and Migration are often viewed as capable of threatening the society. This is because conflicts are deemed capable of jeopardising the social systems and human welfare while migration is deemed capable of undermining the integrity of the nation-state and bounded identities. This notwithstanding, both conflict and migration are

often described as characteristic of the contemporary world as scholars proclaim that we are in an 'age of crisis' and an 'age of migration' (Castles and Miller, 2009; Solimano, 2010).

Most known lingering conflicts as witnessed in the African countries like Sudan, Rwanda, Sierra Leonean, Darfur and Nigeria are either as a result of ethnic confrontation or boundary clashes arising from the negative effects of migration. Displacement of people in the different parts of the world at present is the product of reactions from the effects of famine and drought, bad leadership, unemployment and poverty which have combined to increase the rate at which Africans migrate to different parts of the continents of the world thereby increasing the frequency and potency of political, ethnic and religious conflicts at any given point in time.

Migration has played a negative role both in promoting chaotic atmosphere and causing immense damages in Nigeria most particularly as a result of the activities of foreigners who are possessed of damning ideologies from different backgrounds that are detrimental to the peace of the country. Some of these unruly elements are fleeing rebels, war lords and combatants who have come with arms and ammunitions either to sell or avail themselves as recruits for anyone willing to pay or the highest bidders. These migrants are willing to do whatever it takes at all cost to survive. They feed off the fragile security atmosphere of the country by engaging in criminal and illegal activities. It is therefore in this regard that this study seeks to examine cogent problems surrounding migration most especially as it relates to its attending conflicts and the likely probable strategies in confronting the situation.

1.2 Aims and Objectives:

The problem of insecurity occasioned by conflicts in the nation is alarming and must of necessity be addressed. It is for the purpose of doing justice to this menace that this research aims at examining arising conflict situations as a result of migration in Nigeria. The work also examines the probable operation and impact of migration on the promotion of violent conflicts and how it can be effectively dealt with, in order to ensure peaceful coexistence among the several people of diverse ideologies in the country.

1.3 Theoretic Framework

The study adopted a qualitative approach on analytical method of research. The applicable theory in this research is Frustration Aggression Theory. The Frustration Aggression Theory largely implies that aggression is often a result of frustration. This theory was originally conceived by Dollard and Miller (1939) but it was later substantially refined by Berkowitz in 1969. The theory states that aggression is an outcome or result of blocking or frustrating a person's efforts towards a certain goal (Dollard, 1939; as cited in Myers, 2007). The theory further posits that frustration caused by interference in goal-directed activity produces a 'readiness' for aggression which if 'triggered' can result in aggressive response. According to Rationis 2014, the trigger could be an insignificant element of behavior, such as a casual joke, gesture or mild criticism which would normally be overlooked, but to the frustrated individual who is already waiting for an opportunity to show his frustration, it may provoke aggressive response or reprisal. (Rationis 2014). The applicability of this theory is on the ground that every person notwithstanding her/his ethnic

affiliation, religion, ideology has diverse expectations and when these expectations are perceived to be threatened by another, it will give rise to conflicts and most often times are too severe to be easily arrested until underlining factors are adequately arrested.

2.1 Conceptual Clarification

A clearer perception of the subject of this research will be made possible with the attempt to provide a conceptual review and clarification of some concepts that are related to the subject of this study and these are as discussed herein.

2. 1.1 Migration

Charles (2004) opined that according to conventional wisdom, migration, and international migration in particular, is a major problem in today's world. This perspective holds that migration is primarily a product of economic and political crises that push people to leave their homelands, usually involuntarily. Migrants tend to crowd into cities, where they become an underclass exploited by unscrupulous employers and landlords. In addition to creating social problems, migrants are alleged to lower wage standards and to take jobs from domestic workers. It is worthy of note that migration out of one's place of origin will always be counter-productive to that place because it will occasion the dearth of the skills and potentials of its outbound migrants. Migration can occasion a brain drain in a society when most of the able and talented youth, are being pushed out because of the search for a better life and the prospects of socioeconomic development in the new areas. According to economic theory, migration is a normal response to the mismatch between the spatial distribution of people and opportunities. The presumption is that free

mobility of labor has a similar logic to the argument for free trade. Free trade is considered to maximize economic opportunities and wealth in the long run, although the benefits are often unevenly distributed in the short term. There is not a clear consensus among migration researchers on the benefits and costs of international migration, nor is there unanimity on policy prescriptions. It is expected that there will be considerable variation in the effects of migration at different times and places and for different groups. Migration is heavily problematised, by contrast with immobility and more micro-mobilities (Carling, 2002; Cresswell, 2006). Migrant identity is often assumed to be a key explanatory variable in social processes and experiences, where in fact other distinctions (gender, age, race, class) may be more or equally important.

2.1.2 Violent Conflict

A violent conflict involves at least two parties using physical force to resolve competing claims or interests. While a violent conflict may involve only non-state actors, often, the term is used as a synonym for war which involves at least one government. Violent conflicts are categorized according to different factors, one of which is the number of casualties they result in per year. As such, the most frequent number coming up to distinguish violent conflict from mere conflict is 25 battle-related deaths per year. If the battle-related deaths during the course of a conflict are under 1000 they are considered as minor, while between 25-1000 in one-year as during a particular year in conflict are categorized as intermediate conflicts. Above 1000 battle-related deaths during one particular year is considered as war or as a major armed conflict (Wallensteen and Axel1994: 333-349).

Another way of classifying violent conflicts is depending on which type of actors are involved in the conflict and where the conflicts take place. These

categories are however rather blurry as the distinction between national and international conflicts is difficult to establish due to the degree of international involvement in internal conflicts. An example of this is the Congo wars in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) which, to at the beginning was called a national war, but which transformed into an international war to the degree that it was named the 'First African World War' (Reyntjens, 2009).

The distinctions remain however and internal violent conflicts are often defined as conflicts that take place within a state as opposed to between states (Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010). Similarly, inter-state conflicts are characterized by the official involvement of two or more governments. Violent conflicts are also differentiated by the balance of power between the opposing factions: a symmetrical conflict reflects an even balance of power where the factions involved have more or less similar material, financial and technical capacities whereas an asymmetrical conflict refers to a disequilibrium between the actors, where a faction clearly has the upper hand in the balance of power. Similarly, violent conflicts are labelled according to what the topic of the conflict concerns, be that apolitical, ideological issue, a social, exclusionary or inclusionary topic, or a religious or ethnic focus. Most often however, conflicts are a mixture of several different topics that overlap each other. Ethnic conflicts are for example often more of social conflicts where parts of the population have been excluded from power or education, for political reasons, whereas ideological topics also may include religious questions. (INFOCORE Definitions, 2015)

There is no single cause of conflict. Rather, conflict is context-specific, multi-causal and multidimensional and can result from a combination of the following factors:

- Political and institutional factors: weak state institutions, elite power struggles and political exclusion, breakdown in social contract and corruption, identity politics
- Socioeconomic factors: inequality, exclusion and marginalization, absence or weakening of social cohesion, poverty
- Resource and environmental factors: greed, scarcity of national resources often due to population growth leading to environmental insecurity, unjust resource exploitation

Each of these factors may constitute a cause, dynamic and/or impact of conflict. New issues will arise during conflict which perpetuates the conflict. Identifying and understanding the interactions between various causes, dimensions, correlates and dynamics of conflict – and the particular contexts in which conflict arises, is essential in determining potential areas of intervention; and designing appropriate approaches and methods for conflict prevention, resolution and transformation. The way in which a government or institution at an international or societal level addresses conflict between individuals, groups or nations can determine whether the parties to the conflict will resort to violence (GSDRC, 2014).

The impact of violent conflicts on a country's society, economy and political governance is devastating and encompassing. The effects can be tangible and visible, including killed and injured civilians, destroyed or derelict bridges and wells, and damaged or inadequate health care and education facilities. They can also be intangible, such as the collapse of state institutions, mistrust in government, the disruption of social cohesion, psychological trauma and pervasive fear. These impacts can be long lasting, hindering the peaceful development of societies. An understanding of the causes and dynamics of

violent conflict and the careful design of conflict prevention, conflict management and peace building activities are essential to avoid violence in the first place or to alleviate its harmful outcome. (Haider, 2009)

3.1 Types of Migration

Two major types of migration have been identified and these are; voluntary and involuntary migration. These two are discussed as follows:

3.1.1 Voluntary Migration

When people choose to migrate on their own volition, it is called voluntary migration. This is a situation where a migrant has a choice whether to migrate or not, and has the choice of choosing where to migrate to and the duration for which they move. Choice is voluntary when made within the context of acceptable alternatives, though the perception of acceptable alternatives is shaped by the amount of information the person can access as well as their personal beliefs. People migrate voluntarily for better living conditions, access to advanced healthcare, access to good education and employment prospects among others.

This form of migration is usually comfortable for both the migrant and the receiving country. While migration can benefit countries by providing them with the prospects of new trades, skills and cheaper workforce, it has telling effects on such countries such as the following; The healthcare and education services can become strained, housing shortages may occur, there is the tendency of cultural tensions due to cultural differences and the welfare system is also strained in a case where migrants lay claim to their benefits,

An increase in population, expansion of urban areas, and a thrust of industrialization and infrastructural development have in one way or the other put a strain on available resources. There is shortage of land readily available for farmers to farm. Most of these farmers are forced to move hinterland to access vast lands to farm. Most of which usually stay for short spells or while the farming season is ongoing and return to their day-to-day activities when the farming season is over.

3.1.2 Involuntary Migration

A movement where people are faced with no other option than to move away from their homes due to danger and insecurity is referred to involuntary migration. Herdsmen mostly migrate for environmental reasons. Harsh weather conditions as a result of global warming, deforestation, desertification, drought, crop failure, insecurity to the herdsmen and their cattle as a result of cattle rustling and the Boko Haram menace, as well as the shortage of fresh water for their cattle have forced the herdsmen to abandon their primary settlement and to move southward to communities with proximity to fresh water and pasture lands. Communities that have experienced farmers/herdsmen's clashes are usually characterized as having large arable lands, mostly farmers by occupation and have access to fresh water while the weather is conducive with constant periodic rainfalls. These are factors lacking in areas being abandoned by the Fulani herdsmen. The destruction of farmlands by the herdsmen's cattle is usually met with resistance from the farmers; this resistance from farmers attracts retaliation from the herdsmen.

4.1 Causes of Migration

Human migration is the movement of people from one place to another; usually over long distances and sometimes short distances for the purpose of meeting their anticipated needs and with the intention of either settling there permanently or temporarily. There are a lot of factors that have been found responsible for migration in the world generally, and these are succinctly examined in this work. Olivia Giovetti (2019) identifies six causes of migration and these are listed as: drought, hunger, flooding, earthquakes, war and conflict, economic circumstances. At the High-Level Expert Group Meeting (EGM) organized by The United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA) and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), over sixty (60) expert participants were assembled to examine the theme, “Conflict-Induced Migration in Africa: Maximizing New Opportunities to Address its Peace, Security and Inclusive Development Dimensions”. At the said meeting which was held in Durban, South Africa, from 23rd to 24th of November 2015, participants identified six (6) major causes of migration to include the following:

- a) **State Fragility and Governance Failures**: State fragility and bad governance was noted to be a major cause of conflicts resulting into migration in Africa. Participants decried the breakdown of the social contract between governments and their citizens that is largely informed by the growing perception of the failure of governments to meet the basic needs of their citizens. Such misdeeds of the government are said to include; marginalization from the act of governance; Electoral violence; human rights violations and etc. which creates mistrusts,

grievances and conflicts and thus resulting to massive refugee outflows from a nation.

