POWER POLlT/CS AND THE
TRANSIT/ON OF POWER IN NIGERIA:
INTERROGATING THE DOMAIN
F POLlT/CAL SCIENCE

By
E ONUOHAPROFESSOR BROWN



PROFESSOR BROWNE ONUOHA
B.Sc. (Ibadan); M.Sc., PhD (Lagos)

n ~" .•• •.. ,.



ii

POWER POLITICS AND THE TRANSITION OF
POWER IN NIGERIA: INTERROGATING THE

DOMAIN OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

An Inaugural Lecture of the University of Lagos Delivered on
7 April 2021 at the JF Ade-Ajayi Auditorium

By

PROFESSOR BROWNE ONUOHA
B.Sc. (/badan); M.Sc., Ph.D (Lagos)

PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCiENCE .
Department of Political Science

Faculty of Social Sciences
University of Lagos

iii



Copyright © 2021, Browne Onuoha

All righ~s reserved. No part of this ..
stored In a retrieval system or tra pub~lcatl~n may be reproduced,
m.eans electronic, mechanical hot~~ml~ed In any form or by any
without the permission of the author. opymq, recording, or otherwise

ISSN: 1119-4456

Published by

University of Lagos Press and Booksho
Works and Physical Planning comple~ Ltd

P.O. Box 132
University of Lagos

Akoka, Yaba
. Lagos, Nigeria

E-mail: press@unilag.edu.ng

iv

DEDICATION

TO MY PAPA AND MAMA, MICHAEL AND JUSTtNA

v



PROTOCOL
The Vice Chancellor
Deputy Vice Chancellor (Academics & Research)
Deputy Vice Chancellor (Management Services)
Deputy Vice Chancellor (Development Services)
The Registrar
The Bursar
The University Librarian
The Provost, College of Medicine
Dean of Social Science and Other Deans Present
Members of the University Senate
Head of the Department of Political Science
Other Heads of Department
Distinguished Academic and Professional Colleagues
Distinguished Non-academic Staff (Administrative and Technical)
Your Lordship (Spiritual and Temporal)
Your Royal Majesties and Highnesses
Dear Students
Dear Family and Friends
Members of the Mass Media (Press, Broadcast & Virtual)
Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen

PREAMBLE
My inaugural lecture interrogates a dominant, in fact, the
dominant subject in my discipline, political science. The
subject is POWER - state power. The purpose is to share with
you my studies, researches, and knowledge gained and
produced over the years about the power of the state as the
most central subject in the discipline of political science. It is
also to share lessons learnt, contributions made and above all
offer suggestions, about the subject matter especially as it
relates to our country Nigeria. Please permit me to observe
that my lecture is the third inaugural lecture from the
Department of Political Science since the department became
independent from Business Administration (Management
Sciences) 48 years ago in 1973. The first inaugural lecture
was delivered by Professor Alaba Ogunsanwo in 1990; the
second was by Professor Solomon Akinboye in 2013.

Inaugural lecture has more than one objective. For me, it is to
share with those in my discipline and others my knowledge

1



and result of findings, as a f ..also to pontificate make p~o elssor. of political science. It is
knowledge production in or~ ec ~ratlon about my academic
future. The word 'pontificate~~sto Im~rove. the discipline for the
uniqueness of inaugural lectu u.se advisedly to express the
allow interjections or interv . re .. I~~ugural lecture does not
as that of the priesupastor/~~~nhs, I~IS the professor's "pulpit"
mosque; though in my case Wit~ I~r "' the c~urch or Imam in a
is at liberty, and that is what I shall ~IC.of s~le.nce. The lecturer
and so request the Vice Chancello~ In.this Inaugural lecture;
that I may so pontificate. ' Sir, to grant the liberty

My scope of political science h . .state power includes the ereb In. re.la~lonto the subject of
specialisation of Internatio~ul -dlsclpll.nes or areas of
Administration. This is because ~a Relatlo~s and Public
subject between political sci te power, IS the commonest
?isciplines on the other. Alm~~~~~1~n ?ne hand and the sub-
In International Relations and P .he Issu.e~, th~mes or topics
indirectly relate to state power. ubllc Administration directly or

My lecture is organised into four rt .
the development of political sci pa s. The first part deals with
It discusses the centrality Ofence as ~n academic discipline.
second section reports cases IPnOWter I.nt.the discipline. The
the t' I . ransi Ion of power' d

ore rea discourse of transition The thi .' an a
on power, politics, and transitio~ f e third ~ectl?n ~ocuses
fourth and concludin .0 power In Niqeria. The
political Science to te~c~~rt examines the critical need for
to reduce ignorance inacc~;:cr'leas a cdour~eof study in order

and th b
' s an naivety about p

ere y encourage stabilit d ower,
knowledge about state ow y an dev~lopment through
lessons and sUggestionsPfor fert·The conclusion also providesu ure research.

Power ~nd .the Discipline of Political Science
My fascination with power as a can adolescent in the seconda on~ePt began early in life as
day Abia State. This was b i se 001 at Umuahia, present-
science concept of power In: or~. I el"" knew the political. pa ICUar Instance, while I was

2

on a narrow street with a close friend, two women emerged
from a venue where a women's association was holding a
community/town development meeting. Suddenly after,
another woman burst out of the same venue, and shouted at
the top of her voice, ordering, indeed commanding the two
women to immediately come back to the venue of the meeting.
The two women looked at each other, murmured words my
friend and I could not hear from our distance; and very
reluctantly the two women went back to the meeting venue.
This image has not left me to this day, but the scene did not
make much meaning to me until a few years later at the
university in the midst of introduction to political science
lectures. The lectures taught me that' ... action ... contrary to
one's will', and '. . . the imposition of '. . . sanctions for
noncompliance', were some of the elements of power
relationship. In the case reported, the woman who
commanded the two to return to the meeting venue could have
been an 'officer' of the women's association, conferred with
power (authority) by the association. And if the two women did
not return to the venue of the meeting, most likely they would
have been sanctioned, in one way or the other, probably by'
paying a fine. This form of relationship, particularly at the level
of state organisation is the central concern of political science.
The nature and form of this relationship, the way it is controlled
and managed, determine development or decay in the state
and society. And this is one of the reasons studying and
understanding power relationships in state formation are of
primary importance, and why they are of ultimate concern to

political science.

Defining Political Science
The most ordinary definition of political science (politics) is the
science that studies 'who gets what, when and how' (Lasswell:
1936). The scope provided by that definition of political
science has identified the modern state as the organisation in
any society, having the greatest capacity to determine "who
gets what, when and now". In the same scope, political
science has established that the instrument the state uses to
determine who gets what, when and how is its power - the

3



state power. So, political science studies how the state uses
its power to determine who gets what, when and how.
Therefore, whether the emphasis is on "science" or "art"
(emphasis is on both), the political science discipline accepts
that "power" is the most central concept and most critical
subject in political science. In fact, "power" is the subject
matter of political science. From ancient times, power, the use
and/or misuse of power, was what dominated Plato in his first
critical work on politics, The Republic or Concerning Justice.

History of Political Science
Political science as a discipline like other disciplines has
developed over many years. The growth may be traced to
Plato (427-347 B. C.), in his work - The Republic _
Concerning Justice (Barker 1969). The Republic was all about
proper knowledge and correct practice in the access,
management and control of power. In other words, power was
the subject matter of what was first a Course of study, POlitical
SCience, put together by Plato. Although according to
literature, some writings on the state and its powers had
appeared in ancient writings by poets and other artists in
literary works (Wallach, 2014:28-58). But Plato had the first
best, logical and coherent work that was called political
science. According to Ebenstein, The Republic is:

The first work that deserves to be called political
science in that it applied systematic reasoning and
critical inquiry to political ideas and institutions ... After
thousands of years, it is still matchless as an
introduction to the basic issues that confront human
beings as citizens. No other writer in politics has
equaled Plato (427-347 BC) in combining penetrating
and dial,gctical reasoning with poetic imagery and
symbolism (Ebenstein 1969:2).

No doubt Aristotle also made a pioneering and fundamental
contribution to the birth of the diSCipline of political science.
The same Ebenstein had this to say of the foundational role of
Aristotle to the birth of POlitical science:

4

.. I hi\osophy, no one has
In the history of pol.ltlcaen~ clopedic interest and
surpassed Aristotle m. y d politics are the first

. t His ethics an Thaccompllshmen '. . their respective fields. e
systematic treatlse.m nd oetic imagery of the
Politics lacks. t~e fire a ste~atic and analytical, and
Republic. But It IS r:n~re ~~ an introductory textbook ~o
after 2,300. years, It I~.s I science. It cannot be easily
the entire field Of.political ht sobriety of expression,
surpassed in ctarity of thoug f' openness of mind ... ,
range of topics, and undogma IC
Ebenstein, 1969: 65).

est that political scie~ce was
Therefore, it is correct to sugg d of the two earliest and

. . b tween the hea s . I
given birth me.. . ce Plato and Anstot e.
greatest minds in political sClen , .

. Medieval times, and indee.d m
Other works in Ancient a~d I from Plato and A.ristotle either
modern times drew extensl~e l n of alternative views (Barker,
in agreement or the ~resen a I~ t today may begin the study
~969). No political s~lence'stutoe~nd Aristotle, and those other
of political science. Wlthou~~!a. principally because currently,
ancient political thmker~. IS~s lars are still relevant today m

ideas of those ancient se o.
the d . g of the state and society.the or enn ..

. fty what is today's political
As a discipline with its ownf Idh~~~OPhYin the 16th century. It
science began first as part.0 ~el 17th century in Europe, after
became a taught c~urs~ l~i79 Indeed, the excitement and
the French Revolution m A' t . e Tracy's (1754-1836)
discourses provoked by ,. ~,~m, in the 1790s as 'sci~~ce
formulation of the concept, ide g~ and German uruverslties
of ideas', encouraged ~~me ~re~c with philosophy. and law
to begin to teach oonucs a on
(Britannica, n.d. 4). .

olitical science was established m
The first separate school of PLib des Sciences Politique (now
1872 in France as the ~.cole I r:ritannica, n.d. :4). The ~rst
I ftute d'Etudes Polltlques) ( . . the English speakinqns I h I of political science mindependent se 00

5



w rid was set up at th C I b' .
York in 1880, introduc:d ~/~h,a ~nl~ersity in the city of New
the Ecole Libre in Pan Thl urgess, who studied at
stablishment of the ns. IS ~as followed by the

Hopkins, Princeton and ~~~~~ of polltl.cal. sci~nce in John
between 1880 and 1882 T d University In quick Succession
London School of E . .welve years later in 1892 the

conomlcs and P IT I .
England) was established and 0 f d ! onnca .Sclence (in
4; Adcock and Bevir, 2005: 1_16).x or In 1912 (Bntannica, n.d.