- b) **Youth unemployment**: High youth unemployment was noted to be a major driver of voluntary migration, as well as a threat to peace and security. Africa's demographic trends demonstrate a highly youthful population, of which a significant majority are without decent jobs. For instance, participants referenced the 2015 African Economic Outlook, which stated that "sub-Saharan Africa's population is becoming more youthful, with youth aged between 15 and 25 as a proportion of the total population projected at over 75 per cent by 2015. It is estimated that about 133 million young people (more than 50 per cent of the youth population) in Africa are illiterate. Many young people have little or no skills and are therefore largely excluded from productive economic and social life. Those that have some education often exhibit skills irrelevant to current demand in the labour market, in a situation where educational and skill requirements are increasing, resulting in millions of unemployed and underemployed youths.
- c) **Pull and Push Factors** Some participants further noted that migration, in all its forms, is also caused by pull and push factors, which are largely driven by gross underdevelopment, extreme inequalities and the resultant perception that another region or state is better developed or peaceful than one's current region or state. This development-security nexus underscores the need to invest in the building of inclusive, peaceful and prosperous societies where all are equal and entitled to life, liberty, human rights and enjoy the dividends of governance. The absence of which creates tensions, and political instability that could

result in armed conflicts and forced migration. This research in line with this identified three major kinds of push and pulls factors for migration: Environmental, Insecurity and Economic. These factors are examined as follows:

- i. Environmental Push and Pull Factors:** People who migrate for environmental reasons are usually pulled toward physically attractive regions and are pushed from hazardous ones.

 - ii. Insecurity Push and Pull factors:** One major reason for global migration is insecurity. Insecurity simply put human beings to the risk of many dangers, most particularly as regards loss of lives. Issues of warfare, terrorism, kidnapping, banditry and the likes as now experienced in Nigeria as at present expose the people to fear and intimidation and thus, they are forced to move out of the country.

 - iii. Economic Push and Pull Factors:** Poor economy which has resulted into high level of poverty because of bad governance has provoked more migration all over the world, most particularly in the African countries. Youths particularly in search of better life look for ways both legal and illegal to get out of the country for the purpose of looking for greener pastures and this is tantamount to "Economic Push and Pull Factor.
- d) **Border Issues in Africa** Participants noted that contestations over porous and artificial borders in Africa remain a cause of disputes and

violent conflicts, which can lead to forced migration. For instance, border disputes between Eritrea/Ethiopia, Sudan/South Sudan, Kenya/Uganda, as well as Somalia and Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya, have led to various forms of conflicts. In addition, the porosity and poor management of borders in Africa, coupled with the effects of the war on terrorism, make border crossing dangerous and create strict border controls and enforcement. Often this has implications for the safety and protection of migrant populations, who are increasingly vulnerable to exploitation and abuse at border points by state and non-state actors. The porosity of borders in Africa also tends to create disjoints in national identities, as communities on either side of the border are merely divided artificially, despite having family ties on either side.

- e) **Small Arms Proliferation:** Participants underscored the continuing challenges posed by the proliferation of small arms in Africa. They decried the availability and easy accessibility to small arms that end up in the wrong hands. Small arms are sold at affordable prices in some crisis region without restriction; thus, constituting further threats to peace and security. Participants inter alia emphasized the important need for disarmament and weapons collections, as well as the need to better regulate private security companies across Africa. They also called on Member States to ratify and domesticate the Arms Trade Treaty, as well as enhance measures to comprehensively assess and address the role of suppliers, financiers, facilitators, transit and recipient countries of illicit weapons, and of non-state actors involved in the proliferation of small arms. They called on the African Union and Regional Economic Communities to work with Member States in

accelerating efforts in this regard, especially when there is the aim to realize the targets of Agenda 2063's Flagship Project on "Silencing all Guns in Africa by 2020".

- f) **Environmental Issues**: Participants further observed that issues such as population growth, environmental degradation and climate change are subtle but potential significant drivers of conflicts in Africa. Floods, droughts, landslides, unpredictable weather patterns and food insecurity have led to various forms of violent contestations and forced migrations on the continent. Participants called for integrated approaches that address the economic, humanitarian, developmental, as well as peace and security implications of these drivers, as a strategy to avert future conflicts and forced migration

5.1 Migration and Conflicts

The increase in the number of migrants can contribute to conflict in migrant receiving areas in different ways. This ranges from competition over natural and economic resources, ethnic tensions, socioeconomic tensions and burden on infrastructure and services. Bangladesh and North India are considered examples for the relationship between environmentally induced migration movements and armed conflict (Reuveny 2008). Conflict and migration are connected most particularly in most rural communities where there are scarce resources. Wherever there is uncensored or unguided migration, it results into many conflicts which often have counter effect on productivity, agricultural resources, social infrastructure, national security, etc. This researcher asserts that conflicts which are likely to arise due to migration include but not limited to; scarcity of resources, religious tension, cultural disparity, ideological differences, land disputes, etc. The indigenous Nigeria has witnessed quite a

number of ethnic contentions as a result of migration which are still lingering up till this present time. Notable amongst these violent ethnic confrontations as a result of migration conflicts are; the Offa and Erin-Ile clashes, Ife and Modakeke clashes both in the southwestern part of Nigeria. There is also the case of the Aguleri and the Umuleri communities in southeastern part of the country among so many others. On the other hand, Nigeria has not ceased to experience all kinds of volatile religious contentions emanating migration conflicts which have occasioned loss of lives and properties and an example of this is the Nigeria Maitatsine religious violence between 1980 and 1985.

Nonetheless, migration provoked conflicts have been known to have severe, dangerous and highly destructive impacts on the host communities and some of these effects are being experienced in many local communities in Nigeria. Such implications of migration conflicts include; Food Insecurity- which may increase perceived marginalization and exclusion (Breisinger, Ecker and Trinh Tan, 2015), loss of lives, loss of means of livelihood, displacement, chaos and disorderliness, political instability and diverse kinds of criminal activities resulting to serious violence of any kind which may arise from grievances formed along ethnic or religious lines (FAO, 2017a).

6.1 Management of Migration Conflicts

In as much as it may not be possible to eliminate crisis that may arise from migration, there is the guarantee that positive actions in time may help to prevent it and where not possible, help to reduce the effect. This research identifies five (5) basic ways by which migration provoked conflicts can be effectively managed and these are discussed as follows:

1. **Effective Security of the Borders:** Security of the border is necessary in order to safe-guard the country from unscrupulous elements. This is to justify the assertion of Dauvergne (2008) who says; “in an increasingly globalized world, laws controlling the movement of people across borders represent ‘the last bastion of sovereignty’. It will therefore be necessary for the government to take the first and the most necessary action in securing the lives of the people and this is the conscious effort to protect the borders from illegal immigrant who are most likely to facilitate undue conflicts and acts of violence within the nation.

2. **National Identity:** One major factor that encourages unguided in-flow into a nation is the lack of national identity in whatsoever form it may be deemed fit. When a nation is unable to identify its citizenry, it will lack the adequate data to provide for their needs and security. Lack of national identity also makes it easy for illegal immigrants to easily naturalize and claim the citizenship of a nation where they have no relevance and this make them to be susceptible to all kinds of criminal activities since they know, they can always return to their nation of origin when there is trouble

3. **Public Discourse and Dialogue:** Like other authors, Babacan and Babacan (2009), point to the importance of public discourses. Dialogue is an essential instrument in dealing with crisis as it helps the parties to have a common knowledge about issues that can occasion disunity and cause crisis. So as a defensive mechanism, the host states in any given

community should provide a platform by which they can engage their immigrants in discussion with the hope of making them to understand and learn the values by which their community operates. Where this is done, there will not be any room for offence or agitations that can lead to crisis.

4. **Prompt and Effective Integration:** Most migrants are often faced with the challenges of negotiating their rights to integration which includes right of stay and citizenship. And one of the major ways to get the migrants constructively committed and effectively monitored is through integration. It is therefore in this regard that Ager and Strang (2008), identify ten dimensions of integration grouped within four main areas: markers and means, social connection, facilitators and foundation. Integration can be defined along the border line of a nation's sense of identity, its 'cultural understandings and nationhood' (Saggar 1995). This sense of identity as a nation incorporates certain values; and these are values that significantly shape the way that a concept such as integration is approached. Such values include; employment opportunity which constitutes perhaps the most researched area of integration (Castles *et al.* 2001) and housing, along with the financial security of tenancies and, where appropriate, ownership.

5. **Promotion of Culture of Peace:** If a society will be free from the attending problems of migration, it must take proactive actions of educating and enlightening not only her nationals but also the migrants on the need to imbibe the culture of peace. There is the need to inculcate

the culture of peace which prioritizes the utilization of peaceful means of settling disputes, especially through preventive diplomacy, negotiation and mediation, rather than military means. It is also expected that each egalitarian society should ensure the integration of peace education into the curriculum for education and training of the nation.

7.1 Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation

This study has been able to examine the concept of migration vis-à-vis its attending challenges across the globe. It has been ascertained that migration and conflicts are two sides of a relationship coin which will continue to exist together notwithstanding the challenges which can reasonably be dealt with through proactive actions. This study exposed the fact that unguided migration may be the reason for the increasing rate of insecurity in any society of which Nigeria is not an exception. The paper itemized the causes of migration and the probable way to manage the crises or conflicts that are likely to emerge from such issues. The conclusion of this research is that migration has been in existence for long and it will continue to exist despite its attending challenges but the probable attending conflicts thereto can either be prevented or effectively managed through right orientation and right action in the right direction.

This research recommends that the Nigeria Government should take proactive actions through appropriate policies and effective enforcement strategies to

deal with the issue of migration and its attending conflicts. The country Nigeria needs an integrated approach under the direction of a central organization coordinating the various security forces and resources towards achieving a common goal. The Federal Government of Nigeria should design an organization with the core aim of addressing distinctive threats in each of the border areas. The security of Nigeria's borders should be reviewed to ensure all the illegal routes of the country's land borders are properly manned and necessary equipment provided for immigration and customs to carry out their duties effectively. There is also the need to station security officials across all routes leading in and out of Nigeria to supplement the efforts of immigrations and customs. This is to checkmate illegal activities across Nigerian borders and keep close eyes on activities in border communities. On a final note, the media should be used for proper orientation and enlightenment on the inculcation of values of peaceful co-existence at all times.

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Syndemicity of COVID-19: Implications for Global Studies on the Pandemic

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Abstract

The syndemic model exemplifies the effect of the clustering of health conditions which are intensified by socioecological factors that result in worse outcomes among vulnerable populations. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated varying health outcomes against a backdrop of distinctive structural contexts. A holistic view of the factors responsible for the wavering health

outcomes at the individual, family and community levels points to the interplay between biological and socioecological factors.

Studies have shown the role the biological interactions of the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) with existing communicable and non-communicable diseases play in increasing vulnerability to worse health outcomes. A similar dynamic has been demonstrated by the biological interactions of the virus with social determinants of health and political factors. Together, these factors synergistically create a spectrum of possible outcomes, making some individuals and populations more vulnerable to worse outcomes than others.

Though several COVID-19 studies have been conducted, there are relatively few studies which explore the disease from a syndemic model. This leaves a research gap in the study of the effects of the disease on existing diseases in the host system, as well as social, environmental, and political factors that may increase the risk of individuals and populations to clustered disease effects. Researchers are urged to view the COVID-19 pandemic through a syndemic lens, and design and implement studies based on this perspective. In addition, we recommend the development and implementation of a global syndemic framework by international bodies, which will be adaptable at national and subnational levels for the conduct of COVID-19 related studies. These could provide better understanding of the virus and the factors that lead to the clustering effects which have both direct and indirect impact on health outcomes.

Keywords: COVID-19, pandemics, syndemics, global studies

Background

The synergistic interaction between biological and socioecological factors resulting in varying health outcomes is a “syndemic”. This concept was defined by Merrill Singer in the 1990s as “a set of closely intertwined and mutual enhancing health problems that significantly affect the overall health status of a population within the context of a perpetuating configuration of noxious social conditions”.²⁷ The clustering effect of biological factors and socioecological factors, working together to create distinctions could make some individuals or communities more vulnerable to a particular disease than others.

Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is caused by the severe acute respiratory coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). Being a novel virus, significant body of knowledge around this virus is still being generated. The pandemic is arguably one of the biggest threats to global health security in the 21st century and its effects have been profound across the world.²⁸ However, the pandemic has had varying effects across different contexts, including the individual, community, and national levels. This may not be unrelated to the interconnectedness of COVID-19 vulnerabilities and outcomes with the

²⁷ Merrill Singer, “A Dose of Drugs, a Touch of Violence, a Case of AIDS: Conceptualizing the SAVA Syndemic,” *Free Inquiry - Special Issue: Gangs, Drugs & Violence* 24, no. 2 (1996): 99, <https://ojs.library.okstate.edu/osu/index.php/FICS/article/view/1346>.

²⁸ Oluwatosin Wuraola Akande and Tanimola Makanjuola Akande, “COVID-19 Pandemic: A Global Health Burden,” *Nigerian Postgraduate Medical Journal, Nigeria* 27 (July 2020): 144–55, https://doi.org/10.4103/npmj.npmj_157_20.

biological, social, environmental, and political factors in these contexts. A significant proportion of studies conducted on COVID-19 may have failed to holistically consider the role socioecological factors play in the pandemic. This gap in research limits the evidence-based information on structural and deep-rooted implications and potential interventions for the pandemic. This paper aims to describe the syndemicity of COVID-19 and its implications on global studies on the pandemic.

The Syndemicity of COVID-19

Bio-bio interactions

Biological interactions of the SAR-CoV-2 virus with existing pathogens in the host system could result in adverse health outcomes. These biological interactions can be demonstrated with communicable diseases which could be bacterial, parasitic or viral, antimicrobial resistance, and non-communicable diseases.²⁹ For instance, malaria, a parasitic infection caused by *Plasmodium* spp. triggers inflammatory reactions which result in clinical symptoms of the disease.³⁰ Similarly, COVID-19 triggers a lot of inflammatory reactions through the cytokine pathway.³¹ SARS-CoV-2 and *Plasmodium* spp. coinfection is associated with severe COVID-19 as a result of excessive proinflammatory

²⁹ Uday Narayan Yadav et al., "A Syndemic Perspective on the Management of Non-Communicable Diseases Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic in Low- and Middle-Income Countries," *Frontiers in Public Health* 8 (2020): 508, <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2020.00508>.

³⁰ Temitope W. Ademolue et al., "Patterns of Inflammatory Responses and Parasite Tolerance Vary with Malaria Transmission Intensity," *Malaria Journal* 16, no. 1 (April 11, 2017): 145, <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12936-017-1796-x>.

³¹ Yujun Tang et al., "Cytokine Storm in COVID-19: The Current Evidence and Treatment Strategies," *Frontiers in Immunology* 11 (2020): 1708, <https://doi.org/10.3389/fimmu.2020.01708>.

cytokine-mediated responses and hypercoagulable state.³² These responses may manifest in form of acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) and thrombocytopenia, both of which are associated with poor prognosis.

HIV infection has been linked with increased vulnerability to SARS-CoV-2 infection and worse health outcomes. In a systematic review and meta-analysis conducted by Ssentongo et al, there was an 80% excess risk of mortality from COVID-19 among HIV/AIDS patients compared with those without HIV/AIDS.³³ Studies have shown SARS-CoV-2 and Hepatitis B co-infected patients have been found to have increased risk of hepatic dysfunction, altered albumin production and lipid metabolism, and manifestation of symptoms such as severe monocytopenia and thrombocytopenia.³⁴

A study of the trend in the use of antibiotics among patients with severe SARS-CoV-2 infection found antibiotic use to be higher than the incidence of bacterial infections.³⁵ Coupled with the de-prioritization of antimicrobial resistance surveillance and antimicrobial stewardship programmes as a result of the diversion of resources to COVID-19 response, COVID-19 has been

³² Mogahed Ismail Hassan Hussein et al., "Malaria and COVID-19: Unmasking Their Ties," *Malaria Journal* 19, no. 1 (December 23, 2020): 457, <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12936-020-03541-w>.

³³ Paddy Ssentongo et al., "Epidemiology and Outcomes of COVID-19 in HIV-Infected Individuals: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis," *Scientific Reports* 11, no. 1 (March 18, 2021): 6283, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-85359-3>.

³⁴ Yong Lin et al., "Patients with SARS-CoV-2 and HBV Co-Infection Are at Risk of Greater Liver Injury," *Genes & Diseases* 8, no. 4 (July 2021): 484–92, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gendis.2020.11.005>; Rui Liu et al., "Clinical Characteristics of COVID-19 Patients with Hepatitis B Virus Infection — a Retrospective Study," *Liver International* 41, no. 4 (2021): 720–30, <https://doi.org/10.1111/liv.14774>.

³⁵ Jesús Rodríguez-Baño et al., "Key Considerations on the Potential Impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Antimicrobial Resistance Research and Surveillance," *Transactions of The Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene*, no. trab048 (March 27, 2021), <https://doi.org/10.1093/trstmh/trab048>.

associated with inappropriate antibiotic use and may contribute to antimicrobial resistance in the long term.³⁶

Studies have also found patients with non-communicable diseases to have worsened health outcomes when co-infected with COVID-19. A systematic review conducted by Nikoloski et al has shown people living with diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, chronic respiratory diseases, chronic liver and kidney diseases to be more vulnerable to COVID-19.³⁷ The interaction between COVID-19 and these NCDs have direct and indirect effects on the individual which increase their risk of dying. For instance, patients with hyperglycaemia have more severe COVID-19 health outcomes as a result of modulatory immune and inflammatory responses.³⁸

Bio-social interactions

Social determinants of health have a significant effect on the outcome of COVID-19.³⁹ These social determinants may be grouped into five key domains: health and health care, social and community context, physical environment, education, and economic stability.⁴⁰ These factors are also interconnected, as one factor can be linked to the other.

³⁶ Rodríguez-Baño et al.

³⁷ Zlatko Nikoloski et al., “Covid-19 and Non-Communicable Diseases: Evidence from a Systematic Literature Review,” *BMC Public Health* 21, no. 1 (June 5, 2021): 1068, <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-021-11116-w>.

³⁸ Soo Lim et al., “COVID-19 and Diabetes Mellitus: From Pathophysiology to Clinical Management,” *Nature Reviews Endocrinology* 17, no. 1 (January 2021): 11–30, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41574-020-00435-4>.

³⁹ Sravani Singu et al., “Impact of Social Determinants of Health on the Emerging COVID-19 Pandemic in the United States,” *Frontiers in Public Health* 8 (2020): 406, <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2020.00406>; Elissa M. Abrams and Stanley J. Szeffler, “COVID-19 and the Impact of Social Determinants of Health,” *The Lancet Respiratory Medicine* 8, no. 7 (July 1, 2020): 659–61, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S2213-2600\(20\)30234-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/S2213-2600(20)30234-4).

⁴⁰ Michael Marmot and Richard Wilkinson, *Social Determinants of Health* (OUP Oxford, 2005).

Access to healthcare services is key to preventing severe health outcomes from COVID-19 and non COVID-19 cases. Ironically, the COVID-19 pandemic has led to a disruption in access to healthcare services.⁴¹ For example, disruption in routine health services such as immunisation and maternal health services could increase a community's risk to an outbreak of a vaccine preventable disease and worsen maternal health outcomes. An interplay of these factors could result in an increase in a community's vulnerability to the high burden of the disease in terms of morbidity and mortality rates.

Closely linked to education is its impact on health literacy. People who are not educated are likely to have low health literacy.⁴² Adherence to public health and social measures is important in the prevention of COVID-19 transmission. Those with low health literacy may not understand the need to adhere to this measure and the responsibility they have to others in order to curb the transmission of the virus.⁴³ In addition, those in fragile communities may be disadvantaged, as they may be underserved in the dissemination of risk communication messages that could reduce transmission of the virus.

Economic stability and social class distinctions have a noteworthy role to play in the outcome of COVID-19. Daily wage earners whose businesses cannot be

⁴¹ Alicia Núñez, S. D. Sreeganga, and Arkalgud Ramaprasad, "Access to Healthcare during COVID-19," *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health* 18, no. 6 (March 14, 2021): 2980, <https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph18062980>.

⁴² Tahereh Bayati et al., "Investigating the Effect of Education on Health Literacy and Its Relation to Health-Promoting Behaviors in Health Center," *Journal of Education and Health Promotion* 7 (October 29, 2018): 127, https://doi.org/10.4103/jehp.jehp_65_18.

⁴³ Singu et al., "Impact of Social Determinants of Health on the Emerging COVID-19 Pandemic in the United States."

done remotely have to go out to earn a living.⁴⁴ Social interventions such as the imposition of lockdowns and closure of businesses in response to the pandemic decreased income for many families during the pandemic.⁴⁵ Low socioeconomic status may also be associated with unwillingness to seek healthcare services.⁴⁶ These have implications on the individual level and community levels. In addition to putting the individuals and families at increased risk of contracting the virus, those who are asymptomatic or have mild symptoms but must continue to go to work to earn a living serve as a source of infection that could drive community transmission. Conversely, the pandemic provided an increase in demand for high skilled workers, including frontline workers and those in the Information, Communication and Technology (ICT) sector, with an increased likelihood of more income.⁴⁷ These factors may suggest that individuals in the lower wealth quintiles are more vulnerable to COVID-19 infection and may have worse outcomes compared with those in higher wealth quintiles.

Physical distancing is one of the public health social measures that contributes towards decreasing transmission of the virus. However, the feasibility of this

⁴⁴ Centre for the the Study of the Economies of Africa, "COVID 19 and the Informal Sector in Nigeria: The Socio-Economic Cost Implications," April 2020, <http://cseaafrica.org/covid-19-and-the-informal-sector-in-nigeria-the-socio-economic-cost-implications/>.

⁴⁵ Gbemisola Oseni et al., "Tracking the Socioeconomic Impacts of the Pandemic in Nigeria: Results from the First Three Rounds of the Nigeria COVID-19 National Longitudinal Phone Survey," September 2020, <https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/tracking-socioeconomic-impacts-pandemic-nigeria-results-first-three-rounds-nigeria-covid>.