Thereafter, Political science d rt
from the 1900s. In fact, by 199~a ~ents develo~ed .unevenly
and debate had begun as to w senous ~cader:n'? discussion
part of political science or full ~e~~r ~UbIlCadministration was
popular Woodrow Wilson debaten(S~nf~~endent discipline, the
30). 1976). Also, from that period ~~ 1~~gH~?e, 20~7: 28-
subject, remained an im ort t ' s, power as a
science. And according t~ sc~nI pa~ of th7 study of political
from the beginnin as 0 ar~ power' had been known,
politics (Dahl. 195~~ 1-2) p~eI1~mllnant.~ubject .in the field of
began to grow it' eater, International relations
imperialism and ~o~onfali:~bfield. ~~edless to say with
introduced olitics' . ' ~~e British and the French
in their cOl~nial te:~t~~~~n:se;:~;:~y/c~ll~~e~ they established
Africa in the 1940s A: . n la In the 1920s and
poli~ics was mostiy ~~~'Ss~~~y time, ~he Course content of
institutions, constitutional d y ~f history, gov~rnmental
government legislative st . eve opr:nent, functions of
international relations E udies, P~bllc. administration and
events later influenced thxpectedly, like In other diSCiplines,
science. e course of development of political

The New Orientati . P "
Movement' on In ohtlcal Science - the 'Protest

The Second World War, 1939-19 ..
for political science. Alon wit 45, w~s .a .defln.lng moment
SCiences, political sCienc~ bh other disciplines In the social
approach', a 'new orientatio "ecame engrosse~. in a 'new
The 'new orientation' w n t~bthe s~udy of political science.

as a ehaVloural' approach which

6

made use of some of the methods of natural science in
political enquiry. This new orientation, "a protest movement",
was led by American scholars from University of Chicago (the
Chicago School), - headed by Charles Mariam as the Pioneer
Chair. Robert Dahl, one of the distinguished members of the
new orientation school wrote an epitaph to what he called a
successful protest (Dahl, 1968: 271-289). The new orientation
rejected the 'traditional approach' hitherto in use for research,
which was said to be noncompetitive, descriptive, parochial,
historical, normative, static and legalistic (Macridis, 1989: 43-
46).

The new orientation encouraged new methods of knowledge
production, and several publications in political science. In
particular, it was the efforts of the new orientation more than
any other attempt that influenced the change of name of the
discipline from 'politics' or government to 'political science'.
Nevertheless, the "new orientation" remained particularly an
American approach to the study of political science for about
four decades: It was .Criticised as an American scientisrn
sponsoring American ideology «Leys, 1969: 1; Adcock and
Bevir 2005:1; Ake, 1979; Oyovbaire, 1983:239-254).

One of the greatest contributions of the American new
orientation in political Science is the comparative and
interdisciplinary approach to study and research in the
discipline. Today researches are in the areas of the economy,
agriculture/fishery, wheat cultivation, irrigation, tax regimes,
indigenisation, privatisation, gay marriage, football, insecurity,
human trafficking, street trading, oil, shipping, property
ownership, religion, health, etc. These are subjects which
ordinarily would be considered outside the domain of political
science. Indeed, today political science studies any subject
under the sun, as long as such a subject has a touch of the
state and government (once the powers of the state are
involved).

One of the issues about the discipline which the new
orientation resolved was that political science was both 'art'

7



and 'science'. But one remarkable fate political science
suffered at the time was that in the search for science, the
discipline seemed to have lost or diminished the "art" of
political science. In other words, it was in that maze chasing
'science' that the study of power, the "art" of political science,
slipped, and suffered neglect; and power as a course of study
seemed to have been ignored, degraded or in some cases
even abandoned.

Power in the Domain of Political Science
However, a few political science scholars recognised the
centrality of power in political science. Robert Dahl began in
1957 an attempt to study power scientifically. He attempted to
quantify or measure power, wherein he employed data,
statistical coefficient relationships, and graph in measuring
power relationships (Dahl, 1957). In another work, which
appeared as a chapter, 'Power, Influence, Authority', Dahl
wrote a short but strong introductory text for both graduates
and undergraduates in the study of power, first published in
1963 (Dahl, 1970). There were other works on power by
political scientists in the early 1960s, following the increased
use of scientific tools of analysis: Dahl (1961), Hunter (1963),
Polsby (1964); most of these were American scholars and
were guided by the pluralist perspective. Earlier, immediately
after the Second World, Hans Morganthau (1948) did a
monumental work on Power Among Nations: The Struggle for
Power and Peace, first published in 1948, a work on the
exercise and the play of ('balance' of) power among states of
the international community.

A scientific approach to the study of power could not be
sustained. There was scepticism, as to the viability of a
scientific approach to the study of power, which considered
'the whole study of power - as a bottomless swamp' (Dahl,
1957: 1). Thus, the greatest obstacle was the measurement of
the nature of power; another was the unpredictability of the
human nature involved in the exercise of power. These might
explain the less attraction and attention given to the scientific
study of power in the 1960s during the "new orientation".

8

k on power remain on the side
Presen,tly,most of theffe~i:C~ :cience, that is, the 'traditional
of the art element 01 P the traditional approach has the
approach'. Neverthe ess, T power once more as the
methods which may repo~1Ion
subject matter of political science.

The Anatomy of Power . borrowed from the title of(This attractive sub-heading was
John Gailbrait's work, 1985).

Vice cnancellor, Sir, after years of studYroluVpiesw'lnPowwh~~ha~n:
. d' id als or among g ,

relationship a~ong ~a~~ ~ulesand binding decisions on other
has the capacity to 11 as possessing the same
individ.uals .and gro~~~'\ti:: if~~ere is default or disobedience
capacl~ t? ~mposep This definition tries to incorporate
by the individuals or grou~s. ear since the time of
the diverse definitions which ~e1~~ t~ ~:~edY to the misuse of
Plato. Plato's major tas~ ~~s ;ta~~} in his time. Power was an
power i~ Athens (Gree I to justice and specialisation or
expression an~, adhe.~~nc:;. the Republic. Plato rejected a
respect t~ one s f~~1~~~~~t promote justice (Wallach, 2014
concept 0 power . hands of those who have the
31). Power shoul~ dbe Ine~~~rtise specialisation, the training
knowledge, the WIS ~m, u~al life with special moral
through long education, ~~m~ave acc~ss to control and todiscipline to handle power, 0 ,

manage power.

I d of power were formulated by
Our current s~u.dyand k~ow e ic~O~IOMachiavelli (1469-1527) a
an Italian political the?rlst, N a e (14th to 15th centuries).
product of the Renaissance .s~that created a century after
Machiavelli gave power thedtwl d decisive meaning of state
h te the most focuse an } th te wro '.. h reatest "transition" (of power a
power which trl.gger~~t ~ g1648' the fall of the Holy Roman
ever occurred In politics I~ t' the State and not to the
Empire - power belongl~g 0 .
Churchlthe Pope (Ebenstem, 1969. 278-286).

9



For ~achiavelli, power is an end in itself ...
retention and expression of whi h - the acquisition,
which guide the statesman P IC a:e the cod~~ the cannon,
consideration, attribute whi~h eOw~~IS that position, capacity,
course, and in successful ~a es ~hestat~sman to be on
life and liberty of the coun~U~sUltof actions ~hlch will save the
system of values independZ~t ~i. the ~~ateIS an autonomous
the specific situation of the states any .fh er source; ... and in
priority over those of ethics dman, ~ rules of power have
280-281). Machiavelli's conc~nti morajlty (Ebenstein, 1969:
changed of the structure of stat!~oOnd ~nd~~we~ died, to !he
and enforcement of state ,us 0 ay s notion
and concept of the state power. A~d prese~tly, that notion
political science. power quide, and IS the focus of

Currently, our state of kId
'anatomy of power' includi~~wdel~'.and the details of the
many as there are scholar e rru Ions, have come from as
~umanities and the social :~i~~e s~~olars c0':'le from both the
Include Max Weber 8ert es. n no particular order, they
Lasswell and Ab~aha~an~ R~ssell, Ralf Dahrendoff, Harold
Morgenthau, Robert Dahl ap an, Rob~rt Michels, Hans
~Lord Acton), and many othe;sOh~ ~al~ralth, Darlberq-Acton
Identify and focus on . os 0 the studies on power

. some common el t
relationship, authority, influence em~n s such as
manipulation, persuasion Als ,for~e, dynamism, coercion,
features such as types ~ate 0 ~xaml.ned a:e power's diverse
complexities (Onuoha, 2011 :~~r~i1~.Imenslons, sources, and

For.H~rold Lasswell, power ma be def .
an individual, or group of indivi~ ~ d~flned ~s the capacity of
other individuals or grou . ua s, 0 modify the conduct of
(Lasswell and Kaplan 19j~. ~n5)th~ manner. he desires ...
perhaps the most fundamental in t . asswell vle~s power as
According to him the IT Ihe whole ofyolltlcal science.
distribution, and ~xercis~o ~Ica process IS t~e shaping,
availability of sanctions whe: t~o~e~....There IS also the
forthcoming (Lasswell and Ka lan e In e.nded e~ects are not
sanctions which differentiat p ,1976. ~5). It ISthe threat of

es power from Influence in general.

10

Power is a special case of exercise of influence: it is the
process of affecting others with the help of (actual or
threatened) severe deprivations for nonconfonnity with the
policies intended (Lasswell and Kaplan, 1976: 76). According
to Lasswell, "what men seek in their political negotiations is
power. .." (1976: 76).

Mills (1964:171) corroborates the views of Lasswell and
Kaplan, and observes that 'all politics is struggle for power;
(and) the ultimate kind of power is violence.' Weber has a
similar definition of power as 'the possibility of imposing ones
will upon the behaviour of other persons' (Gerth and Mills
1978:80). Weber painted a picture of power as a 'war castle'
which political parties build and live in, in order to win state
power through elections. According to him, 'parties live in the
house of power' (Gerth and Mills 1978:81). In discussing
power and political parties, Robert Michels (1968:342-356)
argued that political parties become oligarchic in structure and
organisation in order to win state power through erections.

Dahrendorf (1968: 205j introduced' another dimension of the
dynamics of power when he stated that 'power always implies
nonpower and therefore resistance'. According to him, 'the
dialectic of power and resistance is the motive force of
history ... Power produces conflict, and conflict between
antagonistic interests gives lasting expression to the
fundamental uncertainty of human existence .. .' (Dahrendorf
1968:227). Power underlies conflict as well as underpins class
differences in every human society. Therefore, power implies
an inherent imbalance. And if there is an imbalance, there will
be little or no urge for those holding the power to commit to
change, unless there is a meaningful threat to their control of
power (Dahrendorf 1968:227,1967:17).

A dreadful characterisations of power may be summed up with
the concern and warning of Robert Dahl about the nature of
power. According to him:

11



Nothing is more likely to lead to bad political strategies
than to misunderstand 'power', to misperceive 'the
power structure'; for to be misled about 'power' is to be
misled about the prospects and means of stability,
change, and revolution. The graveyard of history is
strewn with the corpses of reformers who failed not
only because of the forces arrayed against them but
because the pictures in their minds about power and
influence were simplistic and inaccurate (Dahl 1970:32,
15).

In the same note of warning, Lord Acton cautioned against the
centralising and total nature of power. This is contained in his
widely quoted statement: 'power tends to corrupt, and absolute
power corrupts absolutely' (Darlberg-Acton 1988:519 - 521;
Hill 2000:300-302). According to Acton, 'great men are almost
always bad men, even when they exercise influence and not
authority ... among all the causes which degrade and
demoralise men, power is the most constant and the most
active' (Darlberg-Acton 1988:519-521; Hill 2000:300-302; Dahl
1970:15).

The other important consideration of power is its sources.
According to Galbraith, they are three: personality, property,
and organisation (John Galbraith 1985:19-25, 51-64). All of the
three sources of power are interconnected, and all three find
the most effective expression in the study of organisation and
the state. Thus, 'the modern state unites within its structures
all three sources of power ... It has manifest access to all three
instruments of enforcement, and these have increased over
the years in their absolute and relative importance within the
formal structure of government' (Galbraith 1985:140-141).

In all cases, the formal structure of government bears the mark
of the structure of power. The Power structure refers to the
building blocks of power, the scaffold of power, the
embankment of power, from which the exercise of power is
effected and sustained. The Power structure is a composite of
special institutions, instruments which activate the use of

12

.' ower structure is made up of: th~
power. In Nlgerl~ the ~. . arms of government and th~lr
constitution ~nd It~ provlslons~d forces and the other security
institutions, including the a~m I constituencies; the states as
agencies; the federal elec ora rnments as created. power
created; and the local gov: of these building blocks; they
structure re~e~sto an aggreg: There may be other hidden,
are very difficult to chang. th e blocks and any other

. h' between esunwritten relations IP~ t' the society which may on
significant g~OU? or Inter~hse:ilding blocks of power. Such
regular besis. mfluence 'th influence may be.' t p or groupS, WI 'other slgnlfican grou f ·t· of the particular power. t the de 1nlIon tconsidered to tmpac . N' rla there is a general bu
structure. Fo~ example, t d't:~~al institution in the North, th.e
significant notion that the ra I . ith the special aristocratic
Caliphate/Emirate in collaboratlo; ~ the traditional monarchy,
group, most of whom are drawn tr~Octureof power in Nigeria
significantly influence t~;87s) In a case as this, the
(Takaya and Tyoden,. ,'rtution becomes a proximate
Caliphate/traditional Emirate ,lnSN\geria, In this sense, we may

Part of the structure of power In t . 'In Nigeria without the
t wer struc ure

not talk abou ~o,' their interest group because
Caliphate/Emirate ~nstltutlon an~he principal building blocks of
of the enormity of Influence on
power.

e one way or the other affects
And that type of power stru~~rloits of power. Dynamics of
the power dynamiCS: the f P f the 'tsunami' which power
Power refers to velocity, th~ orcedo eed the manoeuvrability

h 'ght motion an speeu, , II b
possesses, t e weioru. 'd'fficult to restrain especla y Y
of power which mos~ ~ft~~ ISte~ except with greater power.
those against whom It IS irec ,

and dynamics of power are
As indicated above, the structu~t overnment. But in a formal
interrelated with the structure d ;f a democratic order, the
structure of government" :~uments of enforcement of, ~he
structure of power and Inderthe control of the ruling po"tlc~1
powers of th~ st,ate, ~re u~ all the checks and balances In
party, This IS In spite g11' 21), The control of power can
government (Onuoha, 2 '

13



only come about through a countering power. It is only with
power that power can be put in check (Galbraith (1985:81;
Darlberg-A~ton 1988:521). For the purpose of this lecture I
am subsuming authority and influence into power. '

Vic~ .Chancellor, Sir, in my study of Nigeria (and Africa) and
deriving from the conceptualisation and expositions of power,
two result~ were recorded: firstly, because the state in Africa
lacks r~latlve autonomy, state power is captured and seized by
a dominant. ruling interest (Onuoha, 2011). Accordingly it
becomes difficult for power to effectively check po~er
beca.use the dominant interest that captures the state ensure~
~hat It has a monopoly of state power, which since political
Independe~ce ,in A!rica has been near absolute and
overwhelm.lng (the wlnner-takes-all' pOlitics) (Onuoha, 2011).
However, In more recent ti~es, prospects for challenges to
power, though not yet effective, have been increasing with the
em.ergence of democratisation processes of the 1990s in
Africa (Bratton and Van de Walle 1988' Onuoha and Fadakinte2002). '

Put di~erently, as I argued, countering power with power
the?retlcally presupposes that the state possesses the know~
attr~butes of 'relative autonomy', and plays the role of an
arbiter among group interests within the state (Gramsci 1971'
Showstac~ 1987). But Nigeria and other states in Africa lack
these attnbutes (Ake 1985, 1994). The pioneer political
leade!"s who struggled for political independence from the
colonral masters in the 1950s and 1960s appropriated the
benefi.t~ of political independ~nce, especially through the use
of polltl~al power to expropriate economic resources, at the
same . time deploying these resources of the state to
consolidate their grip on state power. Furthermore for more
~han~ d~cade,. the late 1960s to the early 1990s, ~ost states
In Africa including Nigeria were under military dictatorship so
powe~.countering power could not be envisaged. Power u~der
the military was near absolute (Onuona, 2011).

14

The second report of my study examined the consequence of
pronounced power imbalance in Nigeri~ (and Africa) and its
deconstruction through consensus. I argued that under the
imbalance of power that existed, it would be misleading to
begin to advocate 'consensus' in the resolution of J?Oliti~al
struggle or political conflicts. This is because power I~phes
inherent conflict arisinq from competition. And as reviewed
above if there is imbalance, there will be little or no urge for
those 'holding power to commit time to consensus building,
unless there is a meaningful threat to their control of power
(Dahrendorf, 1968 227; Onuoha, 2011: 20). Consensus i~ I~ss
attractive because those controlling the state are beneficiaries
of the present character of the state, and are aware of the
enormous powers of the state under their control. Under such
power imbalance, consensus will not be attractive to those in
dominant control of the instruments of state power (Onuoha,
2011: 23).

Thus, according to my study, 'a hidden reality is that the
success of consensus arises at the point power is being lost or
is slipping off those holding power. In other words, the success
of consensus is an indication that those wielding power are
getting weak and losing control of power, and contenders
getting stronger, more confident and more daring to challenge
power. At that point, in order not to lose power completely,
those controlling power conceded to consensus (Onuoha,
2011: 23). As is argued later in the lecture, this was .exactly
the case in 1999 when the military bloc, representing the
interests of a particular power bloc, with a meaningful threat to
their control of power by NADECO activities, conceded to
Obasanjo being the President of Nigeria.

In a detailed study of power, it is germane to observe that
much earlier in the socio-economic and political development
of a society, state power must have protruded from a particular
hegemonic order. This means that the concept of power, state
power, will be incomplete without knowledge of the root
(different from the structure, but certainly shapes the structure)
of power - the hegemonic basis of power.

15



Power and Hegemony
The power of most old states and societies is traceable to a
hegemonic order; the time when power structure began to
develop. The study of hegemony may be said to have started
with Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) (1971) in his attempt to
understand the resilience of capitalism in Europe in spite of the
crises of capitalism between the 1920s and 1930s; and at the
same time the difficulty of building socialism in the Soviet
Union. Gramsci identified a stronghold that the dominant
capitalist class and its fractions had on capitalism in Europe as
an acceptable means and mode of social reproduction.

Gramsci discovered that the monarchy, the aristocracy or the
dominant capitalist class, developed an ideology of capitalism,
which they imparted into the working class, who accepted and
sustained the ideology. This was done in collaboration with the
intellectuals, educational institutions, cultural groups, and of
Course the military and the bureaucracy. These various groups
turned round to defend and sustain the ideology of the
dominant class .. This process _culminates in the' building of
hegemony. Hegemony involves Socio-economic and political
processes which create unique nationalist values through
which consent to a particular mode of social reproductive
relations are organised, enforced and maintained (Sassoon
1987:116). It is a manifestation of class rule, which involves
intellectual and moral leadership and domination, force and
consent, violence and civilisation - tactics and strategy
(Sassoon 1987:110-115). Hegemony encompasses
sociocultural, economic and political leadership and control. It
involves all aspects of life. (Onuoha 2014:333-4)

Hegemony building is an aspect of socio-political history: at a
point in nation-building, the monarch, his army, his
bureaucracy, the priests, intellectuals, aristocrats of the
society, agree and work and live their lives under a culture of
common values. Culture is very critical to building hegemony.
These values get to be observed and practised in society for
an appreciable time. Over time, a long time indeed, maybe
centuries, members of the society cultivate these values,

16

. . t the observance of these values,
accept the practice or acce~t Through all forms of crises
evolving into a common cu ure. rulers ( the monarchy, his
and conflicts, including war~, tt~~ tual) and the rest of the
army, the ~ureaucracy, the In e ecs as 'their rules, their guide
citizens, stili hold on to th~s~hv~~~s well as the guide to their
to viewing t.hew~rld a~ou~ SOeCi~tyAcceptable, agreeable or
ways of doinq things In t ~ . g th~ir society evolve from theworkable method of orqarusm
values and their practices.

. the process of observingThe citizens, the majorit~ of them, ~ trust and loyalty and
these values give their monarch acts' and defends the

. b se the monarc
allegiance ecau. . ational development proceeds,
interests of the cltlz~ns. As n. the source of the authority
the citizens ac~ept wlthoutdque~tlo~ent and implementation of
that is respon~lble for thb~d~~e~pas a people, their lives andthe values which now In e

, their col/ectivities.

. ..- ,of the social values, their
. The people s acceptance creates the sovereiqnty.

demonstration 'of 10y~lty.to the r~e~ent of the society, all the
At a point in the contInUln11~:vO~t~e people, their culture; and
values become the way 0 I.. society ideas about power,
whatever idea~ a.bout org~nlslng . fro~ those commonly
authority, institutions WhtlChbde~~ethe reigning idea, i.e. theshared values, coalesce 0 eco
ideology.