⁴⁶ Singu et al., "Impact of Social Determinants of Health on the Emerging COVID-19 Pandemic in the United States."

⁴⁷ OECD, "An Assessment of the Impact of COVID-19 on Job and Skills Demand Using Online Job Vacancy Data," April 2021, <https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/an-assessment-of-the-impact-of-covid-19-on-job-and-skills-demand-using-online-job-vacancy-data-20ff09e/>.

intervention is variable in different contexts. This is particularly concerning among those who live in urban slums where overcrowding is a norm. Physical distancing may be close to impossible in this setting, thus increasing their vulnerability to the infection.

Bio-political interactions

Governments are expected to take decisive actions during health emergencies such as the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the response of governments may be politicised for certain political gains. There are reports that some governments might have misused their power and for political gains, declared a state of emergency as a response to the pandemic.⁴⁸ Some governments have been implicated in the use of the pandemic as a pretext to crack down on free expression and public access to information.⁴⁹ Others have remained adamant in their denial of the existence of the virus and used political power to limit testing for the virus in their constituencies. There are also political costs for (mis)managing the pandemic. Herrera et al found a negative relationship between the number of COVID-19 cases and political approval across countries and time. Governments that placed more emphasis on health outcomes as opposed to short-term economic outcomes gained more political support.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ The Economist, "Would-Be Autocrats Are Using Covid-19 as an Excuse to Grab More Power | The Economist," April 2020, <https://www.economist.com/international/2020/04/23/would-be-autocrats-are-using-covid-19-as-an-excuse-to-grab-more-power>.

⁴⁹ Freedom House, "Information Isolation: Censoring the COVID-19 Outbreak," 2020, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/report-sub-page/2020/information-isolation-censoring-covid-19-outbreak>.

⁵⁰ Helios Herrera et al., "The Political Consequences of the Covid Pandemic: Lessons from Cross-Country Polling Data," *VoxEU.Org* (blog), November 6, 2020, <https://voxeu.org/article/political-consequences-covid-pandemic>.

Conversely, mistrust in the government may also influence people's willingness to have confidence in the government guidelines and recommendations aimed at responding to the outbreak. In Nigeria, Ezeibe et al found that corruption motivates wide-ranging political distrust which undercuts compliance to government protocols. This undermines the outcomes of government responses to COVID-19 and facilitates the transmission of the virus in the country.⁵¹ The use of the top-down policy approach, without community involvement and participation may also downplay the effect of government protocols, as communities may not be motivated and willing to adhere to such protocols.⁵²

Implications for Global Studies on the Pandemic

The consequences of the social determinants on social gaps and health disparities even after the pandemic cannot be overemphasized. The syndemic impacts of COVID-19 could pose a greater public health burden than the pandemic itself. This syndemicity implies that solitary studies of COVID-19 may undermine the complex nature of the disease and prolong the deleterious societal effects beyond the pandemic.

⁵¹ Christian C. Ezeibe et al., "Political Distrust and the Spread of COVID-19 in Nigeria," *Global Public Health* 15, no. 12 (December 1, 2020): 1753–66, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17441692.2020.1828987>.

⁵² Chinwe Lucia Ochu et al., "Responding to a Pandemic through Social and Behavior Change Communication: Nigeria's Experience," *Health Security*, December 18, 2020, hs.2020.0151, <https://doi.org/10.1089/hs.2020.0151>.

The research roadmap being coordinated by the World Health Organisation (WHO) on COVID-19 is quite comprehensive.⁵³ However, it may not effectively address the complexity of biological and socioecological interactions as an entity that has led and may continue to lead to structured vulnerabilities in various contexts. Poor interdisciplinary inclusiveness in implementation of research agendas mean complex syndemic interactions may not be adequately appraised by current studies. Though skewed research that have focused on the sole effect of COVID-19 have provided quick and useful interventions that have been used to inform the implementation of response strategies (in form of vaccinations, therapeutics, diagnostics and behavioural interventions), there is a gap in more in-depth studies that address the broader and deeper bio-ecological and socioeconomic vulnerabilities that could predispose to worse pandemics in the future.

While it may appear that we may be winning the COVID-19 war, the world is experiencing a trend in emerging and re-emerging threats. This may imply that the COVID-19 pandemic may not be the last pandemic and countries and health systems need to build resilience, particularly during peacetime. Little investment in integrated biomedico-ethnographic studies on COVID-19 keeps the root that feeds pandemics underneath the earth of scientific obscurity. Failure to address the syndemicity of COVID-19 in public health research could result in the global health community remaining on the defensive rather than on the attack line, dealing with periodic “surprises” from biological threats.

⁵³ World Health Organisation, “Global Research on Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19),” 2020, <https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/global-research-on-novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov>.

The implementation of an integrated multi-disciplinary approach to research will provide a better understanding of the COVID-19 syndemic and generate holistic data that will be more relevant to policymakers, health practitioners, and the public. The amplification and integration of biomedical and ethnographic studies in the global research roadmap would aid the generation of robust scientific evidence which could reduce the negative impact of the COVID-19 syndemic. To ensure community participation and involvement, end-users and target population should be involved in the development and implementation of research agenda on COVID-19. Similarly, there should be a deliberate consideration of structured vulnerabilities in the design of global and local studies.

Owing to the significant role NCDs play in the pathophysiology and eventual health outcomes of COVID-19, these should be reconsidered as a component of the pathogenetic pathway of COVID-19 outbreak and not just as “pre-existing conditions” or superficially as “co-morbidities”. Global research policies should be underpinned by the understanding of COVID-19 as a syndemic, not just a pandemic. As WHO convenes experts to review the current research roadmap, the complexity of COVID-19 that exceeds biomedical boundaries should be more extensively explored.

Conclusion

COVID-19 is not just a pandemic; it is a syndemic. Critical to the understanding of the factors that drive disease clustering effects is the recognition of the role of varying contextual realities. The interplay of biological and socioecological factors has a significant role to play in varying health outcomes in terms of

predisposition or vulnerability and severity of the disease. However, this interplay is often undermined. This extends to research studies being conducted, as many studies do not holistically consider the critical role social, environmental and political factors play in COVID-19 outcomes.

To bridge this research gap, we urge researchers to holistically consider the syndemicity of the COVID-19 while designing and implementing research. In addition, there is a need to develop a global syndemic research framework for holistic studies on the pandemic. This initiative could be led and coordinated by international bodies such as the WHO. This framework should be flexible and adaptable by researchers at the national and subnational levels, to ensure relevance in local contexts. These recommendations could foster broader and deeper understanding of the syndemicity of COVID-19 and potentially lead to the development of evidence-based strategies that address not only the virus, but the structural socioecological factors that could result in disease clustering effects.

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Global Migration, COVID-19 and Its Effects on Economies: A Focus on Repositioning Nigerian Economy

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Abstract

A healthy nation is a wealthy nation, which may account for the nexus between health, human mobility, and economics development. Freedom to move within a nation and among nations engenders the active population's engagements in social economic activities that are expected to impact on economic growth. The world is currently witnessing a virus popularly known as COVID-19 (Corona virus, 2019). It first surfaced in the city of Wuhan, China towards the end of 2019. However, the virus has moved from being epidemic to pandemic issues in many countries, thus moving from being a health issue to political, security and most importantly economic issue affecting human's national and transnational economics and migration. The paper employed secondary data, use of charts and descriptive analysis to touch on the situations posed by COVID-19 pandemic. It analyses the potential effects of COVID-19 on gross domestic products, aviation industry, tourism, commodity prices in different economies based on the description

of some selected key macroeconomic indicators at a global and Nigerian context. It found that the short-run policy strategies by Nigerian government is suitable for immediate recovery of the economy. It also found that COVID-19 has come to expose lapses in the Nigerian economy not just in the health system but also in non-availability of database and modern management of economy with current digitalization and technological avalanche. It then proceeded to highlight long-run policy strategies for economic revival and repositioning of the Nigerian economy.

Keywords: globalization; Migration; COVID-19; Pandemic; Economic Development

JEL: E63, F22, F62

Introduction

Coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) is a health issue and it is interwoven with the migration, globalization, economy, politics, security, and religions of the world among other things. Politically, particularly as pertaining to the issue of globalization, it is obvious that corona virus and any other pandemic whether natural or manmade can change and inhibit phenomenon and processes of globalization such as seamless interconnectedness of countries and migration that always take place among the people of the world. The first infectious transmission was in Wuhan, a city in China toward the end of 2019. COVID-19 is still spreading across the countries. Coronavirus cases has reached up to 204,644,849 million and 4,323,139 deaths globally, the world continues to battle the COVID-19 pandemic (World Health Organization, 2021).

Globalization did not become an unavoidable buzzword in social sciences until 1980s, and it entered the public vocabulary, at least in the West in 1990s (Steger 2009). Economically, “globalisation is seen as a process of economic integration; it deepens and broadens linkages of economies through trade, finance, and investment to create a world market of goods, services, and capital” (Bankole & Kareem, 2017). According to (De Haas, Miller, & Castles, 2019), migration is transnational human mobility, but it should be noted that inter-state or national human mobility is an aspect of migration, and both are very important aspects of globalization. COVID-19 pandemic sparked an inextricably link between mobility and its global governance through border control. The current situation reveals the complexities of migration in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. Discussion on migration, mobility, and economy in continents such as Africa, Asia, Europe and globally have been inconclusive due to the COVID-19 health crisis. It was declared as a pandemic by The World Health Organization (WHO) on 11 March 2020 because it has become a global menace and an emergency because of its impact on the entire world economies.

There were “blame-game and bilk passing” as Italy’s Salvini blamed the virus on African migrants, Hungary’s Orban followed suit making Iranian migrants responsible, and Trump termed it the ‘China virus’ on social media. This was an attempt at ‘blaming’ a disease that spread across borders into nations just like the ‘Irish Disease’ (Cholera) and the ‘Spanish flu’. In addition, incidents of harassment, stone attacks or foot chases were reported in Ethiopia. Governments in each country made strong use of migration and partial mobility policies as management tool to curtail the spread of the outbreak.

The infectious disease led to high death rates, international trade was disrupted and many countries had to shut borders to curtail movement as infected people have been restricted. Also, planes were grounded, cars were parked, schools were closed, employees were working from home, unemployment was and is still rising and demand for crude oil was down significantly. Before the pandemic, the world economy and especially that of developing countries like Nigeria had fragile outlook because global GDP growth was estimated to be only 2.5 percent in 2020 (World Bank, 2020). The hitherto weak health care systems in many developing countries aggravated the pandemic and in turn its global effects on economies.

International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicted a fall in global growth by 0.5 for the year 2020. Any country that is open to international trade and migration, was not immune to the endogenous and exogenous effects of COVID-19. The exogenous effects are from direct trade links between affected partner within the continents such as Asia, Europe, and the United States especially as they affect key sectors such as aviation, travelling and tourism as well as investment and economies. Worthy of note is decline in remittances from African Diaspora; Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Official Development Assistance; and domestic financial market tightening on one hand. On the other hand, the endogenous effects were felt due to the swift circulation of the COVID-19 in the West and in some African countries. Consequently, there was a disturbing record of morbidity, mortality, movement disruption, disruption of production of goods, and services as well as other economic activities. These led to decrease in domestic demand, reduction in tax revenue because of fall in oil price and commodity prices. Meanwhile, the situation necessitated increase in public expenditure to protect humans' lives and to stimulate

economic activities. Consequently, it is imperative to assess the effect of COVID-19 on global migration and Nigerian economy which remains largely informal and thus vulnerable to external shocks. Monetary theory application on increase in money supply which is seen as driver of economic activities and growth may apply at a period like this to reduce loss of production, loss of labour and investment which may hurt several households and the economy at large. The paper is divided into five sections namely: Introduction; Methodology; Global Economic Context; Nigerian Economic Context; Conclusion and Recommendation.