. .. I hi t hegemony is built. It isAt this point i~ soclo:~olltlca h. ItS~;:;, anthropological and
socio-eco~om.I~, political, ISi~~' 'rocesses which explain
indeed scientific and techn~l~g d ~olitical order in a given
the root of. power, and S?CI~ea~OCio-economic and political
society. This IS a staqe ~ h most of Africa could not attain
development. o~ society w IC Bini empire, Oyo Empire,
before colonialism. H~weveri :heels of development of their
Sokoto Caliphate at ~Ifferen e~ hegemony before their
societies w~re ten?l~g to~a~h: process of hegemony wasencounter with colonialism an
truncated (Onuoha, 2014:333-4).

17



hu , every power began to evolve and develop from a
h emonic order. And most old and stable societies have
clearly identifiable hegemonic order: European states
generally, United States of America; Japan, China, Russia;
even most of the kingdoms in Asia have identifiable
hegemonic order (Geertz, 1963). Therefore, observed from
socio-political history, it may be argued that without hegemony
most nation-states will find it difficult to organise and develop.
It is hegemony that organises society for a 'take off to national
development (Rostow, 1960). Indeed, the problems of
structure of power are resolved as hegemony is being built.
Thus, power is the foremost and most critical element of the
society which hegemony resolves and brings up as state
power.

The states itself - an enigma- a most formidable organisation-
is that invisible but real organisation which mediates,
reconciles, acts as an umpire in the various and complex \
interests and relationships between and among groups in a
particular society. A radical expression views the state as an
exe~utive committee for the management of conflicts (the
affairs of) among the bourgeoisie, the dominant class (Marx,
1976; Ake 1985: 9-32). The sources of power of the state
include the people - the citizens; the constitution; the
legislature; the judiciary, presidential orders; the military/
police/security agencies; the natural resource/the economy;
science and technology. The inability of the state to mediate,
reconcile or act as arbiter among the diverse interest groups in
the society leads to the various forms of power struggle which
bedevil nation-states.

Power Struggle and Nation-building
In developed societies and civilisations, all issues of the
structure and distribution of power among groups in the
society were significantly resolved before socio-economic
development could be achieved and sustained; or they were
being resolved as development was ongoing; but certainly not
abandoned or ignored and unaddressed. According to Russell,
"There is no hope for the world unless power can be tamed,

18

and brought into the service, not of this or that group of
fanatical tyrants, but of the whole human race, white and
yellow and black, fascist and communist and democrat, for
science has made it inevitable that all must live or all must die"
(Russell, 1948: ch.2). It is emphasised that every society must
solve the issues about power in order to achieve its goals or
risk failure, distortion, atrophy or total extinction (Turner
2005:1 )

The process of resolving power contestations or acceptable
distribution mechanism may take generations, or indeed
centuries - the British Glorious Revolution 1640; the French
revolution 1779, The American Revolution 1776, Thirty years
war in Europe, 1618-1648; Russian Revolution 1917, Chinese
Revolution 1949; the two world wars 1914- 1919 1939 -1945;
the Yoruba Wars, about 1789-1880, the Nigerian civil war,
1967-1970, African World War (Congo/ the Great Lakes of
Africa), 1998-2003, were all aspects of the struggle for power;
and were activities in the process of resolving the organisation
of state in terms of power relationship.·' Europe is notoriously

. reputed to have achieved its own through 'iron and blood'.
Indeed all wars are struggle for power. And in all the conflicts,
one common denominator, common issue, is state power. This
is because as earlier stated, structure of power, acquisition or
loss of power shapes every other trajectory of state and
society.

Put differently, part of the reasons Nigeria is still in a cycle of
crises and conflicts is not because of ethnic divide, or
tribalism. It is because of its inability to resolve power sharing
formula; its inability to develop an acceptable power structure.
In Nigeria, the creation of three regions in 19511 1960 (later
four in 1963), the Western Region crisis 1962, the Nigerian
civil war, 1967, the military coups, the creation of twelve states
in 1967 and other state creation exercises thereafter, the June
12 (1993) election crisis; the agitation for resource control, and
the demand for restructuring of the federation, were all
directed at resolving power sharing formula. And until this is

19



ttled, stability and development will remain elusive in
Nigeria.

It may interest us to mention in passing that the Asiatic states
settled their power structure earlier in their monarchical and
collective agrarian systems before their territories were
momentarily colonised by the Europeans. Most of Asia
belonged to societies known to be monarchical as well as
"agro-hydraulic societies" before the short-lived colonisation of
their societies (Wittfogel, 1978). Their precolonial societies had
fully developed structures of power; centralised, monarchical
institutions of power. In their societies, hydraulic irrigation was
in practice in its primitive technology, and requiring
collectivisation and centralisation of power. And because no
individual (or with his entire household) could provide the
resources of irrigation to his household, there was the need for
centralisation and collectivisation in the community. There was
also the need for a strong ruler to enforce the irrigation
technology guidelines and the processes to the satisfaction of
the entire. farming community (WittfogeI 1978: 161-338).
Remarkably, colonialism (which was not as destructive of
cultures as in Africa) could not destroy the Asian culture. After
independence, the Asiatic societies seamlessly went back to
that structure of power out of the culture and values of "agro-
hydraulic societies".

The adaptation of West European democratic principles of
power in the Asiatic societies, most often are at their own
choices, designs and speed. The nature and structure of
power of their precolonial societies, the agro-hydraulic culture,
from which their ideology and exercise of power flow, are
known and accepted by the people. From a careful
observation, it is discovered that this background history of
power, partly explain why Asiatic cultures have fewer crises
and conflicts of power than Africa. Thus, unlike Africa, Asiatic
countries/societies had little internal conflicts and disruptions
of their societies immediately after independence (for those
that were colonised) arising from power struggle. And if there
were struggle or revolution like in China, the society settled

20

back to their fundamental values which protrude from their
agro-hydraulic culture. This partly explains the relative sta.bility
that prepared the environment for rapid and stable national
development in those cultures.

And this brings out clearly the relationship between power and
culture. The anatomy of power, the structure of P?wer, and. the
particular attitude to power are related to the part~cular SOCI~ty,
which is a reflection of the culture of a particular society
(Oahrendoph 1967:17; 1968:227). This aspect of cultu~e and
power is what most Nigerian political leaders seem to I~nore,
and to the detriment of proper judgment or understanding of
power. Nigeria has no one cultural background of attitu~e to
power. The three major ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulam, the
Igbo, the Yoruba, and the other nationalities, do not come fro~
the same culture of power background. This of course IS
compounded by colonial politics. These are aspects of
knowledge production of power which study and research ~y
political science will provide and make available. But that IS
until political science begins to teach and carry o.ut research
on power. Aspects of teaching and researc~. Include th~
complexity and transient nature of power - trans.ltlo~ ~f p~wer,
at times expressed in the metaphor of 'riding a tiger. Riding a
tiger" is a way of speaking about power, a vision ~f .and access
to power; often the rider may be oblivious, so obliVIOUStha~ he
may not perceive that he is ending up in the mouth of the tiger
- in such a case, power has transited. A word about
Transition.

Power Politics and Transition of Power
Transition refers primarily to fundamental cha.nge in a~it.u.de,
values and ethos of individuals and their coltectivities.
Transition hinges upon individuals' newfou~d desires to
participate in social action. It is a general design Of.~ fu~ure
society ... a transition to a participant society. Transition .I~ a
continuum (Onuoha, 1996; 2002:20-21). In power ~.nd POIl~ICS,
transition is an irreversible change of status, condition, object,
life or activity in the social system. It is a clean b~eak ~ith th.e
past. In every political transition something gives: In this

21



model, power is lost or changes irretrievably. It may be
recovered at another epoch, generations minimally. In such a
case, it becomes yet another transition. In other words, there
may be more than one transition in a society, like more than
one revolution (Onuoha, 1996). Put differently, there is a
chance of failure of transition. Once that is the case, it means
the transition failed; and will not be discussed as transition
except as failed transition. This throws up the issue of
successful and unsuccessful transitions (O'Donnell and
Schmitter, 1986).

In my findings in "Reflections on the transition programmes" in
our edited work with my good friend Dr. Fadakinte, I was of the
view, which I still hold, that theoretically and empirically, no
transition took place in Nigeria when the military government
committed so much resources into what they called transition
programme from military to civil rule, 1970 to 1999. This was
a programme in which my humble self was a participant as the
National Secretary of National Republican Convention (NRC),
one of the political parties established by the military
government 'of General Ibrahim Babangida. Whether they'
were men in "khaki" or "agbada" the changes in government
which occurred between 1970 and 1999 were not "transition".
(Onuoha, 2002). In fact, I made that argument earlier in 1996
(Onuoha, 1996). The 'transition' were mere changes in
nomenclature and personnel in government. There were no
fundamental changes even with what appeared like changes
in the structure of government (from parliamentary to
presidential) and in the Constitution (Onuoha, 1996; 2002).

Cases of Transition of Power
Three cases of transition of power briefly identified
immediately below, provide some sense of what may be
referred to as transition of power.

The First Case of Transition of Power
One of the earliest recorded accounts of power struggle, and
transition (of power), is contained in the Bible. Though it
appears spiritual, but the Bible makes reference to power,

22

kingdom and empire. These are temporal concepts whic~ are
identifiable and known to political science. The account IS the
power struggle between God and Lucifer; and therefore t~e
first or one of the first recorded struggles for power and ItS
transition. According to John in the Revelation as contained in
the Good News version of the Bible,

... war broke out in heaven. Michael and his angels
fought against the dragon, who fought back with his
angels; but the dragon was defeated and he and his
angels were not allowed to stay in heaven any
lonqer ... He was thrown down to earth: a~d all his
angels with him. Then I heard a loud voice In heaven
saying. "Now God's salvation has come! Now God has
shown his power as king! Now his Messiah has shown
his authority (Good News Bible, 12: 7-9).

Revised Standard Version of the Bible has this:

. ~. war arose- in heaven, Michael and his angels
fighting against the dragon; and the dragon and his
angels fought but they were defeated and there was no
longer any place for them in heaven. And the gre~t
dragon was thrown down, that ancient serp~nt, who IS
called the Devil and the Satan, the deceiver of the
whole world - he was thrown down to the earth, and
his angels were thrown down with him. An~ I heard a
loud voice in heaven saying: now the salvation and the
power and the kingdom of our God, and authority of the
Christ has come for the accuser of our brethren has
been thrown down ... " (Rev.12: 7-10).

And Jerusalem Bible has this:

And now war broke out in heaven, when Michael with
his angel attacked the dragon. The dragon fought back
with his angels, but they were defeated and driven out
of heaven. The great dragon, the primeval serpent,
known as the devil or Satan, who had led all the world

23



astray, was hauled down to the earth, and his angels
were hurled down with him. Then I heard a voice shout
down from heaven, salvation and power and Empire
forever have been won by our God, and all authority for
His Christ, now that the accuser. .. has been brought
down ... (Rev. 12: 7-11).

The three versions of the Bible make references to salvation
(political or spiritual independence or freedom); power,
authority, kingdom or empire. The last four concepts, power,
authority, kingdom and empire fit into our analysis about
power, politics and transition of power.

For a political scientist, the Bible is more than the word of God.
The Bible is one of the earliest recorded political history of the
people. The story of creation, the war between God and
Lucifer, and all the other wars, the institution of Kings and
kingdoms, the sending of prophets, the movements of the
people/slavery, the building of tents and various sacrifices, the

.commandment, crossing of the Red Seas, are but the political
. history of the Jews, and their attempt to organise their society.
And in all the activities and situations, power and politics were
involved. Thus, for a political scientist, behind all the narratives
and phenomena of the Jews, is the struggle for power which
symbolically (some say mythically) began with God and
Lucifer. In that episode, Lucifer lost power; there was transition
of power. From the biblical account, power transited to the
Child (King) The Christ. There were other contests of power,
politics and transition contained in the Bible.

The Second Case of the Transition of Power
The second case of transition of power took place in the
earthly kingdom: the Holy Roman Empire. In the year 800 AD,
Pope Leo III resuscitated the old Roman Empire, and declared
it Holy Roman Empire because of the growth and acceptance
of Christianity in the Empire. The Holy Roman Empire lasted
for over 800 years, about 800 AD to 1648 ending formally with
the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. At its apogee, the Holy
Roman Empire consisted of a multiethnic, multilingual complex

24

of territories in present-day Western and Central Europe:
France, Germany, Britain, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Poland,
Holland Switzerland, and Russia. The split of the Eastern
Church,' the rise of the Byzantine Empire, reduced the size and
partly weakened the Holy Roman Empire. It must be
mentioned that the Holy Roman Empire was the forbearer ?f
the "Graeco-Roman civilisation" which produced what today IS
known as 'Western civilisation" in all its aspects:
culture/values, human/economic endeavours, art, education,
exploration, scientific discoveries, hegemonies, a.nd of course,
wars ("blood and iron"). It is a civilisation motivated by the
dynamics and auspices of power - imperial and papal state
power.

In the Holy Roman Empire, power and leadership were
hierarchical, with the Pope as the spiritual head and the
Emperor as temporal head. In hierarchy, the Pope was overall
and had superior powers (Ebenstein, 1969: 167-172). Though
there was a college of electors of the emperor, most of whom
had allegiance to the Pope; but· the Pope would accept,
approve and crown the emperor. There were cases of
disagreements and struggle for power between the Pope and
some emperors of the Holy Roman Empire.

The powers of the Pope were enormous: power of le.gislation,
settlement of disputes between and among krngdoms/
sovereigns/monarchs, endorsement of treaties, religious
control/enforcement of Christian morals, war and peace (the
Pope had an army) over the whole Empire. The Papal Bull. of
Demarcation (1493), a Decree by Pope Alexander VI, which
divided the 'New World' between Spain and Portugal, though
later challenged by others, was one of the . effective
demonstrations of the powers of the Pope at the time. The
decline of the Holy Roman Empire came through the
challenges from the age of Renaissance,. indi~idual .state
nationalism, and religious crises (religious schism) In particular
the Christian religious Reformation in the 15th century.

25



In a series of wars that lasted thirty years (1618-1648), most of
which were religious wars, alliances, counter-alliances,
intrigues involving the Pope (the Papacy) France, Spain,
Sweden, Britain, Germanic States, the Holy Roman Empire
collapsed and lost all its powers. Transition of power took
place, from the Pope to sovereign nation-states in Europe. A
treaty, the Treaty of Westphalia 1648, ended the powers of the
Pope over nation-states in Western Europe. In reaction to the
loss of his powers, the transition of his powers, the Pope,
Pope Innocent X, in an outburst, had this to say: "(The Peace
of Westphalia) ... is null, void, invalid, unjust, damnable,
reprobate, inane, empty of meaning and effect of all time
(Holsti: 1991: 25). In spite of the outburst, transition of power
took place, the Pope lost power that was never reversed.

Regardless of the inadequacies of the Treaty of Westphalia,
the powers of the Pope transited. The transition of power of
the Holy Roman Empire was the greatest transition in modern
politics. That transition of power ushered in the notion of
'nation-states' in the modern study of international relations.
While the Holy Roman Empire continued to exist till 1814, all'
its powers over the vast territories of Europe prior to 1648
transited to individual, sovereign nation-states (Holsti, 1992:
34-35, 38). The transition of power of the Holy Roman Empire
was a tumultuous, and remarkable events that 'in the course of
three most eventful centuries (1618-1814), amid so many
bloody wars. .. so frequent changes of power ... amid
general anarchy of all social, civil, religious, and political
relations (but) no independent state was annihilated by violent
means (Holsti, 1991: 83).

The Third Case of the Transition of Power
The third case of transition of power is the Ottoman Empire.
Another great Empire, a state and a caliphate founded in the
13th century. At the height of its powers in the 16th Century,
Ottoman Empire was a multinational, multilingual empire
controlling most of present-day Southeast Europe, parts of
Eastern and Central Europe, West Asia, and the Caucasus,
North Africa and the Horn of Africa. It inhabited 32 provinces

26

and numerous vassal states (Othman Emp~re). ~ith
Constantinople (present-day Istanbul/Turke~) as Its caplt~l,
and control of the territory around the Mediterranean Basin,
the Ottoman Empire was at the centre and control of trad,e
interactions between the Eastern and Western World for SIX
centuries (1448-1923).

But that great empire declined and collapsed, lost its ~~wers
early in the 19th century. This was a result of the ~mbltlon ,of
endless acquisition of territories, and exha~stlon of Its
resources and powers in military expeditions against remna~ts
of the disintegrating members of the Holy Roman Empire
(Wilson, 1999).

The participation of the Ottoman Empire on the side of
Germany during the First World war, 1914-1919, and ~he
defeat of Germany at the war marked the end of the Empire.
Its territories were divided between Britain and F.ran?e (the
allied forces). Turkey, the only territory I~ft of the ~mplre was
victorious in its war of independence against the Allle? Forces.
After winning the war of independence, Tu~key abolished the
Ottoman and the Empire and the Monarchy In 1923. Tod~y the
narrative of the civilisation of Europe will be incomplete Without
the record of the Ottoman Empire. But the power of the
Ottoman Empire which bestrewed most part of prese.nt
Europe, like a colossus for six centuries (~448-1923) lost Its
powers: the Ottoman Imperial powers t~anslted to autonomous
states and the victorious allied forces In the w~~. The powers
of the almighty Ottoman Empire suffered transition and came
to an end in 1923.

We may add that revolutions also bring about the tr~nsition of
power: Russian revolution 1917; French .revolutlon 1779.
American Revolution 1786; Chinese revolution 1949. At the
end of each of the revolutions, power transited to a new ,~rde.r.
The revolution that brought about the new order was. politlcs In
another guise. Of importance is the deqree of the I~pact on
civilisations which marks every transition of ~?wer, part of
which will be a function of the nature of the politics. But from

27



emerges yet another base ofthe ashes of the transiting power I e
power and another power structu ( .

. . of empires should also be of
The agelong transitions of power" (lce more than it is presently.
partic~la: interest to .pol.itical SCi~ the powers of the temporal
Our .flndlngs .so far I~dlcate tha ,exity, nature and manner of
empires, their dynamism, comp ,cant subjects of research for
transition currently are not signif' need for greater focus,
politi~al science. Th~re. ~s .a ~tudy and research on power
consistency, and sustainability In 5 will assist us to understand
in all shapes and form. Such focJ,4 Africa. Let us examine the
the situation in Nigeria or indeeV'
case of Nigeria.

. . .. n of Power in Nigeria
Power Politics and the Transl.t~P(1 of power there is politics.
Between power and the transitic' litics is the handmaid of
Politi~~ medi~~es .transition. P~/1at shapes the nature and
transition. Politics IS the agent and how in the process of
manner of who gets what, when;rnines the success or failure
transiti?n of power. Politics dete the manner and shape of
of n~~lon-states, and. therefore pens in the political space,
tra~~ltlon of power. It IS what hafemPire or nation-state) that
politics at the level of the state transition of power.
determines the nature and form of

. . tlrch and publications on
Vice ..Chancellor, Sir, my .. res~ Nigeria indicate that while
trans~t~on of power an~ politics 1~8ken place in 1960 when
tr~nsl~lon of power ~~ght ha.ve pendent from Britain, no
Nlge~l~ becam~. politically mde tace in 1979 or 1999 when
transition of political power took ~ power to Nigerian elected
Nigerian mi.litary handed over st~t~~39; 1996}. While power
representatives (Onuoha 2002.1 ing the military transition
mi~~t have changed ha~~s dLJ~ower.What took place that
pOIl.tICS,there was no transition of ",er from military to elected
p~~I?d was. ~ .transfer of state poG not transition of power
civilian polJtlcl~ns.' and that walier discussed, theoretically,
(Onu?ha 2002.21 '. 19~6). As ear ~rnental change in attitudes,
transition refers primarily to a fund and their collectivities.
values and ethos of individualG

28

(Onuoha, 2002:20-21; 1996: 49-52). None of these took place
both in 1979 and 1999.

In order words, all the activities of the military from 1970 to
1979; 1983 to 1999 called transition programmes could be
events on a transition continuum. They were only transfer of
power from men in "khaki" to men in "agbada". It may quickly
be observed that those in "khaki" in quick succession
transformed to "Agbada"; or went into coalition with those in
"agbada" and accordingly reinforced the imm.edi.ate preceding
structure of power in spite of apparent constitutional cha.nges
to civilian rule. Such contraction or coalition will not merit the
concept of transition of power.

The question to raise in this lecture is: How does politics relate
to transition of power, or how does politics mediate or shape
transition of power, or what does politics make.?f the
transitions of power? How does politics handle transl~l?n? It
may be recalled, in the three earlier cases of t~ansltJon .of
power, including the transition of the power of Luclf~r ~o Child
Christ- God, politics failed, and war broke out; confirming war
as politics in another form or war as the failure of politics.