Methodology

The paper examines the effects of global migration on economies due to COVID-19 pandemic. It analyses the effects on global and Nigerian contexts, using some selected key indicators such as gross domestic products, aviation industry, tourism, commodity prices especially between 2018 to 2020. The study assesses the impact of COVID-19 on the Nigerian economy. The study is based on descriptive and content analysis and presents a conclusion on key policy recommendations for long-run solutions.

Analysis and Discussions

Global Economic Context

COVID-19 disruptive and it is still disrupting the interconnected world economy and global value chains. There have been unexpected falls in commodity prices, revenues, foreign exchange receipts, foreign financial flows, travel restrictions, declining of tourism and hotels, and it has also frozen the labor market. The COVID-19 predicted a general world economic

crisis not only in 2020 as it still ravaging the globe in 2021.


Effects on Cross Boarder Migrations

Migration has sociocultural, ethnocultural, historical and economic implications. Despite daunting technological means for surveillance and control, border control in many nations has been a difficult task. For instance, USA had over 15 million illegal immigrants as at 2017 (Colic-Peisker, 2017). Nigeria and most countries shut down their boarders against migrants to restrict the multiplied effects of COVID-19. Consequently, international trade and migration were affected negatively.

Effects on World Gross Domestic Products

According to IMF, these three accounts for half of the world's GDP: The European Union, the United States and Japan because they are economies based on trade, services, and industries. Nevertheless, in order to stop and curtail COVID-19, they were compelled to close their borders. This drastically reduced economic activities. The Chinese economy accounts for about 16% of global GDP and it is the largest trading partner of most African countries and the rest of the world. The OECD forecasted a decline in economic growth rates for these major economies as follows: China 4.9% instead of 5.7%, Europe 0.8% instead of 1.1%, the rest of the world 2.4% instead 2.9%, with world GDP falling by 0.412 from the first quarter of 2020. UNCTAD forecasts downward pressure on foreign direct investment from -5% to 15%. The International Monetary Fund announced on the 23 March 2020 that investors had withdrawn US\$ 83 billion from emerging markets since the start of the crisis.

Graph 1: Distribution of the World GDP between Countries and Regions



Source: IMF


Besides, according to the World Economic Outlook of the IMF, global growth was projected to be 2.5% in 2020, a slight increase compared to 2.4% in 2019, thanks to the gradual resumption of trade and investments. In advanced economies, a slowdown from 1.6% to 1.4% was anticipated, mainly due to the persistent weakness of the manufacturing sector. The OECD downgraded its forecast for the world economy, indicating that global growth could drop to 1½% in 2020, half the rate projected prior to the virus outbreak. However, although it is difficult to measure the exact impact of COVID-19 on the world economy, some stylized facts can show how the world economy will be affected – a considerable tumble in commodity prices. Oil prices lost about 50% of their value dropping from US\$ 67 a barrel to below US\$ 30 a barrel (as the graph shows).

Graph 2: Oil

Figure 1. Drop in crude oil prices in 2014 vs. COVID-19



**prices
from
Decem
ber
2019
to
March
2020**




Source: OECD (2020)

The decline in crude oil prices was far more rapid, with some analysts projecting even more severe price declines than in 2014. Crude oil prices fell by 54% in the first three months of 2020, with prices falling below \$30 per barrel. Non-oil commodity prices have also declined since January, with natural gas and metal prices dropping by 30% and 4%, respectively (Coulibaly & Madden, 2020). Aluminum also fell by 0.49%; copper 0.47% and lead 1.64%. Cocoa lost 21% of its value within five days at the height of the crisis.

Effects on Commodity Markets

Numerous African countries who are net importers of products such as wheat and rice, can feel the heat of COVID-19 and this has lasted beyond 2020 as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Global prices for key food commodities, 2005-2019 (base100= year 2005)




Source: World Bank Commodity Markets Database, March 2020


Effect on Aviation and Travel industry

Other most affected sectors are the aviation and travel industry. This industry’s revenues were \$830 billion in 2019 and were projected at \$ 872 billion in 2020. However, with the surge in every part of the world, many countries put a halt on international flight and borders were closed to international immigrants. On 5th March 2020, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) projected that COVID-19 could seriously disrupt the industry and cause a loss of about US \$ 113 billion.

Graph 4: Aviation Revenues in the world



Graph 5: Travel and Tourism in % GDP



Source: UNWTO, 2019
2020

Source: UNWTO,

Tourism industry also experienced comparable challenges. United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO, 2020) estimated an expected fall of between 20-30% in international tourism receipts (exports) of between US\$300-450 billion, almost one third of the US\$1.5 trillion generated in 2019. By inference, it means that this sector is losing between five to seven-years' worth of growth due to COVID-19. With the unparalleled initiation of travel restrictions across the world, international tourist arrivals fell by 20% to 30% in 2020 when compared with 2019 figures. Millions of jobs in the industry are at risk of being lost so also are small-and-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that always service this industry especially the hotel and hospitality industry. More impacts are likely to be felt by countries like Cambodia, Vietnam, and Thailand (where the sector represents around 20% of the employment). France with around 89 million tourist arrivals per annum, Spain with around 83 million: USA (80 million), China (63 million), Italy (62 million), Turkey (46 millions), Mexico (41 millions), Germany (39

millions), Thailand (38 millions), and United Kingdom (36 millions) are more likely to be badly hurt. Tourism and travel industry usually supports one in ten (10) jobs in the world, generating 10.4% of world GDP.

Effects on Global Financial Markets

Global financial market suffered a great setback on March 9, 2020. Indeed, it was referred to as “Black Monday episode”, the notable stock markets indices experienced one of the worst developments in their history in decades. The Dow Jones lost almost 3000 points in one day. FTSE plunged by about 5% and losses were estimated at over US\$ 90 billion, to name just two. During this period, the banking sector lost almost 40% of its value in the last month and the trend is still bearish.

Table 1: Some stock market indices as of March 9, 2020

Index	Last	High	Low	Change	Change %	Time
Dow 30	20,188.52	21,768.28	20,116.46	-2997.10	-12.93%	16 :20 :01
S&P 500	2,386.16	2,562.98	2,380.94	-324.86	-11.98%	15 :59 :59
CAC 40	3,881.46	3,962.01	3632.06	-236.89	-5.75%	12 :35

DAX	8,746	8,988.0 0	8.239.5 0	- 485.8 3	- 5.26%	12 :34 :58
FTSE 100	5151,08	5,366.1 1	4898.79	- 215.0 3	- 4.01%	12 :34 :58

Source: OECD, 2020

Global unemployment was forecasted to range between 5.3 million and 24.7 million. according to an assessment by the International Labor Organization (ILO, 2020). ILO's estimation might be built on formal sector employment in the developed countries. According to the most recent estimates, vulnerable employment rate was at 76.6 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa, with non-agriculture employment in the informal economy representing 66 percent of total employment and 52 percent in North Africa. The vulnerable employment rate was estimated at 76.6 percent in 2014 (ILO, 2015).

Nigerian Economic Context

Nigerian economy has been struggling with recovery since the 2014 oil price shock, and GDP growth was around 2.3 percent in 2019. IMF revised the 2020 GDP growth rate from 2.5 percent to 2 percent result of relatively low oil prices and limited fiscal space.

Aggregate Demand and Government Expenditure: This is expected to receive a bolster through increased government spending and tax cuts for

businesses. The fall in household consumption caused consumers to spend primarily on essential goods and services due to restrictions on movement, low expectations of future income, predominantly by short-term and contract staff in the formal economy and the working poor in the informal economy. The immobility has not only reduced the consumption of nonessential commodities in general, but it has also affected the income-generating capacity and reduced consumption expenditure. Economic agents also responded policy measures as investors' negative sentiments caused turbulence in capital markets around the world. Nigerian Stock Exchange recorded its worst performance since the 2008 financial crisis.

The Policy Responses by The Nigerian Government (Short-run approach)

Central Bank of Nigeria (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2020b) has arranged a fiscal stimulus package, including a 50 billion naira (\$138.89 million) credit facility to households and small and medium enterprises most affected by the pandemic, a hundred (100) billion naira (\$277.78 million) loan to the health sector, and a one (1) trillion naira (\$2.78 billion) to the manufacturing sector (Central Bank Of Nigeria, 2020a). In addition, the interest rates on all CBN interventions have been revised downwards from 9 to 5 percent, and a one-year moratorium on CBN intervention facilities has been introduced, effective March 1. With oil being Nigeria's major source of foreign exchange, amid the steep decline in oil prices, the official exchange rate was adjusted from 306 to 360 naira. The exchange rate under the investors and exporters (I&E) window was also adjusted from 360 to 380 naira to unify the exchange rates across the I&E window, Bureau de Change, and retail and wholesale windows. Furthermore, the government has introduced import duty waivers for pharmaceutical companies and increased efforts toward ensuring that they

receive forex. All these can be classified as short run approach to boost the economy.

Conclusions

The paper examined the effects of COVID-19 on global economies with a special focus on Nigeria. COVID-19 has been able to expose the weakness of some economies especially in the healthcare sector. The COVID-19 pandemic has woken up policymakers especially on reliance on foreign health care aids because of the competition for international support on medical supplies and equipment. every sector of the economy needed attention at the same time aside health sector, finance, and trade and investment also required operational issues that is expected to make the country less resilient to shocks from the pandemic. However, diversifying the country's revenue base away from oil exports more importantly, improving investments in the health care sector is of utmost importance.

Recommendations on Long-run Policy Responses (Long-run approach)

Considering the enormity of COVID-19 impact on the Nigerian economy, there is the need to implement other long -run recovery strategies that could stimulate demand and stabilise the economy. Thus, the study recommends the following:

- The Federal Government needs to improve efforts towards enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the distributive mechanisms for cash transfer program already in place, to ensure it reaches households that are worst-hit by the pandemic.
- The Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) as well as State Inland Revenue Services (SIRS) should waive payments on personal and corporate income tax for the second quarter of 2020, considering that the shock has affected the income and profits of households and businesses.
- Cash Reserve Ratio was reviewed (CRR) from 22.5 percent to 27.5 percent in January 2020 by CBN. This should be revised to stimulate liquidity for banks so that they can, in turn, create credit to the private sector.
- FIRS and SIRS should delay tax collection for the worse-hit sectors including tourism, the airline industry, and hoteliers to enable them recover from the steep decline in demand. Tax holiday or reduction as well as moratorium may be considered, this may encourage more investment and less downsizing by firms to reduce effect of the pandemic on the economy.
- There is need for provision of additional liquidity in the foreign exchange market. CBN should establish a swap facility with the U.S. Federal Reserve and/or the People's Bank of China, as was done in 2018, to provide dollar and yen liquidity to financial institutions, investors, and exporters. This move would ease up forex shortage in the financial market and economy. Dollarization of the economy should be

completely frowned at, hypermarket or firms in the economy should denominate their sales and payments in Nigerian naira.