I want to report my finding of the Nigerian experience in te~s
of how politics handled or shaped transition of power by asking
some rhetorical questions: everything considered. ab~ut
Nigeria, especially her size, ~eterogeneity, .c.ultural diversity
including religion, language differences, polJtl~al ~eowaphy,
varied levels of social mobility, why did the Nlgenan pioneer
political leaders accept the Nigerian federal structure includin.g
its constitution at independence in 1960? What was the basis
of the optimism of the political leaders especially those from
the South (geographical South) that at independence they
would win election, control the federal government (state
power) and at the same time maintain a stable democracy?

Another related question: why were the political leaders from
the South surprised or disappointed at the results of the
elections of 1959 and 1964/65? Why the disappointment when

29



there were such a high degree of illiteracy and ignorance in
the country, a situation where essentially primordial
attachment explained or dictated electoral behaviour and
voting patterns? I go further to ask, why did the majority North
think it could sustain for a long time the power domination of
the South; the South which was getting more and better
educated, getting more urbanised, having higher social
mobility and overall development? Those indices of
modernisation and political development growing in the South
at the period under review, would increase chances of
resistance to hegemony and political domination by the North
(Deutsch, 1961: 493-514).

Nnamdi Azikiwe firstly, and Obafemi Awolowo in the second
order, had sufficient knowledge of, understood and
appreciated the structure, dynamics and complexities of state
power, they would not have accepted the federation of 1960,
even if they desired one Nigeria. In fact it was even the so
called minorities who pressed for greater balance of power
before independence.

The colonial masters threatened that independence would be
delayed if some of the political leaders insisted on the demand
for the creation of more regions (O'Connell, 1970:1017) before
independence. But if the Southern leaders adequately
understood the structure, and dynamics of power they were
going to confront, they would have preferred delay of the date
of independence to accepting independence under the three
regional structures at independence. With the three regional
structures, the North was twice the population of the South; it
had 54% of electoral seats in the parliament. Why did the
Southern leaders accept the three regional arrangements with
the Northern Region having a size and population larger than
the other two regions put together? That arrangement gave
the North greater political influence (political power) in a
country where representation was tied to population
(O'Connell, 1970: 1017).

'in the minds of the Southern leaders, there was the
hope that once the British withdrew, they would use
their control over the more developed part of the
economy and their lead in manpower skills to wrest
power from the North'(O'Connell, 1970: 1018).

A word about the use of the North and the South in this
lecture. The North in this lecture refers to the very dominant
power group in the North of Nigeria, the Hausa-Fulani (the
Fulani). The North excludes the area we call the Middle Belt.
The South refers to the East and the West of Nigeria. The
South excludes the area today referred to as the 'South- .

.South'. I am not unaware of the hundreds and tens of other
ethnic nationalities in both the North and the South at the
period under analysis, but the political leaders from the two
divides, North and South, were those involved more than 75%
of the time and period under review with the critical
competition and conflict in federal state power.

The picture of power in the minds of the Southern leaders was
simplistic and inaccurate. The Southern political leaders were
naive about the power implications of the 1960 federal
arrangement. Trying to explain it, O'Connell had this to say:

Vice Chancellor, Sir, part of the findings of my study is a
confirmation that at Nigerian independence, there was no real
and active nationalist flavour, partly because of the ethnic
divide among the autonomous nationalities who made up the
union. The political leaders did not understand the enormity of
the burden of sharing power in a divided society. And more
importantly, the political leaders, especially from the South
were simplistic and inaccurate about the structure and
dynamics of power to think that exactly under the federal
structure the British left behind in 1960, they would be able to
win elections to state power (the ultimate objective of political
parties), run government, and at the same time ensure
democracy and stable polity. If the political leaders, especially

30 31



This was a pipe dream, and one of the greatest proofs that the
Southern leaders were simplistic and inaccurate in their
judgment of power.

of power be respected and implemented by the colonial
masters? Thus, it is curious attempting to find out why the
political leaders of the South did not pay sufficient attention to
knowledge and understanding about the structure and
dynamics of power of Nigeria that was preparing for political
independence.

In fact, if the elements of power were fully recognised and
appreciated, the fear of domination which would emanate from
state power under the control of the North, would have driven
the Southern politicians to civil unrest or even to arms to
forestall the inevitable conflict and instability in the future if the
federation were left in the structure of 1960 Constitution. The
inevitable struggle for power and the accompanying instability
could have been avoided in the first place.

It may be observed that at the time, perhaps the leaders were
young and inexperienced, and ill-prepared to fully understand
and manage the competition for power in such a plural society
like Nigeria. Also, they had no effective strategy to prevent the
crises and conflicts which would attend to the imbalance of
power at independence. Thus, if 'politics as a theoretical
study is concerned with the relation of man, in association and
competition, submission, and control, in so far as they seek,
not the production and consumption of some articles but to
have their way with their fellows'; and if ·... what men seek in
their political negotiation is power' (Lasswell and Kaplan,
1976:75), why were' the political leaders of the South so
Simplistic' 'and inaccurate .about power, the most single
objective of their participation in party politics?

Every activity of government under the 1960 Constitution, or
any constitution for that matter, will require the application of
power in one form or the other. The place of power in
situations of competition and conflict within the state is familiar
to scholars, power must be employed in one way or the other
(Etzioni, 1970: 18). This is to say that there was no way the,

.pioneer political leaders would have avoided power
competition or struggle, because power appears both in
competition which is inevitable in a federation and in conflict
which goes with competition. Thus, power arises in political
position of some kind. If we add the crises and conflicts of
plural societies like Nigeria, to the competition and conflicts
inherent in power, why was the issue of state power so
culpably ignored by the Southern political leaders?

Vice Chancellor, Sir, this lecture does not intend to suggest
that power answers every political problem of Nigeria, or that
every problem of Nigeria is related to power or struggle for
power. But according to Etzioni, 'the realization of most
societal and political goals, even in situations in which the
actor's commitment and knowledge are considerable, require
the application of power'. Thus 'to make power a central
element of social and political analyses is not to assume that
other elements are less important. But it is to emphasize that
every of those goals, values and resources in the service of
society must be mediated by state power (emphasis mine)
(Etzioni, 1970: 18, 22). Therefore, no political leader can afford
to lose attention of the ubiquity and indispensability of power
or what the structure of power portends in every political
activity or every political negotiation.

Vice Chancellor, Sir, the attempt here is to re-emphasis the
centrality of power in the Nigerian federal arrangement; and
indeed in any federation at all, and express surprise that the
pioneer political leaders from the South failed to recognise the
central and dynamic nature of power manifest in that federal
structure. In fact, one of the definitions of a federal system of
government is that it is an arrangement for the balanced
distribution of power among the federating units in a political
system; an attempt to settle power relationship among
federating units (Wheare, 1964:10). Why did the Southern
political leaders not insist that the federal principle of balance

3332



And so, with such awesome exposition about the nature of
power, so much dread and warning about its abuse which is
prevalent, and the obvious structural imbalance of power in the
Nigerian federation, why did the political leaders from the
South of Nigeria, victims of power imbalance, not insist on the
acceptable balanced structure of power of the federation
before independence in 1960? The power distribution
conferred definite power advantage to some, or did not allow
even distribution of power. This is also intriguing because as I
may observe, at the eve of independence, Nigerian political
leaders did not have the leadership qualities of George
Washington (of America), or Nehru or Gandhi (of India),
Bismarck (of Germany), Ataturk (of Turkey), or even N.kru~ah
of Ghana or Nyerere of Tanzania, examples of netionelists
who built their nations (Onuoha, 2010).

In India, for instance, Nehru told the Pakistanis that they could
have their own country, if they so desired to pull out of a
proposed federation of India and Pakistan. This was ~~er
Nehru had considered the deep religious and cultural divide
between the Indian section and the Pakistani section of the old
India federation kept together by the British colonial masters.
But before the Pakistanis could be allowed to go, they had
fought for self-determination through every conceivable
means, mass civil disobedience, boycotts, burning of
government buildings, and "fasting to death" (Young, 1983:
298-301). In East African Federation/Federal of Nyasaland:
made up of Nyasaland (Malawi), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia)
and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), the leaders were
confronted with such choice as Nigeria between 1951 and
1960, to form one country or separate and independent
countries. The East African leaders insisted on long term
benefits, which was to form as independent states.

The federal structure that was emerging from 1950 to 1959 in
Nigeria merited very serious rejection by every means,
including resistance by sustained mass protests, organized by
political leaders of the South because of imbalance in power
structure, and attendant power domination, competition and

34

conflict which would be inevitable. This did not happen
primarily because the young and inexperienced political
leaders had little knowledge about the nature and structure of
power, and so did not understand or appreciate the dynamics
of power, and what would be their implications or
manifestations after political independence.

There might have been other reasons the Southern leadership
accepted the structure by the British colonial masters. But the
most potent according to the thesis of my lecture is the pioneer
political leaders' lack of knowledge and understanding of the
structure and dynamics of power The greatest challenge to the
study of power and having the knowledge to resolve
imbalance was the inability of the two foremost political
leaders of the South, Azikiwe and Awolowo, to agree on a
common interest that would guide their working together. More
about Zik than Awolowo, it appeared the dictum or the
principle in politics about "no permanent friend, no permanent
foe, but permanent interest" did not resonate. If that age-old
"principle in politics had been taken into account, the very fear
of the structure and dynamics of power in the new
independent country, even by 1958 when the North had got
over 50% of legislative seats, would have driven Zik foremost,
then" Awolowo, into working out some strategy of common
interest between both of them and their followers to correct the
fundamental structural defect in power distribution in the
federal constitution. Unfortunately, the political history of
Nigeria we know is replete with reasons the two could not
agree, and common ground could not be found.

But in politics, the fear of power is the beginning of wisdom.
The consciousness that there is a power structure with some
imbalance in its distribution will provoke fear. The fear would
have been sufficient to instigate the Southern pOlitical leaders
to work together to correct the imbalance. A Simplistic and
inaccurate picture of power in the minds of the pioneer
Southern political leaders came about because of this lack of
wisdom gained from knowledge, and it is why power

35



imbalance was not resolved and is still creating instability and
political disorder to this day.

The other circumstances which may explain why the Southern
political leaders accepted withou~ major ~e~!sta~c~. ~he
structure given to them included, firstly the Initial inhibiting
factors of heterogeneity of ethnic nationalities; the second, a~d
very serious too, is the British divide and rule and separatist
policies. The divide and rule tactics of the colonial masters
ensured that Nigerians were not united, they struggled for
power, and distrusted each other, and so no cohesi~e
nationalist leadership. These further accentuated ethnic
differences and did not allow the development of an ideology
or some sense of nationalism. Indeed, from the details of
colonial politics, studies of pluralism, and known national
integration theories, the basis of Nigerian successful federal
experiment was weak (Onuoha, 2010).

. If the odds were so much against a successful experiment of
Nigeria federalism' of 1960, because of power imbalance,
where was the optimism of Zik, and subsequently Awolowo,
for instance, that there would be stable competition for power
in Nigeria after political independence? This questi~n becomes
germane because by their different backgrounds Zlk, and also
Awo, who had Western education must have been aware of
the nature and problem of plural societies, and the difficulty of
successful negotiation of power in a divided multi-ethnic
federation. They also would have been aware that these
differences in religion, culture, norms and values became
more pronounced as the society modernised. In or~er wor~s,
successful negotiation of power would be more difficult with
modernisation and political development because citizens
would be more conscious of the fault lines which got more
pronounced (Deutsch, 1961: 493-514).

Their knowledge of the divides would have led Zik in particular,
'followed by Awolowo (and other leaders of the South), to reject
the federal arrangement. But they did not. As a reason, for
their choices, they might have considered their times, positions

36

,

and advantages in history as pioneers. Zik and Awolowo were
the "new men", displacing traditional/aristocratic institutions in
the South, which could have likely taken over power from the
British at Nigerian independence (as was the case in the
North). So, early enough, Zik and Awolowo (and other political
leaders of the South) antlclpated their new role. They were
certain that they had worked hard enough to inherit power. In
other words, they were preoccupied with the self-interest of
new positions of power in a new nation; but thoughtless about
the limits of their powers under the very difficult structure of
power, with a11the imbalance which the British had instituted
(Onuoha, 2010: 47).

Vice Chancellor, Sir, my study came to the conclusion that if
Zik firstly, and Awolowo in second order, were the reigning
Alaafi, Oni, Oba, Obi (or Princes of any of the thrones) who
had controlled and tasted power, and superintended the affairs
of the citizens of their different Kingdoms in the South, and
were in the posluonto negotiate independence with the British,
they would' have negotiated hard enough between 1950 and
1959 to retain their separate kingdoms. This would be their
likely positions because they would have been more used to
the independent exercise of power. This is regardless of the
fact that they had been wearied by inter-ethnic and intertribal
wars at the dawn of colonialism, and also, they had lost their
kingdoms to colonialism. If those were the monarchical and/or
aristocratic positions of Zik and Awolowo, they would have
been more used to the exercise of power, and would not have
wanted to relinquish their powers to a new central authority
which would subordinate and dominate them after the
departure of the colonial masters.

Conversely, this position of the "new men" as political upstarts
largely explains why the head of the Northern political
leadership, a prince, and grandchild of Uthman Dan Fodio, a
prince of "the Caliphate" itself, was less enthusiastic about a
federation with the South because he appreciated the power
implications. In the North, there was an established structure
of power. The Emirs and traditional aristocracy retained their

37



powers under British colonial rule. Also, the literature suggests
that the Aristocracy were made to understand that they would
succeed the British at independence (O'Connell, 1970: 1017).
The implication was that they would not have accepted a
federation of Nigeria if they would be subordinated to the rule
by any other nationality of the federation. And the British would
have been in greater difficulty forcing the North into the federal
arrangement, unlike their readiness to put the British man-of-
war standing alert near the coast of Lagos when Obafemi
Awolowo threatened that West Region would reject the
federation if Lagos were not created part of Western Region
(Ezra, 1960: 182-186, 189).

badly rocked not only once, but several times. . .' (Kirk-
Greene, 1971: '197), the North was still sceptical about the
success of a federation of Nigeria as structured in the 1960
Constitution. The reasons for scepticism rested on the nature
and exercise of power; the fear of losing power and how power
might be exercised by other members of the federation. The
Northern leadership, traditionally and in keeping with Royalty,
was not prepared for subordinate power position in the
federation.

For instance, the structure of the federation, in 1960 gave
room for gerrymander: the Northern region was bigger in size
of population than the other two put together. The electoral
constituencies were divided according to the size of the
population, 54: 46 North and South ratio. This meant that even
before any federal election was conducted, the result was
known. Of course, electoral victory would confer state power;
and every resource and value allocation in the state would
depend on state power, the control of which was predictable,
by the arrangeme.ntof the 1960 Constitution. '

Therefore, political leaders of the North were reluctant
"federalists". When they were under British colonial pressure
to federate with the South, they brought their Royalties
(Emirs), or those the Emirs endorsed, to participate in colonial
government preparatory to taking over federal state power.
They did not bring, upstarts; or "new men". Crawford Young
observed this When he remarked that confronted with a clear
threat of incorporation into subordinate status to an Africanized
Nigeria (hitherto, in the eyes of the Caliphate, the Nigerian
federal project was subordinate to the Emirate system), the
Emirate power structure recruited a political elite from within
the traditional aristocracy to represent the North. The elite then
mobilised the people culturally around the symbol of Islam,
traditional hierarchy and speech community (Young, 1983:
301). This was confirmed by the first representatives of the
North in the House of Representatives in 1946 (they had no
elected members). They were the Emir of Gwandu, Emir of
Kastina, Emir of Abuja, and the Atta of Igbirra (Clark, 1991:
97). This is a demonstration of knowledge and mastery of the
dynamics and trajectory of power, the access, the
management and control of power by the Northern political
leadership.

Therefore, with political power shifting to the Centre by 1960,
the real levers of power were actually to be found in the North.
With 54/46 majority ration, the North was structurally in control
o! federal .state ~ower. Federal super-ordination, to put it
differently, In practice turned out to be Northern domination ...
(th.us) the undisputed fact remained; federal supremacy had
shifted the balance of political power in favour of the North and
NPC. So, the struggle for power was no longer competitive,
~ut su:ucturally detennined (Dudley 1966: 16-29). It is
instructive to ask, were the Southern political leaders
conscious of the structurally determined power arrangement?
Mostly unlikely. The situation was not helped by the fact that
the other two regions, the East and the West (later three
regions, the Mid- West) could not form an effective alliance to
check the power of the biggest unit. Partly because of the
inability of Zik and Awolowo to reach understanding and work
together. It was also because of other dynamics, including
personal or group interests like the 'minorities', and other

It is important to observe that up to 1966 when General
Yakubu Gowon made the broadcast that there was no basis
for Nigerian unity: that 'the base for unity is not there or is

38 39



concerns in the same power struggle. As only power could
check power, and there was no other state power, except that
controlled by the dominant unit, frustration set in, and conflict
and instability became inevitable (Onuoha, 2010: 49).

Vice Chancellor, Sir, in spite of their credible achievements for
their peoples, and generously recorded in history, both
Nnamdi Zik and Obafemi Awolowo at varying degrees, stand
classified among those in whose minds the picture of power is
"simplistic and inaccurate". From my study, it is evident neither
Nnamdi Azikiwe in particular, nor Obafemi Awolowo
sufficiently understood what was going to be the dynamics of
the power structure of that federal arrangement in the 1960
Constitution (Onuoha, 2010: 49-50).

Both Zik and Awolowo at various times between 1960 and
1966 had some bitter taste of federal state power. The one
during the 1964 general election when it would have become
clearer to Zik that he had no powers beyond the ceremoniat, to
callthe winner of the erection (Abubakar Tafawa Balewa) to
form 'a government (Onuoha, 2010:·49-50). Earlier Zik had left
the Eastern Region in 1960 where he was the Premier of the
Region to become Governor- General at the Centre where he
had no real powers. The other, Obafemi Awolowo during his
ordeal in the Western Region in 1962, where he also made the
same mistake of leaving his region where he was the Premier
to become Leader of the Opposition at the Federal House of
Assembly where he had no powers. In that process, Awolowo
lost his power base even before his ordeal in 1962 (Sklar,
1966: 118).

But unlike Zik and Awolowo, Ahmadu Bello never lost sight of
the Centre of power in the federal arrangement even before
the Ibadan General Constitutional Conference of 1950 (Ezera,
1960: 115). At the Ibadan Conference, the North got more
than half the seats in the new central legislature: the North
174, the East 74, the West 62, Lagos 3: a condition the North
gave in order to be part of the federation (Ezera, 1960: 256).
That secured, and understanding the structure and the

40

constellations of power, Ahmadu Bello did not leave his base
in the North, because his base in the North influenced and
shaped the dynamics and configurations of power at the
Centre. Instead, he sent a second in position to represent his
Region at the Centre, while he stayed back to guide against
any crack on his hold of power in the North.

Accordingly, he ensured the consolidation of his power base
which was critical in maintaining control of the Centre. And
because he had control of the central legislature, he
subordinated the Centre to the control of the Northern and
NPC (Dudley, 1966: 16-29). If Awolowo for instance, had
stayed back as Premier of Western Region, the chances of the
crisis in the Western Regions in 1962 would have been
considerably reduced. Or the crisis would have taken a
different shape which Awolowo as Premier would have been in
the power position to contain. These cases expose differences
in knowledge, understanding and appreciation of power, the
one from the South, and the other from the North (Onuoha,
:2010: 59).· .

Nevertheless, the North had its own misjudgment of power. In
the Indian case, it was Nehru who, having been convinced that
the Muslim Society of Pakistan and Hindu India would not
work a stable federation because of sharp plural divide,
accepted that Pakistan could go, thus the "partition" of India in
1947 (Young, 1983: 301). The Northern Region of Nigeria at
the Ibadan Conference in 1950, could have opted to go it
alone as was the constant reminder during any sharp
differences with the South. Access to the sea could be
negotiated later in the conferences since this was an attraction
to the Union (Ezera, 1960: 182-3). However, the North might
have thought, in error, that taking control of half the seats of
the future legislature would be sufficient to guarantee the
control of state power. Events from the Tiv riots and Western
Region crisis for instance, and the civil war later, all under six
years of independence. show that competition and conflict in
power. especially when unbalanced could be debilitating. The
events also showed that quest for self-determination was

41



endle~s, especially in a deeply and culturally divided society.
More Importantly, those events of self-determination indicated
that control of the South by the North would involve more crisis
and instability in the future because the South was getting
better and more educated, more SOCially mobile and
urbanized; and were made up of SOCiallyconscious "agitators"
and "troublemakers" (Onuoha, 2010: 50). Such a group will
not accept domination for too long, because the desire for
freedom is unquenchable for a group so pOliticallyconscious.

Therefore, according to my study, it was not tribalism,
ethnicity, or nepotism which was creating instability and
disorder. Rather, it was lack of adequate knowledge about the
structure and dynamics of power, and thus the inability to
resolve power distribution mechanism which have been
r~spo.nsible for the other crises and conflicts bedevilling
Nigeria. These have made political order and development

. .unachievable. And the disabilities have been made more
serious by the factthat political science as a diSCiplinehas not
faugl:ttanQeducated SOCietyabout state power.. .