- Foreign exchange shortage led to the adjustment of naira; it is therefore imperative that the CBN maintains exchange rate stability by deploying external reserves to avoid investors selling off naira-denominated assets.
- Credit support to the health sector and any other sector should be judiciously utilized for the purposes they are meant for through a system of accountability and transparency in implementations.
- Provision of items for COVID-19 prevention as well as creating awareness on their usage is recommended. Universities-Industry collaboration on research and development is of utmost importance at this period.

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Migration and Displacement: Legal Constraints of Internally Displaced Persons in Nigeria

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Abstract

This paper sets out to evaluate how displacement impacts on migration in Nigeria. Displaced persons ordinarily suffer from severe deprivations and precarious living conditions; the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic without doubt, worked even more grave hardships on the community of the displaced. This paper ventures into the effects/challenges brought upon displaced persons with regards to the enjoyment and enforcement of human rights and the ability of such persons to abide by the restrictions and regulations guiding the conduct of persons during the pandemic. It considers the

factors causing displacement and argues that the living conditions of displaced persons leaves them with no option but to disregard the regulations consequent upon the failure of government to put in place enabling conditions that will engender respect and obedience to the regulations. The paper adopts the doctrinal approach and examines the regulations for internally displaced persons (IDPs) through reliance on relevant laws in the country, data collection and existing literature. The study finds that the absence of a national legal framework specifically for internally displaced person is a constraint to realizing their human rights. It recommends among others legislation as against a national policy that will cater for prevention and management of internal displacement in Nigeria. The work concludes by advocating for an urgent attention in a systematic and coordinated manner for persons migrating as a result of forced displacement.

Keywords: Displacement, internally displaced persons, migration, Covid-19, pandemic

Introduction

The challenge of internal displacement and migration is globalⁱ and has been with humanity from very early times. However, at the end of the cold war, there was an upsurge in the number of displaced persons alongside varying degrees of human rights infractions (Giustiniani, 2009)ⁱⁱ. Internal displacement is however, more acutely felt in Africa as a result of the wars and violence that has dogged her historyⁱⁱⁱ. Sub-Saharan Africa hosts some of the largest protracted displacement crises in the world^{iv}. Emerging conflicts and the effects of climate change forced millions more people to flee last year, but many of these crises are overlooked and underfunded. In Nigeria, the impact of internal displacement is vast and enormous. From the decade of

colonization when the nation was plunged into bloodletting by the civil war that broke out and lasted for over two years^v to present times, displacement and migration has been a recurrent decimal. Nigeria has grappled with forced migration mostly due to conflict triggered by ethno-religious and communal disputes, a civil war in 1967, and other man-made and natural disasters. It is estimated that within one month of the onset of the Nigerian civil war (also known as the Biafran war), for example, over one million displaced persons were evacuated from the northern part of the county to the South East (Orji, Uebari, 2013)^{vi}. Since 2013, the country has experienced an unprecedented amount of internal displacement due to the insurgency in the Northeast. The country is currently placed as one of the top ten countries with the highest number of internally displaced persons due to conflict – more than in any other African country, ranking fifth with an estimated over 700,000 in 2015 alone (IDMC, 2016)^{vii}.

Internally displaced persons in Nigeria are faced with precarious, deplorable and subhuman living conditions. Usually, displaced persons take shelter in camps where they depend on the government and other individuals and organizations to assist with their basic needs of food, water, clothing and shelter. Life in the IDP camps is tough and characterized by deprivations and violence. They suffer from gross violations of their human rights and are deprived of the basic necessities of life. With the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, the world was thrown into a state of uncertainty in an attempt to contain the spread of the virus. The World Health Organization reeled out a number of measures to be adopted by states in its Covid-19 Regulations (WHO, 2020)^{viii} and this was replicated by the government of several states with

adaptations to meet the peculiarities of local circumstances. Nigeria joined in the fray of reeling out regulations and restrictions to be observed by citizens at the pain of criminal sanctions^{ix}. Law enforcement agents also braced up to the challenge of ensuring that the regulations were obeyed. Convictions were secured for breach of the regulations such as those prohibiting public/private gatherings of more than fifty persons^x. Although reference was made to the most vulnerable and even displaced persons, it is doubtful if actual efforts were made by the government to alleviate the plight of displaced persons particularly as pertains to human rights. This paper sets out to examine if the human rights of citizens and especially the displaced and vulnerable persons, was taken into consideration in the available regulations. The study observes that IDPs are likely to suffer violation of their human rights within their own country without having any legal or institutional provisions to claim assistance particularly as there is no legal framework in place where they can resort to as a basis for legal remedy.

Statement of the Problem

The need for a legal and institutional framework for addressing the constraints of internally displaced persons is long overdue and should be given special attention. In Nigeria, persons displaced have been forced to migrate from their homelands due to factors beyond their control.^{xi} Internal displacement brings about a set of circumstances that renders those affected highly vulnerable depriving them of shelter and basic protection. Sadly, the National Policy on Internal Displaced Persons, the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons (NCFRMI), the African

Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (otherwise known as the Kampala Convention) of 2009 do not adequately respond to the needs of IDPs much less during pandemics. While the national policy has been identified to be inefficient due to some crippling defects^{xii}, it has not been passed into law. The Kampala Convention is yet to be domesticated pursuant to section 12 of Nigerian Constitution 1999 (as amended) which demands that any treaty between the Federation and any other country shall have the force of law except to the extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into law by the National Assembly.

The National Commission for Refugees, a statute created for the protection of refugees was extended to include migrants and internally displaced persons and renamed NCFRMI. However, the needed amendment to this extension has not been carried out. The overall effect of an appropriate legislative instrument for the protection of internally displaced persons foster the constraints experienced by forced migrants. A national legal framework will adequately address the needs of forced migrants or displaced persons, enable them enjoy their human rights without discrimination and seek remedy in the event of violations particularly during the period of pandemic.

Methodology

The study adopts the doctrinal approach of reliance on primary statutes and secondary methods of data collection such as content analysis, review of online materials, journals and existing literatures. This is with the view of emphasizing the suffering and constraints of IDPs and the need for a national legal framework.

Conceptual Clarification

According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), migration is 'movement of a person or group of persons, either across an international border (international migration), or within a state (internal migration), encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes'. The definition is broad and covers all forms of migration (voluntary/ forced migration, internal/international migration, long-term/short term). It includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, uprooted people, and economic migrants. On the other hand, the term migrant refers to any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a state away from his /her habitual place of residence, regardless of the persons legal status, whether the movement is voluntary or not and whatever are the causes for the movement.^{xiii}

This paper however focuses on forced migrants or internally displaced persons who for some factors have found themselves involuntarily in other parts of their country of domicile. The United Nation Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement describes them as:

persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed and internationally recognized State border^{xiv}.

Elsewhere, internal displacement has been described as the forced migration of persons from their homeland due to some unpleasant conditions that has

affected them or their government could not resolve immediately (Akume, 2015)^{xv}. Similarly, a duo of learned minds has described internal displacement as situations in which individuals and groups are compelled or obliged to leave their homes, but remain within the borders of their own countries. The latter element differentiates them from refugees, who are also compulsorily evacuated but cross internationally recognized state borders (Aloh, Obaji, 2016)^{xvi}.

The International Organization for Migration established in 1951^{xvii} defined forced migration as ‘a migratory movement which, although the drivers can be diverse, involves force, compulsion or coercion’. A combined reading of the above definitions makes it obvious that displacement can lead to migration, and in a sense, migrants can be displaced persons who have found themselves in another region of the country due to push factors beyond their control and have not crossed international borders. They are victims of violence, conflicts, tension and natural disasters that are compelled to seek for abode elsewhere within their country. The terms IDPs is thus wide enough to accommodate migrants who as a result of being displaced, have found themselves in a different region of the country from where they were ordinarily domiciled. This paper, therefore, uses the terms IDPs and forced migrants in the very liberal and loose sense and sometimes interchangeably.

Factors of Displacement

A wide range of factors usually account for the displacement of persons. Some of the factors are man-made while others are natural. In the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as well as under the Kampala Convention for example, armed conflict is identified among the factors which force

civilians to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence (Mohammed, 2017)^{xviii}. In Nigeria today for example, it is common knowledge that the *Boko Haram* indiscriminate attack against civilians including bombing, mass shooting, suicide attack, kidnapping and the destruction of property that has ravaged the north eastern region of the country has left thousands of displaced persons in its trail. States like Borno accounted for 1.5 million of the 2.6 million IDPs recorded in Nigeria in 2019^{xix}

Other man-made drivers are ethnic and religious tensions in different communities leading to persons fleeing their homes^{xx}. With the enthronement of the Sharia law in 2000, the country has witnessed myriads of conflicts between the Muslims in the North and Christians in the South leading too many being displaced. The conflicts between herdsmen and farmers have also escalated in recent times triggering more displacements^{xxi}.

Infrastructural development, economic and environmental factors such as oil spillage leads to displacement. In 1993, 27 villages were raided, many killed and over 100,000 Ogoni people were displaced as fallout of long-standing environmental degradation arising from oil exploration, production and transportation (Terminski, 2012).^{xxii}

Nigeria is also highly exposed to natural disasters such as desertification and flooding^{xxiii}. The flooding is caused by heavy rainfall, overflowing watercourses and release from dam reservoirs. In 2019, floods in the Niger River basin destroyed 2,667 homes in Niger state in August and September leaving about 157,000 new displacements^{xxiv}.

These factors have displaced persons forcing them to migrate to other parts of the country creating a lot of challenges for the displaced persons.^{xxv}

Effects/Challenges of Displacement

For persons who have suffered displacement, the challenges are enormous as some take refuge with relatives and friends, others live with host communities. Many others are scattered in different IDP camps in the country while others have as a result of the displacement migrated to neighboring countries such as Chad, Cameroon, and the Republic of Niger, etc. (IDMC, 2020)^{xxvi}. In the first half of this year for example, there has been reports of thousands of displaced persons^{xxvii} and the figures are deemed conservative due to different technics of conflicting data collections^{xxviii} and restrictions on movement to limit the spread of Covid-19. Over two thirds of the reported cases in Nigeria were from the north eastern states of Borino, Adamawa and Yobe as a result of violence and attacks on IDP camps^{xxix}. It is reported for example, that in the IDP camps in Borno and Adamawa states, the bulk of the victims are women and children who are also the most vulnerable. Sixty-two percent of the IDP populations in these camps are females while thirty-eight percent are male. Half of the total numbers of persons residing in the camps are children under the age of seventeen. A good number of the women are breastfeeding mothers while others are pregnant; a good number of the children are also identified to be unaccompanied and separated^{xxx}.

The movement restrictions and measures being imposed by countries, territories and areas as a response to the pandemic are directly impacting the daily lives and circumstances of IDPs and host communities. Livelihoods are being interrupted and access to healthcare, where it is available, remains limited. Many communities hosting internally displaced populations lack

adequate investment into health, water and sanitation facilities, in addition to the issues of overcrowding, poor shelter, scarce resources and limited access to reliable information. The impact felt by these communities not only increases humanitarian need but also exasperates the existing complex barriers for IDPs to seek solutions (Adewale, 2016)^{xxx}. In another report, the number of IDPs in Lagos is reported to be over a hundred thousand facing challenges such as living in slums and under bridges and uncompleted properties. They are often victimized and molested. A majority of them comprise women and children as well. They face economic vulnerabilities because they do not have a stable source of income. Most of them undertake menial jobs and petty trading

Internally displaced persons were severely affected by the lockdown imposed during the Covid-19 pandemic. They also face health risks from overcrowding; the makeshift shelters they occupy do not allow for them to observe social distancing and thus prevent the spread of Covid-19. For most of the times, they depend on well-meaning individuals and charitable organizations for daily survival. More trying is the incidence of insecurity in the camps as the camps are usually invaded by unidentified gunmen and hoodlums who attack and kill the IDPs. There is also the constant threat of eviction by the host communities as some of the landowners of where the camps are located require the use of the land for other purposes.

Aside from the lack and deprivation of the basic necessities, other forms of deprivations suffered by IDPs living in camps include family disintegration being a core psychological and social challenge prevalent in some camps (Olawajaju, Omotosho, Alabi, 2018)^{xxx}. Further, there is the issue of social relations clashes which is reported to be on the increase as well as the

disruption of the education of children and other young persons^{xxxiii}. These challenges have been brought upon them as a result of migrating from the known to the unknown, a situation unanticipated by the displaced persons. Unfortunately, there is no specific legal instrument in place to enforce their rights.

Regulations for Internal Displacement in Nigeria

Internally displaced persons are not stripped of their human rights by virtue of the fact of displacement. Therefore, rights conferred on IDPs can be classed under the general and the particular. The general involves rights conferred by enactments entrenching rights enjoyed by every person whether displaced or not. The particular encompasses those rights and privileges specifically provided for in enactments crafted specifically for displaced persons. Consequently, IDPs by virtue of the fact that they are humans enjoy all the rights accruing to citizens under international, regional and domestic human rights instruments as well as those under the Constitution. Therefore, displaced persons in Nigeria enjoy all of the human rights entrenched in the international bill of rights to wit, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the international Covenant on Civil and Political rights, the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights and their additional protocols. They also enjoy rights under the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights which forms part of the body of domestic legislation by virtue of the fact that same has been domesticated^{xxxiv}. Some of the rights recognised under the African Charter include the right to education, housing, shelter, food, employment, social security, adequate standard of living, safe environment as well as right to cultural life and development. These rights guaranteed under

the African Charter has much the same tenor as the fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy embodied under chapter two of the Nigerian Constitution. Furthermore, internally displaced persons are not precluded in the enjoyment of the fundamental rights conferred on all citizens and persons under the 1999 Constitution^{xxxv}. Most of the rights entrenched as fundamental human rights reflect the human rights recognized under the International Bill of Rights as well as those under the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. These range from the right to life, the right to dignity of the human person, personal liberty, fair hearing, private and family life, to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Others include the right to freedom of expression and the press, to peaceful assembly and association, freedom of movement, freedom from discrimination, etc.

The Constitution however states that the obligations placed on the government in Chapter 11 are however non justiciable to the extent that the courts do not possess the ability to provide adequate resolution of the dispute^{xxxvi}. This constitutes a legal constraint on the IDPs when it comes to enforcing their rights in courts.

Aside from the constitutional provisions which embody rights of citizens whether or not displaced there are a number of other governmental agencies that have duties touching on the assistance and protection of migrants and displaced persons. The National Human Rights Commission^{xxxvii}, for example, has the mandate to promote and protect human rights and ensure discharge of Nigeria's human rights obligation. There is also the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons which is the coordinating

agency for all IDPs and migration related issues in Nigeria^{xxxviii}. The National Emergency Management Agency^{xxxix} has the duty to manage disaster related issues and coordinate response to all emergencies and provision of relief through the establishment of appropriate structures and measures; this agency without doubt, has a role to play in the assistance to displaced persons as most disasters usually leave in its trail displaced persons. Also, there is the draft national policy on internal displacement which outlines the roles and responsibilities of federal, state and local government and other stake holders and civil society. There is also the National Migration Policy which was adopted 13th of May 2015.

The problem is that these agencies have not been effective in carrying out these duties of protecting and assisting the internally displaced persons to ensure they are safe, and dignified as noted above, examples abound of displacements and untold hardships suffered by IDPs.

At the international sphere, concerted attempts have been made to adopt a normative framework for the protection and assistance of IDPs. In 1992, the UN Commission on Human Rights entrusted an independent expert to examine the protection afforded under extant international law including human rights law, humanitarian law and refugee law for the protection of IDPs. The committee was of the opinion that IDPs are not sufficiently protected under those laws and that there was the need for an instrument which specifically cater to the needs of IDP and which clearly addresses protection gaps. The work of the committee culminated in the adoption of the United Nations Guiding Principles on internal displacement in 1998^{xl} (Guiding

Principles) and the establishment of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee on Internally Displaced Persons^{xli}. Essentially, the Guiding Principles identify rights and guarantees relevant to the protection of persons from forced displacement and to their protection and assistance during displacement as well as during their return or resettlement and reintegration^{xlii}. The Guiding Principles generally restate the fact that IDPs shall enjoy the same rights as other non-IDPs; the principles cover general principle, principles relating to protection from displacement, those relating to humanitarian assistance, and those pertaining to return, resettlement and reintegration. The guiding principles are almost all encompassing in terms of catering to the needs of displaced persons at all stages of displacement; however, the guiding principles is a non-binding international instrument with only persuasive effect. The Guiding Principles is a commendable effort in terms of standard setting and formed the beginning as it were of international efforts to regulate the issue of IDPs and served as a great influence on other legal instruments that were adopted after it.

At the regional level in Africa, the first major treaty adopted for the purpose of IDPs was the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa also referred to as the Kampala Convention^{xliii}. The Convention had the advantage as it were of causing the non-binding Guiding Principles to become binding since it encapsulates in essence, the substance of the Guiding Principles^{xliv}. The Convention provides for the right not to be displaced as well as the duty of state to refrain from, prohibit and prevent arbitrary displacement of populations^{xlv}. But this is almost as far as it goes in terms of the framing of rights of displaced persons.

It however places obligations on State Parties to the Convention, laying down duties for them in terms of protection from internal displacement as well as duties of the state with regards to protection and assistance to IDPs during internal displacement. It also provides for the duties of armed groups as well as for international and other humanitarian agencies and duties and obligations for the Africa Union itself. State parties also have a duty under the Convention to create satisfactory conditions to facilitate the voluntary return, relocation and reintegration of IDPs. IDPs reserve the right under the Convention to determine whether they wish to return or not^{xlvi}. The Convention also provides that IDPs are entitled to appropriate compensation for damages incurred as a result of displacement^{xlvii}.

When providing assistance to IDPs, international organisations and other humanitarian agencies are to discharge their obligations in conformity with international law as well as the law of the country in which they operate. Nigeria ratified the Kampala Convention since April 2012 but till date, the National Assembly is yet to pass it into law as an Act of the National Assembly. Hence, it cannot be enforced in any court of law in Nigeria^{xlviii}. If and when the convention is passed into law by the National Assembly, it may be of scant legal utility to the IDPs in Nigeria as the provisions do not embody justiciable rights on them but only makes general provisions obliging the government to carry out a number of responsibilities which may lie at the discretion of the government.

IDPS and COVID-19 Regulations: Constraints and Lapses

As already discussed in the preceding segments of this paper, IDPs are a vulnerable group in the society who already are confronted with a number of existential challenges, ranging from poor makeshift shelters, characterized by overcrowding which impacts greatly on the privacy of IDPs and enjoyment of family life, food and water insecurities, lack of privacy, security challenges, exposure of the women to sexual and other forms of abuse, psychological trauma occasioned by estrangement from family and loved ones, lack of access of children and young persons to proper education, social relations tensions, economic strangulation among others.

The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic served to exacerbate their plight exposing them to the risk of diseases. The sorry situation of displaced persons compels attention and interrogation of whether or not their rights and interests are being taken into consideration by the government in the making and implementation of the Covid-19 Regulation. Without doubt, as already seen above, both in the Regulations made by the President and others, there was mention in general terms of IDPs and the necessity of catering to their needs and ensure their protection. However, beyond the mere mention of IDPs, were concrete steps taken by the government in ensuring their protection as is incumbent upon them by both the Constitution and other international instruments? Is it practicable for example to expect IDPs to observe the regulation requiring social and physical distancing when in actual fact, they live in overcrowded spaces and the government who is under obligation to provide them with shelters have turned a blind eye, virtually, to their plight?

The Constitution for instance provides generally that “the **security** and **welfare** of the people shall be the primary purpose of government”^{xlix}. It is further provided that the state shall direct its policy towards ensuring that “suitable and **adequate shelter, suitable and adequate food...**”¹ are provided for all citizens. Both under the African Charter and the Kampala Convention, the right to shelter is recognized as a human right. Nigeria has domesticated the former and is a signatory to the latter. Even though this right to shelter is not a fundamental right under the constitution, the government is under a constitutional obligation to implement the provisions of this chapter of the constitution.

It could therefore be safely assumed that when making the regulations requiring social distancing, the citizens in IDP camps across the nation could not have been within the contemplation of the government in terms of expectation of adherence or enforcement. In stark terms, the failure of the government to provide the basic necessity of shelter to these vulnerable groups of citizen compels them to be oblivious of the law. Therefore, the demand for social distancing and self-isolation in case of contact with suspected infected persons which is at the heart of the regulations to ensure effective containment of the virus, is almost impossible of performance by the IDPs. Under chapter 11 of the Constitution, “all persons” are entitled to “adequate medical and health facilities”. The implication of this is that IDPs rising from forced migration are covered and entitled to the enjoyment of this provision. It can be said that for IDPs, this is almost an impossible expectation; this is so because non displaced citizens do not even enjoy these benefits in Nigeria. But considered from another angle, it could be said that the IDPs are

even more deserving of the enjoyment of these benefits because of their peculiar condition of vulnerability.

The development of any nation today is inextricably tied to the education and potentials of the children and young persons of that country. Before the Covid-19 pandemic, there was no well-structured plan for the education and training of displaced children and young persons who constituted a sizeable percentage of the IDP population. It is a constitutional duty that government shall direct its policy towards ensuring that there are equal and adequate educational opportunities at all levels. Progressively, government is expected to strive to eradicate illiteracy and provide free education at all levels. There is no evidence of even ad hoc plans to ensure the education of displaced children. Their education thus having been abruptly disrupted by the events leading up to their displacement, their education hangs in the balance until such a time as is possible for their parents to return home and be reintegrated within their communities. There is no certainty as to the length of this period, for example, most of the displaced persons in the north eastern part of the country became displaced as a result of the insurgent activities of the Boko Haram sect, the IDPs sometimes no longer have homes to return to as their entire villages and towns have been razed down and the possibility of their being attacked again remains very high. So it is that for upwards of two years, some persons have lived in IDP camps with no hope of return in sight. For the children displaced along with them, and for those born during the period of displacement, education becomes a farfetched dream.

Another way in which this lack of education and information impacts negatively is that the children and young persons are not educated or

informed, their access to and ability to process vital information is limited as a fall out of compliance to Covid-19.

Displaced persons are more often than not, economically handicapped. They do not have a viable means of livelihood and most times depend on the charity of well-meaning individuals and organizations for their sustenance. This also affects their ability to procure basic items such as face masks and sanitizers to protect themselves from contacting the disease.