Vice Chancellor, Sir, the creation of regions in Nigeria, military
coups and counter-coups, the creation of states, the Nigerian
civil war, 'June 12' 1993, the call for resource control, and the
demand for restructuring, all have one thing in common. They
are demands for an acceptable mechanism for the distribution
of power among the federating units in Nigeria. That these
calls .have remained persistent for more than half a century
after Independence, is evidence that power imbalance appears
a serious political tumour in Nigeria. And until a mechanism for
an equitable distribution of power is brought about and
instituted, Nigeria will remain terminally unstable or may evenatrophy.

And this is why the Military Who are experts in military power,
but creators of the most unacceptable power imbalance in
Nigeria, may be considered the worst managers of state power
of the federation. The military from 1966 were the reasons
inequitable power distribution mechanism has persisted, and

42

destabilising Nigeria. The military, by usurpation o! state.power
in 1966, by its politics, policies and programm~s, includinq the
making of constitutions, exacerbated. power Imbalance, and
thus created more crises and conflicts between 1979 and
present than there were crisis between 1960 and 1966.

Power Politics and Transition of Power in Nigeria: Military
Aftermath 1 . . I
The control of state power after the military coup, mlllta~ ru e
and the civil war, 1966-1979 and 1983-1999,.f!1ayco~vement!y
be broken into two - the long period of military dlctat~r~~lp
the military bloc), 1966-1979 and 1983 -1999; a~.d CIVIlian

~ule 1979-1983 and 1999 to present. Under the milItary bloc,
stat~ power was concentrated at the Centre and under .,-:",hat
could be referred to as military central command. That r:nllltary
was under the control of the North except the short periods of
Major General Aguiyi Ironsi, January-July 1966, and Gene~al
Olusegun Obasanjo July 1975-September 1979. Under t e
civilian politicians, the cqncentratio~ ~f po~e~ ~t the Centre by .
the Constitufionsrirawn by the military. m~lblted th~ proper
functioning of federalism. The constl~utl~ns denied the
federating units autonomy and selt-determination.

Vice Chancellor, Sir, the events that led to. the military
takeover of state power in 1966 were inherent m.the.federal
Constitution of 1960. By that structure of po~er,. Nigeria could
not have escaped the competition and confll~t m power from
1960 to 1966 which ended in a military coup m January 19~6.
And while th~ power struggle amon~ the politician~ wa~ ~omg
on the political leaders did not seriously and natlonal.lstlca.lly
endeavour to genuinely correct the power i.mba!ance,m spite
of the creation of the Mid-Western Region In 1963. The
attention of the political leaders was to outsmart or out
manoeuver each other in the struggle for cont.rolof powe~.The
struggle was not necessarily to correct the Imba.lanc.e.m the
power structure. This was another instance of a ~~mpllstlcand
inaccurate picture of power in the minds of political le~d~rs,
especially those from the South who evidently were the victims
of power imbalance.

43



It is.impo.rtantto add that power domination was real within the
reqrons, Internal to the regions, especially in the East and the
North after t~e c~eation of Mid-Western Region from the
Western Reqion In 1963. This was part of the original
we~kness of the 1960 federation which the minorities fought
agalns~e~en be~~reIndependence, as recorded by the Willink
CommIssIon (Wllllnk Commission Report, 1958). The political
leaders of the So~th, the East Region in particular, did not
un~erstand tha.t In. p~wer considerations, creating more
reqions at ~hattIme In history of Nigeria, like was done in the
West Repion was directly enhancing and protecting the
~uto.no~y of all the ot~er regions. However, the larger
Impllcatlo~s of the power Imbalance in the federation vis-a-vis
the F~lan~.and others was not clear or properly understood by
t~~ mmormos who largely.and committedly fought the Nigerian
cIvIl war, 1967-1970 which was essentially war to balance
power, as fully demonstr~ted. in the 'Aburi Accord' (in Ghana,
1967) betwe~n the Nlgenan Military Government and
Odumegwu OJ~kwuwho represented Biafra. Perhaps in a way
to correct the. imbalance, after the fall of the First Republic in .
1966,. the. military created states in 1967, and other such
exercises In 1976, 1987, 199~, 1992 an? 1995. But the irony
~as that each state creation exercise introduced more
Imbalance by centralising more powers. More centralisation
reduced furth.er th~. powers of the federating units, and
w~akened th.elrparticipanon as viable members of the federal
u~l?n. C~rtalnly, the federating units were weaker under the
military since 1999 than they were between 1960 and 1966.

In my ~ork of 2015, I identified the regional powers that were
centralised by the militray. The powers included legislative
powers over matters, and the powers to appropriate economic
resou~ce~ and revenues, that is fiscal autonomy (1960
Constitutlon, The Schedule, Part 11: The Concurrent Lists)
(Onuoha, 2015: 76-77). Furthermore, while the Executive List
reserved for the Centre in the 1960 Constitution had 44 items
the Con~urrent.List had 28. The 1960 Constitution also had
the R.esl.dualLIst exercised by the Regions. The Nigerian
Constttutlon 1979 was more or less the same as the 1999

Constitution of the Federal Republic. The Federal Government
of 1979 lasted only four years, overthrown on December 31st
1983.

Also in the 1999 Constitution, the Central Government controls
virtually all the legislative powers, 68 of them contained in the
Exclusive List, while the States take part only in 12 items
under which the Centre also legislates; and in which the
Centre has overriding powers in cases of inconsistency (1999
Constitution of Nigeria). Significantly, in the Constitution of
1999, the power to allocate fiscal resources is wholly vested in
the federal government through the Revenue Mobilisation
Allocation and Fiscal Commission (1999 Constitution, Third
Schedule, Part 1, N.). The Commission is a Federal Executive
Body appointed by and responsible to the Central
Government. One of the key functions is to review, from time
to time, the revenue allocation formula, and the principles in
operation to ensure conformity with changing realities (1999
Constitution, Third Schedule, Part 1, N. Sec. 32 b).

In addition, the Federal Government maintains other accounts
in which state governments have no part; or allocations are at
the pleasure of the Central Government. These include
consolidated funds, that is, funds of the federation,
subaccounts or special funds accounts which include funds
like the national wealth fund, ecological fund, the petroleum
trust fund and the educational trust fund. These are funds
which only the Centre has powers to expend or allocate.
These further confer disproportionate powers on the Centre
against the federating states. With these exclusive accounts,
the Centre can allocate resources, values and patronages as it
pleases (Onuoha, 2015: 76-77).

According to the observation made in my study, the implication
of the exclusive accounts is that power to allocate resources is
no longer coordinate as in federation; instead, the Central
Government has disproportionate control over national
resources; and this is at a time derivation principle gave the
federating units only 13% as opposed to 50% in 1960-1966.

44 45



· Also o! greater co~cern t? the elements of 'federal spirit' was
that. this fiscal policy, which was unitary in nature and under
the Influence of the military rule, got entrenched in the 1979
and 1999 Constitutio~s .. Also I observed also that another
aspect of overcentralizatlon of state power which frustrated
many of th? federating units was the fact that the Federal
Centre, which had. all the power, was most of the time
co~t~olled by a faction of a dominant group in Nigeria whose
policles and ?ro~rammes intensified structural imbalance of

· power; includinq In the attempt to take over local government
· by the 1976 local government refonn. (Onuoha, 2015: 77).

Powe~~nthe Creation of Local Government
In addition to overcentralisation of powers in the Constitutions
of 1999, the Central Government took over legislation for local
go~ernments (reform/creation of local governments in 1976).
ThIs was ~ne of t~e strongest indications of the centralization
of po.wers In the ~Igerian federation. It is important to observe
thatl~ a federation, the creation of local government is an
exercise :of power. The debate in Nigerian federalism is
whether the Central Government has powers to legislate on
10c?1~overnment in any form, whether in their creation
legIslatIon or administration. '

The reform of the local government system became
entrenched in both the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions (as
amended). Th!s reform and the subsequent creation of local
governments IS an aspect of centralisation of power which
state governments have contested since 1979 (Onuoha
2016) .•Many of the state governments, especially those i~
opposition to the party at the Centre, created their own local
~oyer.n~ents and/or challenged in Court of competent
jurisdiction the Federal Government reform of the local
government of 1976. Some of the states created what they
referred ~o ~s Local Council Development Areas (LCDA); a
subtle re~ectlon of military government usurpation of laws on
the creation and administration of the local government system
from the State governments. On the whole, with the

46

centralisation of 774 local governments, there are 412 (418
with Abuja) in the North and 355 in the South. (Onuoha, 2016).

It must be emphasized that the reform and creation of local
governments since 1976 has been by military fiat; and in
violation of the principles of federalism. If Nigerian political
scientists were conscious of the dynamics of power,
knowledgeable about the nature of power, no political scientist
would sit on a military government panel to recommend that in
the federation of Nigeria, the Central Government should
create local governments. Local government is an entity of
power belonging to the federating units. Thus, in political
science, we cannot be demanding 'fiscal federalism', 'true
federalism', 'restructuring of the federation', and at the same
time supporting the central government taking over the
creation of and legislation over local government in any guise.

The last local government creation was under the military
Government of General Sani Abacha in 1996. A very sticky
question has remained since the Federal Military Government
creation of local government in 1976; a question to which no
satisfactory answer has been provided: it is about the disparity
between Lagos and Kano. Lagos is 14 million in population
with 20 local governments; Kano is 12 million in population
with 44 local governments (1999 Constitution). How does the
Federal Government explain or defend the disparity and
inequity in the cases of Lagos and Kano? Also, the parameters
used in the creation of local governments was never
negotiated with other groups or interests in the federation.
Also, note must be taken that the local government system
currently is constitutionally a factor in the allocation of federal
resources. In that respect, there is further institution of
imbalance of power.

Accordingly, because of the imbalance in the local government
structure, the present local government system is a substantial
resource disadvantage to many units of the federation. The
reform was an exercise of power by the military bloc. And the
military bloc itself was a centralised organisation well-known

47



for its command structures which was not appropriate for a
federation and democratic practice.

which was not the case between 1960 and 66. So the power
imbalance presently is further exacerbated. The lesson. of
power, and my emphasis is to expose the extent to which
federal state power can be deployed by the Central
Government by usurping the power to create the local
government. When Nigerians agitate for the autonomy of local
governments, according to the reform of 1976, or when th~re
is a call for the creation of more local governments, according
to the reform of 1976, how many political leaders, particularly
from the South recognise the problem of further power
imbalance