IDPs suffer untold indignities that touch on the enjoyment and exercise of their fundamental rights. Their right to life, for example, is constantly under threat as a result of the high level of criminality and attacks by bandits that is now a common feature of life in the IDP camps. The dignity of the human person is severely eroded by the sheer indignities suffered as a result of the living conditions. There is no enjoyment of privacy of any sort as displaced persons are forced to live in open classrooms which they share with persons from different backgrounds. The values of family hood sought to be protected by the fundamental right to private and family life is almost non-existent. The right to personal liberty as well as freedom of movement is severely curtailed. The Covid-19 regulation which imposed a lockdown infringed on the right of IDPs to move freely; whether this is justified or not in the circumstance is debatable. This is because, due to the strangulating economic situation IDPs find themselves some of them engage in daily paid menial jobs and petty trading and then return to the camp at night for shelter. By the forced restriction of

movement therefore, they became deprived of even this little privilege to help them keep barely afloat.

Recommendations

Aside the rights that place a direct obligation on government, forced migrants or internally displaced persons still face a lot of challenges that needs attention to alleviate their hardship. It is hoped that these recommendations if implemented will enhance the plights of these persons.

- There is the need for a legal instrument that caters specifically for IDPs in conformity with global standards that is coherent and manages all forms of internal displacement in an orderly and equitable fashion.^{li} The legal instrument will cater for the prevention, management of internal displacement.
- -Against this backdrop, government must operate on the dynamics of the causes and effects and how to nip them in the bud. For instance, perpetrators of ethnic and religious violence should be fished out, tried and sanctioned to serve as deterrence to others. The legal instrument should contain provisions on sanctions against persons who divert relief materials meant for the IDPs, as well as criminals who take advantage of the vulnerability of IDPs, particularly women and children in the management of IDPs camps
- Government should also recognise the interconnectivity in forced and regular migration as an important step in formulating a coherent national legislation.^{lii}

- With an increasing number of persons forced to migrate, government and relevant stakeholders^{liii} should make concerted efforts towards disaster risk, management preparedness in times of emergency and prevention of conflicts through equity and fairness and accountability. This will help effective settlement and assist to achieve economic self-sufficiency.
- Importantly, Nigeria should domesticate the Kampala's Convention for ultimate effect as the Convention has the advantage of causing the non-binding Guiding Principles to become binding encapsulating in essence the substance of the Guiding Principles. The government should create satisfactory conditions to facilitate the voluntary return, relocation and reintegration of the internally displaced persons. By ensuring that facilities in places of conflicts are rebuilt to encourage IDPs to return home.

Conclusion

IDPs are persons that have been forced for reasons stated above to migrate and live their homes or place of domicile within their country. They are vulnerable groups in the society who already are confronted with a number of existential challenges. Their humanitarian needs should be given attention to alleviate their sufferings through the enactment of a legal instrument specifically for their needs that provides forced migrants cause of action for compensation in the events of default on the part of the government. This will alleviate the legal constraints on them.

Going by the Global Report on Internally Displaced Persons (GRID), on the 20th anniversary of the Guiding Principles, there are over 30.6 million new displacements associated with conflicts and disasters and this does not call for celebration. There is an urgent need by all stakeholders for a well-structured plan for the protection and assistance of IDPs. Concerted efforts against arbitrary forced migration and durable solutions must be put in place to ensure sustainable development that is equitably distributed to enhance governance respect for human right and secure protection in the long run.

There is no denying the fact that internal displacement is a complex phenomenon deduced by various determinants. It is imperative the Nigerian government cultivate the political will to prosecute, in accordance with all extant laws, everybody engaged in insurgency, terrorism, etc. as this will uproot the cause of internal displacement

Good laws and policies without the appropriate political will to implement them will remain dead letters. To this extant, the causes of the displacement should be properly addressed and made justiciable so that when government defaults, victims can take up actions for enforcement through an appropriate legal framework.

References

ⁱ In the first half of the year 2020 alone, it is reported by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) that there are 14.6 million displacements across 127 countries; Internal Displacement 2020: Mid-Year Update, [Internaldisplacement.org](https://www.internaldisplacement.org/).

² Giustiniani, F.Z., *New Hopes and Challenges for the Protection of IDPs in Africa: The Kampala Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa* *Denv. J. Int'l Law*, (2009) Vol.39:2, p.347.

³ It is on record that in Africa, at least half of the countries and 20 percent of the continent's population have been affected by frequent armed conflicts; see International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent *Future Priorities in Africa 11* (2004) unpublished manuscript. According to more recent report, of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, sub-Saharan Africa experienced more internal displacement than any other region as over 16.5 million persons were displaced as at the year ended 2018.

⁴ The IDMC mid-year Internal Displacement Report for 2020 for example indicates that ten countries with the highest displacement from conflict and violence, seven are African countries; the countries are Syria, DRC, Burkina Faso, South Sudan, Somalia, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Mali, Yemen and Central African Republic; *Op. cit.* note 2

⁵ In 1966, there was a coup d'état which was closely followed by other politically motivated events and killings; this resulted in the people of the defunct Eastern Region declaring secession from the Federal Republic of Nigeria and proclaiming the independent state of Biafra. This move was fiercely resisted by the federal government; the ensuing war lasted for thirty months.

⁶ Orji, K. E. & Uebari S.N, *Nigerian Civil War and Refugee Crisis: The Fate of the Minorities in The Former Eastern Region*, *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, Sept-October 2013.

⁷ IDMC Africa Report, 2016.

⁸ World Health Organisation Covid-19 Regulations

⁹ See Nigeria's COVID 19 Regulations 2020, made pursuant to sections 2, 3 and 4 of The Quarantine Act, Cap.Q2, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, whereby COVID-19 was declared as a dangerous disease.

¹⁰ One of the high-profile convictions secured in this regard was that of the entertainer, Funke Akindele and her husband who were convicted for having a party involving the

gathering of over fifty persons and in which social distancing was not observed which was clearly against the COVID 19 regulations. See, the Vanguard of April 6th 2020.

¹¹ E. Mooney, 'The Concept of Internal Displacement and the Case for Internally Displaced Persons as a Category of Concern' {2005}(24)(3) Refugee Survey Quarterly, 10

¹² See Ezenokwasa; Kalu; &Okaphor,' A Critique of the Legal Framework for Arresting the Threat of Internal Displacement of Persons to Nigeria's National Security' 2018 NAUJIL Vol 9 No.2 p. 20

¹³ See International Migration Law – Glossary on Migration, a publication of the International Organization for Migration, available at publication.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml_1_en.pdf, accessed on 16/10/2020.

¹⁴ United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add 2, 11th February 1998, paragraph 2; this definition is adopted as well by the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, 2008, also known as the Kampala Convention.

¹⁵ Akume, A.T., The Question of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Nigeria: A Reflection on Present Realities, Journal of Third World Studies, Vol.32,(1), Spring 2015, p.221 at 222.

¹⁶ Aloh and Obaji, Internal Displacement in Nigeria and the case for Human Rights Protection of Displaced persons, Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization, Vol. 51, 2016, p.26.

¹⁷ Is a leading inter-governmental organization in the field of migration and works closely with governmental intergovernmental and non- governmental.

¹⁸ See paragraph 2 of the UN Guiding Principles as well as Article 1(k) of the Kampala Convention.

¹⁹ IDMC REPORT 2019

²⁰ Examples are the Itsekiris and Ijaws conflict in 1999 , THE Ife- Modakeke rivalries etc.

²¹ According to IDMC REPORT of 2019, over 53,000 new displacements were recorded.

²² Terminski. B, 'Oil –Induced Displacement and Resettlement; Social Problem and Human Right Issues' (2012)>c:/users/user/downloads/docl:26899_741771990.pdf> accessed 16 March 2021

²³IDMC REPORT 2019

²⁴IDMC REPORT 2019

²⁵ See generally, Mohammed, F.K., *The Causes and Consequences of Internal Displacement in Nigeria and Related Governance Challenges*, SWP Working Paper, FG 8, April 2017, SWP Berlin; UNCHR, *State of the World's Refugees, 2006: Human Displacement in the new millennium 160* (2006).

²⁶ Conflict between the Fulani pastoralists and Hausa farmers in north west states of Katsina, Sokoto and Zamfara led tens of thousands of people to flee across border into the Maradi region of Niger; as reported by IOM DTM Covid-19 Impact on IDPs, 2 July 2020.

²⁷ It is reported by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) that for the first half of 2020, 8,800 persons were displaced from disasters while 32,000 were displaced from conflict and violence in Nigeria.

²⁸28

²⁹ International Crisis Group, *The Boko Haram Insurgency 2020*.

³⁰The data for this report are the results of a detailed assessment conducted in 33 sites in Borno and Adamawa in January and February 2015 by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre.

³¹Covid-19 Impact on IDPs No.6 displacement.iom.int.

³²Olanrewaju, F.O., Omotosho, F., Alabi, J.O., *Datasets on the Challenges of Forced Displacement and Coping Strategy among Displaced Women in Selected IDPs Camps in Nigeria*, Elsevier, *Data in Brief Vol.2018*, 152-158 available on <http://doi.org/10.1016/j.dib.2018.07.042>.

³³Ibid.

³⁴African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, Cap. A9, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.

³⁵Chapter four of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides in detail for the fundamental human rights recognized under the constitution.

³⁶ Chapter two of the constitution is made non justiciable vide section 6(6)(c) which provides that the judicial powers of the state do not extend to any issue question as to whether any act or omission by any government or is in conformity with the fundamental principles.

³⁷ Established vide the National Human Rights Commission Act, Cap. N.46 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.

³⁸This is set up under the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons Act, Cap. N21, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.

³⁹<http://nema.gov.ng/>

⁴⁰UN Doc. E/CN 4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998).

⁴¹See generally, United Nations, “Protecting internally displaced persons: inter-agency standing committee policy paper”, New York, 1998, available at <http://www.reliefweb.int/idp/docs/references/iascpolicyprotectionpaper.pdf>.

⁴²This much was stated in the introductory paragraph of the Guiding Principles.

⁴³Adopted on 23 October 2009, 49 I.L.M., 86. At the sub-regional level however, there was the Pact on Security, Stability and Development signed in December 2006, by the States in the Great Lakes Region which included two protocols specifically dedicate to the protection of IDPs.

⁴⁴See Kidane W., Managing Forced Displacement by Law in Africa: The Role of the New Africa Union IDPs Convention. Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 44, January 2011, p.1 at 6.

⁴⁵See Article 3(1)(a) of the Kampala Convention.

⁴⁶ Article 11, Kampala Convention.

⁴⁷Ibid. Article 12.

⁴⁸By section 12 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, for any treaty to have the force of law in Nigeria, it must first be passed into law by an Act of the national assembly; see *Abacha v. Fawehinmi* (2005) 6 N.W.L.R. Part 660, p.240.

⁴⁹Section 14(2)(b) of the 1999 Constitution.

⁵⁰Ibid. section 16(2)(d).

⁵¹The legislation in place presently tends to cater more for refugees than for IDPs..e.g The 1951 Refugee Convention.

⁵² Forced migration has a distinctive character but under contemporary conditions of global mobility and mixed migration flow, it is not a completely separate phenomenon from regular migration.

⁵³Such as Non-Governmental Organisations, Host Communities and Individuals.
